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Scope and motivation 
The damages caused by human activities to the environment have become an increasingly important 
concern. Examining the post world-war II period, it clearly appears that the human perception of the 
environment has changed radically. A simple look through newspapers, programs of political parties, 
claims of interest groups, research agendas of scientists is witness to the claim that most people now 
consider that the existence of humans ultimately depends on the planet’s natural capital, which 
provides all necessary ecological services and natural resources.   
Focusing on economics, the links between economic activity and the environment constitute a long-
standing debate and, not surprisingly, a vast literature exists concentrating on this relationship. It may 
be caricaturized by the opposition between the "Grow or die" economic maxim to the belief that the 
actual path of economic development and the run for ever increasing level of prosperity were 
unsustainable ultimately jeopardizing human welfare.  
This debate rested essentially on theoretical arguments and on simulations until the beginning of the 
nineties. As economists were able to gather data on the environment for larger samples of countries 
and income levels, empirical work boomed and revealed a surprising result: some important indicators 
of environmental quality such as the level of sulfur dioxide and particulates in the air actually improved 
as incomes and levels of consumption went up. Evidence began to mount that as countries develop, 
certain measures of quality of life might initially deteriorate but then improve.  
The relationship between rising levels of prosperity and environmental quality remain however 
controversial. Currently, the flood of papers, articles and books covering the issue refutes the 
conjecture that the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality could be simple, 
unambiguous or fully understood.  
The main objective and motivation of this dissertation is thus to offer additional empirical evidence on 
this issue. It more particularly examines if pollution levels may decouple from economic growth beyond 
a threshold income level. In economic jargon, this dissertation intends to examine the likelihood of the 
Environmental Kuznets Curves (EKC) hypothesis. Our motivation is based on the two following 
established facts derived from the EKC literature. 
First, the empirical studies on the EKC are numerous and estimate the relationship between gross 
domestic product per capita and various measures of environmental quality, for various countries and 
time periods leading to heterogeneous results. Actually, the evidence seems so diverse that traditional 
reviewing practices face considerable difficulties in establishing precise conclusions from this body of 
work. They thus either offer only broad results or/and ignore part of the pertinent studies. 
Second, during most of the nineties, the empirical research on the EKC focused on deriving reduce-
form relationships where gross domestic product (GDP) per capita acts as a catch-all surrogate 
variable for all environmental quality changes that take place with economic development. However, 
the recent theoretical models explaining the EKC now offer much deeper considerations on the link 
between income levels and environmental quality. More particularly, they underline the prime 
importance of the assumptions regarding the evolution of environmental preferences, abatement costs 
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or technological development. However, from an empirical point of view, the underlying forces that 
possibly shape the pollution-income relationship have not been subject to much consideration. 
In order to shed some light on these two issues, our dissertation is organized in four chapters that may 
be read separately. 
 
Chapter synopsis 
The first chapter presents and identifies the issue and questions that this dissertation aims to examine. 
The objectives of this introductory chapter are twofold. First, it intends to offer an explanation of the 
theoretical basis behind the EKC hypothesis. It more particularly insists on the variation in the demand 
for and the supply of environmental quality in explaining the possible shape of the pollution-income 
relationship. It thus directly justifies the attention devoted to the evolution of environmental 
preferences and abatement costs with income growth in the subsequent part of this thesis. Secondly, 
it aims to give a brief and critical overview of the empirical foundations, data sources and techniques 
that have been used in order to estimate the EKC. At this point, the empirical results available in the 
literature are not considered.  
The second chapter intends to fill this latter gap. It is devoted to the detailed overview of the empirical 
results on the EKC by mean of a meta-analysis. It addresses thus the first issue that motivates this 
dissertation, i.e. the difficulties in establishing precise conclusions from the empirical literature on the 
EKC. The meta-analytical technique consists in using the statistical toolbox in order to assess the 
similarities and differences across a large collection of empirical results. In our setting, we intend to 
examine the causes of the variations in the shape of the estimated pollution-income relationships as 
well as the values of the income-turning points estimated by the EKC empirical studies by three 
distinct econometric procedures (a multinomial logit model, a tobit model and a nested logit model). 
The meta-analysis is able to consider the great majority of the available EKC studies and therefore 
offers a rigorous alternative to the casual and narrative discussions of the primary empirical studies. 
Overall, the estimates show that the empirical results available on the EKC are far from stable and 
recurrent across studies and point out the factors that are likely to have a considerable impact on the 
estimates. It concludes that the results, and thus the conclusions, of the empirical studies on the EKC 
vary considerably across pollutant types, the sample of countries considered as well as the 
econometric specifications used. 
The third and four chapters of this dissertation focus on the second issue rose above: the empirical 
examination of the underlying forces behind the EKC. Hence, the third chapter intends to estimate the 
relationship between the demand for environmental quality and income levels. It thus focuses on the 
determinants of the environmental preferences of individuals. Indeed, the EKC theories postulate that, 
as people become richer and attain higher levels of welfare, they may value environmental quality 
more relative to other consumption goods. This demand effect may lead people to desire more 
environmental quality. However, this theoretical hypothesis has seldom been tested empirically as 
there are considerable difficulties in grasping some expressions of the individual demand for 
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environmental quality. We intend to examine this question by using data on the voting decisions of 
Swiss citizens on environmental issues. Several referenda are examined covering widely different 
aspects of environmental quality (nuclear electricity production, taxation of energy, liberalization of the 
electricity market, traffic reduction). We use a bivariate probit model accounting for selection bias since 
we could only observe the voting choice of the citizens that actually participated in the referenda. Our 
results show that the income level of individuals has only a moderate influence on their propensity to 
cast a “Yes” vote. Other characteristics of individuals such as their age and their level of education 
appear to be stronger and more systematic determinants of their environmental preferences. We also 
find a selection effect adverse to environmental initiatives, as people who are more likely to participate 
are also more likely to refuse environmental initiatives. Overall, at the microeconomic level, income 
does not appear to be a strong determinant of the demand for environmental quality. The evidence are 
not thus favorable for the demand related explanation of the EKC.  
The fourth and final chapter of the present dissertation examines the relationship between income 
levels and the costs associated with the preservation of environmental quality. Indeed, theoretical 
models show that if the costs of abating pollution decrease with economic growth, this may favor the 
decoupling of pollution. This article intends to empirically test this assumption in the case of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions. It relies on the estimation of production frontiers by the method called “data 
envelopment analysis”. This technique allows to model the production processes characterized by the 
joint production of desirable outputs and undesirable pollution flows and to compute the macro-
economic marginal costs of abatement of CO2 emissions in a sample of developing and developed 
countries. The latter is defined as the amount of consumption or gross domestic product forgone in 
order to abate the last ton of CO2 emitted. Two results are noticeable. First, when each country is 
considered as efficient (relative to other units), the macro-economic marginal costs of CO2 abatement 
are a decreasing function of per capita income levels. Second, the most inefficient units, i.e. the ones 
who could reduce emission at no cost, have on average greater pollutant intensities. Overall, it 
appears thus that rich and heavy polluted economies face lower macro-economic abatement costs 
and should thus be more prone to devote resources for abatement. This latter result is in line with the 
EKC hypothesis. 
 
Definitions 
This dissertation rests on the following basic assumptions and definitions. First, we adopt a human-
based or anthropocentric-utilitarian position vis-à-vis the value of the environment. This means that 
environmental services have a value if the latter is attributed to them by humans (the moral reference 
class). In such an ethical view, the environment is not considered as possessing an intrinsic value 
independent of the existence of humans. Adopting an anthropocentric approach implies that the value 
of the environment is purely instrumental and subjective as it depends solely on those who assigned it. 
Thus, any consequence on the environment is qualified as bad if it alters its state for the worse of 
humans and protecting the environment ultimately means the protection of human wellbeing. This 
anthropocentric-utilitarian perspective is obvious in the economic models used in this dissertation 
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where change in environmental quality is valued by the variation in utility humans directly or indirectly 
derive from it.   
In this setting, the term “environment” refers to the physical and biological environment. It is defined as 
the stocks and flows of water, soil and air as well as the animal and vegetal communities that shape 
the human existence and habitat.  The origin of pollution is considered as purely anthropocentric. 
Pollution is defined as all harmful consequences of human activities that adversely affect the state of 
the environment. Environmental quality is taken to be a measure of the absence of pollution. 
The term prosperity refers to the process of income growth either at the macroeconomic or 
microeconomic scale. In this dissertation, we will not consider the distinction between development 
and economic growth. Henceforth, these terms will be considered as synonymous. Note however that, 
in the economic literature, the notion of development is not reduced to economic or income growth but 
refers to qualitative increases in the standard of living. Thus, the process of economic growth may or 
may not induce development. Economic growth may indeed generate non-monetary negative 
consequences so that the standard of living decreases (Daly, 1992). Therefore, if we were disposing 
of some measure of development or, at least, some measure of GDP that are environmentally 
adjusted, the EKC issue would be meaningless.   
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this introductory chapter is twofold. First, it intends to review the main theoretical 
explanations of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) and explains why a declining relationship 
between income levels and indicators of pollution may be expected when a certain level of 
development has been reached. The second objective is to offer a short overview of the 
characteristics of the empirical literature on the EKC. Throughout this chapter, no particular attention is 
devoted to the empirical results on the EKC since the second chapter is devoted to their detailed 
comparison and overview through a meta-analysis. 
The introductory chapter of this dissertation is structured as follows. Section 1 offers a brief overview 
of the EKC hypothesis. Section 2 reviews the theoretical literature on the possible causes of the 
downturn of the EKC. It highlights in particular that the level of pollution observed in an economy may 
be apprehended by the interaction between the benefit (the demand for) and the costs (the supply of) 
of environmental quality. Section 3 explains the principal characteristics of the empirical EKC studies. 
It focuses on the empirical estimation techniques, the functional forms used, the available pollution 
and income data as well as the explanatory variables considered for estimating pollution-income 
relationships1 (PIR).  Overall, section 3 constitutes a prerequisite to the meta-analytical approach 
followed in chapter 2. Finally, a brief conclusion summarizes the content of this first chapter. 
 
1 Economic growth, environmental quality and the EKC 
Since Meadow et al’s Limits to Growth (1972), there has been a spate of research on the relationship 
between the economy and the environment. More recently, much work has focused on deriving 
reduced form empirical relationships between income and various indicators of environmental quality. 
A wide variety of results have been computed, including in some cases an inverted-U relationship 
where environmental degradation increases at low incomes, reaches a peak and then decreases as 
income increases beyond this threshold. This pattern has been called the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (see figure 1.I), following the original observations by Kuznets (1955) between the level of 
income and income inequality2. The idea that pollution flows may not always be positively linked to 
income growth was advanced for the first time by Baumol et Oates (1979) « …because of growth in 
population and industrial activity we were convinced that virtually all forms of environmental damage 
were increasing, and that, in the absence of powerful countermeasures, they would continue to 
accelerate steadily. However, a more careful and extensive re-examination of the evidence has led us 
to revise this simplistic view of the course of environmental decay. We have found on closer study that 
trends in environmental quality run the gamut from steady deterioration to spectacular improvement ». 
Ecological modernization theory in sociology makes a parallel argument: the historic path of 
development, at least in the most affluent societies, will lead to a reduction in environmental impacts.  
                                                
1 The pollution-income relationship (or path) designates the behavior of pollution when income rises (Lieb, 2002). 
2 This analogy seems to come from Panayotou (1993). However, there is a controversy about the origin of this appellation. 
Dasgupta et al. (2002) attribute it to Grossman and Krueger (1993). Earlier works refer to the “inverted-U shape curve”. 
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If we were to generalize from environmental impacts to sustainability3, then this development path 
(i.e., ecological modernization) would lead to higher levels of sustainability. Indeed, the idea that 
economic growth is necessary for environmental quality to be maintained or improved is an essential 
part of the sustainable development argument promulgated by the World Commission on Environment 
and Development in Our Common Future (1987).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.I The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
 
The EKC became an independent and essentially empirical research question following the studies of 
Grossman et Krueger (1991), in a NBER working paper as part of a study of the environmental 
impacts of NAFTA4, of Shafik et Bandyopadhyay (1992) for IBRD’s5 World Development Report 1992; 
and of Panayotou (1993) in a Development Discussion Paper of the ILO6.  
Even if the environmental Kuznets curve literature is thus relatively recent (starting at the beginning of 
the 90’s), the relationship between economic development and the environment is however a 
longstanding issue, which continually generates debate. On the one hand, for social and physical 
scientists such as Carson (1962), Boulding (1966), Georgescu-Roegen (1971), Meadows et al. (1972), 
Ehrlich and Holdren (1971, 1974) and Cleveland et al. (1984), higher levels of economic activity 
require larger inputs of energy and material, and ultimately generate larger quantities of waste 
byproducts. These authors put forward that the increased extraction of natural resources, the 
accumulation of waste and the dispersion of pollutants would overwhelm the carrying capacity of the 
biosphere and lead to degradation in human welfare, despite rising incomes (Daly, 1977). Ultimately, 
environmental degradation will put economic activity itself at risk (Jansson et al., 1994). Therefore, 
economic growth must cease and the world should make a transition to a steady-state economy. 
Odum (2003) consequently examined how to optimally realize this transition by finding a Prosperous 
                                                
3 Reductions of pollutant flow and concentration remain however unsustainable as long as the concentration of emissions 
remains larger than the assimilative capacity of nature. 
4 North American Free Trade Association 
5 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
6 International Labor Organization 
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Way Down. On the other hand, others argue that economic growth is not to be limited since technical 
progress, future changes in the composition of outputs and the possibilities of substitution between 
polluting and non-polluting inputs as well as the development of abatement activities might allow to 
push back the limits to growth indefinitively7 (see Aghion and Howitt, 1988 and Stokey, 1988). For 
example, Cole et al. (1973) rerun the Meadow’s model and obtain radically different results by 
postulating increases in resources stocks, through new discoveries and recycling possibilities.  
Overall, the previous debate may be caricaturized by the opposition between optimists who believe in 
the power of human inventiveness to solve whatever problems are thrown in their way, as apparently it 
has done in the past and pessimists, who question the success of these technological solutions and 
fear that future problems may be more intractable (Lecomber, 1975).  
Since the 1980’s, economists broadened their view about the relations between the environment and 
the economy and included pollution in their model (Forster, 1973). Thus the environment is not merely 
a source of resources but also provides services of waste absorption and general ecosystem 
maintenance. More precisely, the environment directly enters the utility function both due to its 
amenity value and its effect on health and also affects the production. However, even if the 
endogenous and exogenous growth models have worked towards avoiding simplistic representations 
of the links between the environment and the economy, the conditions for unlimited growth are built on 
some attempts to break exactly those links, that is, on attempts to decouple matter from the economy 
(Luzzati, 2003). In the Selden and Song (1995) neoclassical growth model, decoupling occurs by 
assuming that abatement is always possible. In the Aghion and Howith (1998) endogenous growth 
model, unlimited growth rests on the possibility that technology can make production non-polluting. In 
Smulders (1995), production can increase indefinitely by increases in human capital that are assumed 
not to affect the environment. In other words, even if we may assume that under specific 
circumstances, growth may be considered as unbounded, one has to judge if those specific 
circumstances are within the realm of possibilities.  
The EKC studies might be considered an attempt to shed some empirical light on this question as they 
examine the behavior of pollution trends when income grows. The inverted-U shape relationship 
between pollution and income seems to support the optimistic consideration as it rejects the 
Manichaeism of the pessimistic by showing that the rise in incomes may, in some circumstances, lead 
to lower pollution levels. However, nothing in the EKC literature allows to conclude that growth is 
unbounded. Furthermore, the traditional EKC empirical studies neither prove the cause-to-effect 
relationship between income and pollution nor precise what circumstances may favor or prevent its 
apparition. 
On the basis of the EKC hypothesis, some argue that pollution is a transitory phenomenon in the 
course of growth and that the surest way to improve your environment is to become rich since 
economic growth offers the resources needed for environmental protection8 (Beckerman, 1992, Cole, 
1997). Panayotou (1993) gives an unequivocal expression to the conclusions that can be drawn from 
                                                
7 For model of unlimited growth, see Aghion and Howith (1988) or Stokey (1988) 
8 Bartlett (1994) went as far as claiming that environmental regulation, by reducing economic growth, may actually impinge on 
environmental quality. 
Chapter 1. The Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis 
-16- 
the general acceptance of the EKC relationship: it suggests that the development process picks up, 
when a certain level of income per capita is reached, economic growth turns from an enemy of the 
environment into a friend… Economic growth appears to be a powerful way for improving 
environmental quality in developing countries… If economic growth is good for the environment then 
policies that stimulate growth such as trade liberalization, economic restructuring and price reform 
ought also to be good for the environment. This in turn would tend to suggest that the environment 
need no particular attention, either in terms of domestic environmental policy or international pressure 
or assistance; resources can best be focused on achieving rapid economic growth to move quickly 
through environmentally unfavorable stage of development to environmentally favorable range of the 
Kuznets curve. 
On the contrary, several authors (Panayotou, 1993; Pearce, 20019; Arrow et al., 1995) warn that there 
are several reasons why such a policy may not be optimal and cast doubt on the EKC studies. They 
first critically review empirical estimates and assert that the EKC relationship cannot be generalized 
across environmental quality as a whole and identify several contradictions between the different 
studies. Secondly, they argue that other underlying determinants and not income levels may play a 
crucial role in the pollution-income path. Their conclusion advances that the EKC is policy induced 
rather than an autonomous consequence of economic growth: Economic growth is not a panacea for 
environmental quality; indeed, it is not even the main issue. What matters is the content of growth (the 
composition of inputs, including environmental resources, and output, including waste products). This 
content is determined by, among other things, the economic institutions within which human activities 
are conducted (Arrow et al., 1995) 
 
2 Theoretical considerations on the EKC 
This section aims to identify the causes of the downturn of emissions. In other words, it tries to 
identify, among the economic determinants of the state of the environment, the one that may be held 
responsible for environmental improvement. 
Usually, when one wishes to understand the causes of the changes in environmental quality, the 
procedure is to explore the determinants of emissions. In this setting, the IPAT10 equation seems a 
good candidate (section 2.1). However, as the IPAT formula cannot grasp the underlying causes of 
the downturn of emissions, we will shortly review the principal theoretical explanations of the EKC 
(section 2.2) and identify its principal underlying causes resulting either from the characteristic of 
preferences and/or production and abatement technologies. 
 
2.1 The determinants of emissions 
A well-known technique to investigate the sources of emissions is to decompose an economy’s total 
impact on the environment into a number of different entities, which may likely be linked to the 
                                                
9 Notes from the SECO (Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs) Conference held in Thun (October 2001). 
10 IPAT states: environmental Impact = Population * Affluence * Technology. 
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production of pollutant emissions. Ehrlich et Holdren (1971) propose to summarize the environment-
economy nexus by the equation I=PAT where the impact I of an economy on the environment can be 
viewed as the product of its population size (P) multiplied by per capita affluence (A) as measured by 
consumption or GDP, in turn multiplied by a measure of the damage caused by the technologies 
employed in supplying each unit of consumption or GDP. As expressed by Commoner et al. (1971), 
the IPAT equation takes the form of an identity:   
   =
A E
E P
P A
 (1.1) 
   
where the level of emission (E) is linked to economic growth in terms of population size, per capita 
affluence (A/P) and the pollutant intensity of production (E/A). The IPAT equation shows that rising 
level of per capita economic affluence A/P (either captured in consumption per capita or income per 
capita) may be benign, neutral or even environmentally beneficial if it is accompanied by sufficient 
emissions-reducing efficiency gains of technology (E/A) 11. However, the IPAT equation remains too 
general to understand how such reductions in emissions may be realized, as it ignores the possible 
interactions between its components.  
When considering the possible interactions between the population, affluence and technology, the 
IPAT equation offers multiple interpretations. The relationship and interdependencies between P, a 
and T are of crucial importance in gaining insight into how these variables affect I. Obviously, if one 
increases and the other stays constant, then so will the environmental impacts. But if there are 
interdependencies, the outcome could be much more complicated. For example, Ehrlich and Holdren 
(1971) postulate the following: 
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dT dA dT
  
dP dP dPA
 (1.2) 
 
i.e. the effect of the increase in any variables on I is magnified since technologies are more 
environmentally damaging per unit of affluence as population or affluence rises and per capita 
affluence also rises with population. Counter propositions have also been formulated: the presence of 
environmental economies of scale (dT/dA < 0, dT/dPA < 0), the situation where the production cannot 
absorb population growth (dC/dP < 0, see Birdsall, 1994) or the situation where poverty increases 
environmental impacts (dI/dA < 0 over some range of very low income). Interestingly, Baldwin (1995) 
postulates an ecological transition, where the marginal damage decreases when affluence rises 
(d2I/dA2 < 0) potentially generating an inverted-U PIR, similar to the EKC.  
                                                
11 A debate opposed Ehrlich and Holdren to Commoner on the relative importance of the population and the technology. For 
Ehrlich and Holdren, technological development may only delay (and not reverse) the environmental consequences of economic 
growth and, therefore, the regulation of the population is necessary. For Commoner, technological enhancement constitutes the 
main factor for diminishing environmental damages.  
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Another drawback of the IPAT lies in the possibility of heterogeneity within P, C and T aggregates. 
More particularly, the IPAT equation does not account for sectoral differences in the environment-
technology nexus. Obviously, the industrial sectors generate proportionally more pollution than the 
other sectors of the economy. Therefore, emissions could decrease if the composition of the economy 
changes. The input-output analysis proposed by Leontief (1970) shows in this regard that variations in 
the level of emissions can be traced either to changes in the final demand for specific goods and 
services, changes in the structure of one or more sectors of the economy or to some combinations of 
the two. Even more than Leontief, Grossman and Krueger (1991) highlight the importance of 
considering the sectoral structure of the economy. The economy’s total emissions are decomposed in 
the form of the following identity: 
 
i
emissions sector i production sector i
emissions = total output 
production sector i total output
!"  (1.3) 
  
and can be restated as: 
  = ! i i
i
E Y e s  (1.4) 
where ei are emissions emitted per unit of output in sector i (the sectoral emission intensity) and si is 
the share of the output of the sector i in total output Y. As we are interested in the variation of E, we 
may logarithmically differentiate (1.4): 
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We may thus distinguish three effects, which determine together how emissions vary. The first term, 
called the scale effect, indicates that, all else remaining constant, the emissions will rise with output. 
The scale effect rests on the fact that production involves the transformation of one set of materials 
into another and that this transformation requires work. All work, while creating value, requires also 
energy and energy is always wasted in work effort. Therefore some unintentional by-products of 
production are always produced and we most often call these by pollution. Rising production levels 
means thus rising pollution. The second term captures the effect of changes in sectoral shares si. 
Since sectoral emission intensities differ, an altered composition of output will usually be associated 
with more or less emissions even if total output remains constant. This composition effect is often 
considered as working in favor of the environment (see 2.2.3). The latter term of the identity (1.5) 
grasps the technique effect, which concerns changes in the sectoral emission intensities and 
efficiency gains. If a unit of output of sector i can be produced at a lower ei, ceteris paribus, then 
absolute emissions decline. This may happen because of technological progress, substitution of dirty 
by clean process and inputs as well as the use of end-of-pipe measures. The technological effect may 
either be intentional, as it may result from the adaptation of production processes or environmental 
regulation, or unintentional, as it may happen as a “good” surprise of various technological innovations 
occurring in the course of growth. The EKC theory argues that these latter composition and technique 
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effects may result in leveling off and gradual decline of environmental degradation. The direction as 
well as the size of these counterbalancing forces are thus of crucial importance for the PIR. 
As far as one explores the IPAT formula and its derivative, the reason why the level of emissions 
varies remains however an open question. Even if it shows that contradictory forces act on the 
pollution path, the IPAT formula gives no indication on the link between income and pollution and 
simply explains decreasing pollution levels by the fact that economic agents emit globally less. In fact, 
any growth model that predicts both rising incomes and falling pollution levels has to work on lowering 
pollution emission via one of three effects or a combination of them. The prior IPAT equation focus 
indeed on direct causes and a natural question to ask is what are the driving forces or the indirect 
underlying causes behind the three effects that sum up to the rate of change of emissions.  
 
2.2 The link between income and environmental quality 
All others things being equal, economic growth is bad for the environment. This statement is widely 
accepted and rests on the first law of thermodynamics, which states that no material can be 
destroyed. Therefore, increasing input of matter and energy leads finally to increasing waste and 
emissions. This is the scale effect, identified above by the IPAT equation, which explains why pollution 
increases with income at low-income levels and generates the rising branch of the EKC. 
However, several counteracting forces are susceptible to explain why pollution may decrease at 
higher income levels.  Those theoretical considerations range from the effect of rising income levels 
on the composition of the economy and the technology (the two effects identified by the IPAT 
equation) and to international trade, environmental preferences and income distribution.  
 
2.2.1 Technological progress 
Even if technological progress seems historically harmful to the environment, it is also considered as 
one of the main causes of the downturn of emissions. Indeed, the development of new technologies 
allows both economic growth and limitation of emissions as far as economic agents have an incentive 
of developing them.  
The incentive may result in the presence of win-win situations, where new technologies imply the joint 
decrease of both production and environmental costs. This is the case for some energy conservation 
measures, which are mainly motivated by the prospect of a lower energy bill but happen also to 
reduce the emissions resulting from the combustion of fuel. In such a case, the reduction of pollutant 
is unintentional. However, the development of technologies friendly to the environment is generally 
induced by environmental policies. Technological progress ensures lower emission levels as far as the 
demand for environmental quality as well as the scale of the economy remain constant. However, 
such emission reductions are policy-induced and require that the costs of environmental degradation 
are at least partially internalized. In other words, even if income growth may condition the 
development and use of cleaner technologies, the following variations in environmental quality are 
intentional and ultimately depend, as far as environmental quality is a public good, on a greater 
support for environmental policies.  
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As far as one concentrates exclusively on technological progress for explaining the EKC, only 
pollutants for which abating and cleaner technologies actually exist, may be characterized by an 
inverted-U shape PIR. Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994)12 show, by deriving an endogenous growth 
model with pollution but where no abatement activities and no factor substitutions are possible, that 
positive economic growth rates are accompanied by rising pollution levels. Thus, for pollutants that 
cannot be abated, the only way to increase the quality of the environment is to restrict the emissions 
and reduce economic growth. Therefore, the EKC may be limited to pollutants for which abatement 
technology or substitution possibilities actually exists. 
In several models explaining the EKC, the link between income growth and the development of clean 
technologies constitutes one driving force of the downturn of emissions. Economic growth appears 
favorable to the invention of environmental technological progress for three reasons. First, it raises 
environmental damages, modify the preferences and, therefore, motivates policies that set appropriate 
market conditions that ensure that these technologies will actually be invented and used. Second, 
economic growth also generates the necessary resources needed for research and development. 
Third, it accelerates the depreciation of capital allowing for its earlier replacement by cleaner 
production processes.  
Gawande et al. (2001) argue consequently that the level of pollution depends on the accumulation of 
knowledge regarding abatement and Stokey (1998) describes an economy that has to pass certain 
threshold levels of development before getting access to cleaner production technologies. In other 
words, there is no technique effect to offset the scale effect when incomes are low. Stokey’s static 
model considers a choice of production technologies with varying degrees of pollution. Her critical 
assumption is that below a threshold level of economic activity, only the dirtiest technology can be 
used. With economic growth, pollution increases linearly with income until the threshold is passed and 
cleaner technologies are used. The resulting PIR is thus an inverse-V- shape, with a sharp peak. 
The model of Smulders and Bretschger (2000) predicts an inverted U-shape pollution path over time. 
Even if it is not shown that income rises along this path, it offers interesting considerations on the 
development and use of abatement technologies. In their model, the rising branch of the EKC 
emerges because a labor-saving, but polluting technology spreads. The pollution induced by the labor-
saving technology becomes apparent only after some time, due to growing evidence of damage. 
Public concern increases accordingly and this motivates the imposition of an emissions tax. Pollution 
drops and a new clean technology is developed. The downturn of the EKC depends on two conditions; 
that a new clean technology is available and that the tax rate is high enough to ensure that adopting 
the new technology is worth its cost. An extension of the model shows that technological progress 
may in fact both abolish one pollutant while generating another one. In this case, the story starts over, 
a new tax is imposed and a new technology is developed. However, this technology may also emit a 
third pollutant, so that a third cycle of the model begins. Labbys and Wadell (1989) present empirical 
evidence of such a cycle of consumption relating to thirty important materials in the United States 
                                                
12 The authors assume a closed economy with a linear (AK) production function. Pollution depends solely on the production 
factor, capital, so that no factor substitutions are possible. 
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(U.S). So progress in technology may in fact not solve environmental problems but rather replace old 
pollutants by new, still unknown and unregulated, ones.  
Note also that abatement technologies themselves cause some pollution while they are abating other 
pollutants (Heusemann, 2001). At the extreme, abating one more unit of pollution requires such effort 
that the damages caused by the abatement are greater than the previous damages caused by the 
concerned pollutant. Pillet (2001) identifies such a situation as the paradox of Senghor. 
Overall, pollution reduction may accompany economic growth as long as some cleaner technologies 
are available. However, in most cases, the development and use of these technological innovations 
depends on the formulation of environmental policies and, therefore, on increased preferences for a 
clean environment. 
 
2.2.2 Increasing returns to scale in abatement 
Andreoni and Levinson (2001) offer a second explanation of the EKC that also concerns abatement 
technology, but in a different way. They argue that increasing returns to scale in abatement cause the 
EKC. With increasing returns, a larger economy can abate pollution at lower average costs. They 
consider that increasing returns in abatement is a plausible hypothesis as many abatement 
technologies involve high fixed costs. In such a setting, when income grows, more and more industries 
reach the critical size where abatement costs can be born with minimum impact on production costs 
and profits. The argument is simply that as the scale of abatement rises its efficiencies may increases. 
This explanation carries with it a twist on scale and technique effect because as the scale of output 
rises, even with constant policy, firms switch to cleaner techniques of production, i.e. the scale effect 
creates its own technique effect. Hence, in the Andreoni and Levinson model (2001), no regulation is 
required in causing the EKC. However, the authors show that without any environmental policy, the 
turning point of the EKC may happen at inefficiently high levels of pollution. 
Andreoni and Levinson (2001) offer also some evidence for increasing returns in abatement in the US. 
However, as far as the EKC depends on the characteristic of abatement technologies, the EKC may 
again not constitute a universal pattern across various pollutions. 
 
2.2.3 Structural change 
The following explanation does not rest on the implementation of abating technologies but on the 
modification of the structure of the economy with economic growth. This is the composition effect 
evoked earlier (section 2.1). As the economy develops, more and more polluting industries are 
emerging causing a rise in emission levels. However, the shift to the service and research activities in 
a highly developed economy causes emissions to decline. Grossman and Krueger (1993) as well as 
Panayotou (1993) argue that economic growth induces structural changes and a transition from clean 
agrarian to polluting industrial, and then to clean services economies. Such a reduction in emissions 
may be considered as unintentional since it results from economic circumstances that happen to 
reduce emissions but are not realized towards this aim. As shown by Copeland and Taylor (2004) and 
Antweiler et al. (2001), the composition effect is determinant here and may result from the source of 
growth without policy response. If growth occurs first via the accumulation of the factor of production 
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used intensively in the dirty industries and then via the accumulation of the factor used in the clean 
industries, an EKC is found. 
Empirical evidence shows that the composition effect remains small and that technological progress is 
much more important for the downturn of emissions (Cole, 2000; Millimet, 2003; Selden et al., 1999, 
de Bruyn, 1997). Furthermore, a fact often neglected is that structural change may generate the EKC 
if the polluting sector shrinks absolutely (not only relative to GDP). This would require that the goods 
once produced by the polluting sector are either no longer consumed13 or are imported. This latter 
point induces that dirty industries have migrated14. The next section discusses this argument. 
 
2.2.4 Migration of dirty industries and international trade 
An alternative explanation of the downward sloping segment of the EKC may be found in the 
hypothesized propensity of countries, as they get richer, to spin-off pollution-intensive products to 
lower income countries with lower environmental standards, either through trade or direct investment 
in these countries. If this is true, the relationship observed between growing income and pollution 
levels in developed countries will remain a limited phenomenon as poorer economies will not always 
be able to find still poorer countries to serve as havens15 for the production of pollution-intensive 
goods (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). 
Copeland and Taylor (1994) present a model with two sets of countries, North (developed) and South 
(developing), and a range of goods with inherently different pollution intensities. The pollution 
problems are assumed to be of a local nature, that is, there are no transboundary or global 
repercussions of domestic production. Both governments are assumed to control pollution through 
pollution taxes, with North choosing to set higher tax rates due to its higher income level (and 
therefore higher preference for a cleaner environment). Trade between North and South generates a 
set of adjustments. The first adjustment is a change in the industrial composition. Polluting industries 
contract in North and expand in South because of the different environmental standards driven by 
different incomes. The displacement effect leads to structural change (i.e., composition effect) and 
mitigates pollution in North and magnifies it in South. Furthermore, the overall expansion of economic 
activity resulting from trade, induces harmful effects on the environment everywhere (scale effect). At 
the same time, the income growth increases the willingness to pay for abatement costs (i.e., increases 
environmental preferences). Pollution taxes will be raised and firms take additional abatement 
measures to avoid the tax. The authors show that theoretically this latter technique effect may 
compensate the scale effect if the environmental preferences respond positively to income growth 
(see 2.2.5). However, it may not mitigate the displacement effect and therefore the South might be 
considered a polluter haven, with pollution raising in the South and decreasing in the North16.  
                                                
13 This could be the case of inferior goods or of goods that are not used anymore due to technological change. 
14 Note that if pollution results from consumption activities, importing the goods will have no impact on pollution levels. 
15 In the literature, the terms pollution heaven as well as pollution haven are used. 
16 This model further shows that balanced growth between North and South does not increase pollution in the world. The reason 
is that environmental standards in North and South will then rise in tandem and thereby keep the industrial composition 
unchanged. However, if North grows faster than South, emission standards will increasingly diverge, leading to more pollution in 
South and less in North. This would increase overall pollution, since the average pollution per unit of output will go up. In this 
regard, the convergence of income will result in lower pollution in the World.  
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Evidence in favor of the pollution haven hypothesis (or the displacement hypothesis) is however 
sparse. Nordström and Vaughan (1999) show that in the U.S, the costs linked to environmental 
regulations remain low and amount only from 1% to 5% of overall costs. The empirical analysis of Xu 
(1999) as well as the one of Tobey (1990) confirm that environmental standards have no significant 
impact on the structure of international trade and investments flows (Jaffe et al., 1995). The traditional 
structure of the comparative advantages (based on labor and capital) is not modified by the 
divergence in environmental costs. 
Note however that the most recent literature on this subject makes the distinction between the 
migration of dirty industries (pollution haven hypothesis) following reduction in trade barriers between 
countries with stringent regulations to countries with weaker regulations and the effect, at the margin, 
of tightening up of pollution regulation on plant location decisions and trade flows. Copeland and 
Taylor (2004) support the idea that there is evidence supporting the pollution haven effect while there 
remains little convincing one to support the pollution haven hypothesis. 
 
2.2.5 The demand for environmental quality 
Another main underlying cause of the EKC focuses on the demand for environmental quality. It is 
commonly argued that as income increases, the demand for environmental quality raises. There are 
basically two reasons in favor of this argument.  
First, the materialist hypothesis holds that economic growth is associated with increasing input of 
matter and energy and, therefore to increasing waste and emissions (Vogel, 1999). This scale effect 
leads to a decline in environmental quality and causes a rising scarcity, and hence appreciation, of 
natural service and unspoilt environment. Secondly, the post materialist approach argues that the 
rising consumption level in the course of economic growth allows people to reach a living standard 
that frees them from the most immediate concern. This decreased scarcity depreciates the value 
attached to the traditional consumer goods relative to other less-materialistic satisfaction such as the 
quality of the environment. Overall, as economic growth brings more environmental damages and 
more material well-being, it also leads to an appreciation of environmental quality relative to 
consumption. These two effects induce people to develop sooner or later a positive willingness to pay 
or to accept the opportunity cost of environmental protection. 
Most models examining environmental preferences (McConnel, 1997; Lieb, 2002; Vogel, 1999) 
consider indeed that the preferred combination of consumption and environmental quality varies as 
income varies. If preferences are not homothetic and lead, at a certain income level, to relatively value 
improvements in environmental quality over consumption, then it is more likely that environmental 
quality will be purchased by spending on abatement rather than on additional consumption. As far as 
abatement is a public good or requires incentives for being adopted, the government has to ensure 
that this growing demand will be met or, identically, that some internalization occurs. This may be the 
case if, with rising incomes, people expressed their greater willingness to pay for environmental quality 
by offering greater support to environmental policies in elections and referenda. 
As a consequence, the type and quality of political institution plays a role in the shape of the PIR as 
they are responsible for auditing and enforcing citizens’ preferences and ensuring that internalization 
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occurs effectively. Congleton (1992) and de Bruyn (1997) find a positive link between GDP and pro-
environmental policies, Torras and Boyce (1998) show further evidence that democratic countries 
have lower emissions levels and are more likely to sign international environmental treaties (see also 
Frederiksson and Gaston, 2000).  
However, as types of pollution have different consequences in terms of impact on health and through 
time, some poorly understood and less visible pollution may not concern citizens. Therefore, 
environmental preferences may differ across pollutants and consequently affect the observed PIR. In 
this regard, a better access to information and knowledge may be positively linked to the demand for 
environmental quality. 
 
2.2.6 The distribution of income and power 
If environmental preferences are positively affected by income growth, a related concern addresses 
the distribution of income. Quite obviously, if a rising income level increases the demand for 
environmental quality, the way total income is distributed throughout the society is of crucial 
importance. A more equal income distribution makes the median voter better off and thus induces a 
greater support for environmental policies. However, as far as the redistribution of income makes poor 
people better off, it may also lead to greater consumption levels and therefore to higher pollution 
levels. As these two effects may counterbalance each other, empirical evidence are difficult to 
interpret as they generally conclude that the link between income distribution and pollution levels 
remains weak.  
Vogel (1999) considers that the middle class is likely to be the greenest one when the composition of 
income is taken into consideration. The higher income level citizen may not be more supportive of 
environmental policies since their income is derived proportionally more than the rest of society from 
profit shares in the polluting industries (see also McAusland, 2003). Others finally argue that the 
richest classes of society expressed their higher environmental preferences through defensive 
protection expenditures (such as consuming bottled water instead of unsafe tap water) and do not 
offer wider support for environmental quality. 
Torras and Boyce (1998) argue that income distribution may in fact be link to the distribution of power 
throughout society. The poor, who may be more particularly exposed to pollution, have low political 
power while the rich, who derive profit from polluting activities and may escape from environmental 
damages through private expenditures, dominate the political process. Thus, a more equal power 
distribution may be finally responsible for the downward sloping segment of the EKC. Some evidence 
shows indeed that higher equality in political power, and not in income, is linked to lower pollution 
levels (Harbaugh et al, 2000; Barrett and Graddy, 2000).  
 
2.2.6 Price shocks 
One final explanation of the downturn of the PIR rests on the possible consequences of price shocks. 
Price increases reduce the quantity of marketable goods exchanged. As far as the consumption or 
production of these goods generate some form of pollution, price shocks may lead to lower pollution 
levels.  
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Policy measures rely indeed on such mechanisms as they intend to raise prices through taxes or 
standards in order to internalize the external effects. However, price shocks may happen for reasons 
that have nothing to do with environmental protection. The two oil price shocks of the 1970’s and the 
1980’S are obvious examples17. Hartwick and Olewiler (1986) show that between 1979 and 1981 oil 
consumption dropped by nearly 10 % worldwide. Logically, the emission of CO2, SO2 and NO2 linked 
to the conversion of oil into energy must have decreased significantly.  Unruh and Moomaw (1998) 
have therefore examined the CO2 emissions trajectory of sixteen OECD countries. They find that CO2 
emissions tend to stabilize and even decrease at widely different income levels since the year 1973. 
They thus postulate that CO2 emission reductions do not depend on income levels but rather on the 
countries’ reaction to historical circumstances.  
However, as such price increases are non-intentional, they may be temporary. The emissions will start 
increasing again when the effect of the shock evaporates leading to an N-shape PIR, except if the 
shock generates policies intending to limit, for example, the use of fuel energy18. Hence, price shocks, 
instead of income, may therefore be responsible for the implementation of policies that ultimately lead 
to emission reductions. In that case, internalization is not resulting from a continuous process but 
rather from sudden jumps. However, how countries react to such shocks may be linked to their level of 
development. In the case of the oil price shocks, rich OECD economies faced the common 
characteristic of being heavily dependent on imported oil.  
 
2.3 Conclusion on the possible causes of the EKC 
Most of the factors advanced for explaining the downturn of emissions appear interrelated. Figure 1.II 
shows some of the possible relationships between them and particularly insists on the fact that the 
formulation of policies that internalize the environmental effects of both production and consumption 
are of prime importance for the EKC.  
Lopez (1994) assumes infinitely lived agents, exogenous technological change and that pollution are 
generated by production and not by consumption. His results are twofold. First, when no 
internalization occurs, pollution rises monotonically with income. Secondly, when government properly 
internalizes the pollution damages, i.e. producers pay the social marginal cost of pollution; he 
demonstrates that the relationship between emissions and income depends then on the properties of 
technology and preferences. Under homothetic preferences, an increase in output will result in an 
increase in pollution. If preferences are nonhomothetic, however, the response of pollution to growth 
will depend on the degree of relative risk-aversion (i.e. the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption) 
and the elasticity of substitution in production between pollution and conventional inputs. The intuition 
                                                
17 The first Oil-crisis was caused by the Arab-Israeli war in which OPEC used oil as a weapon by cutting back production and 
putting an embargo on oil exports to the U.S. and the Netherlands in order to harm the economies of the states which supported 
Israel. The price of crude oil on the world market rose four times above its 1972 level. During the second Oil crisis of 1979-1980, 
the oil price doubled its 1978 level.  This was caused by the Iran-Iraq dispute as it disrupted oil supply. Overall, between 1970 
and 1980 the real barrel price of imported oil rose by 960% in the U.S. 
18 The two oil-crises generated several policies. Mainly, two sets of policies have been conducted. The first dominant option was 
to secure diplomatic relationships with the OPEC and Arab countries. The second type of policy aimed at decreasing the 
dependence on OPEC oil imports by either developing alternative energy forms or increasing the energy efficiency of the 
economy. However, the oil-crisis may not be the most relevant explanation for CO2 slower growth rates. In Europe, low rates of 
economic growth may be the main explanation. 
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is as follows. Income growth increases the value of the environment to the consumers and, hence, 
their willingness to pay for environmental quality. If the marginal utility of consumption falls fast, 
demand for environmental quality rises fast and the government has to impose a large price increase 
of pollution. Furthermore, if substitution between pollution and conventional inputs in production is high 
(i.e. there are many possibilities to substitute away from the polluting input), a given price increase will 
induce major reductions in the pollution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.II  The potential causes of the EKC 
 
In most models of the EKC, environmental policies are indeed of crucial importance since they raise 
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growth is responsible for the emergence of policies by increasing environmental scarcity, by raising 
the standard of living, and hence the value of environmental quality relative to immediate 
consumption.  
Other factors such as increasing returns to scale in abatement, the existence of advanced legal, social 
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boxes are expected to be related. Figure 1.II remains however schematic and numerous other factors 
could be integrated (such as the distribution of income and power, price shocks, trade flows, etc.).  
Finally, the EKC postulates implicitly that if the level of emissions declines for whatever reason, the 
quality of the environment improves. Drawing such a link between the level of emissions and the state 
of the environment requires that the assimilative capacity of the environment is sufficiently high to 
allow for absolute improvement. In fact, even zero emission or concentration may not be sufficient to 
restore environmental quality (Vogel, 1999) when the damages are irreversible. For example, planting 
trees restores a forested area but such remediation cannot regenerate the already lost species. 
Hence, the EKC relationship is not sufficient for ensuring sustainability since, insofar as the emissions 
exceed the assimilative capacity of the environment, pollution starts to accumulate (concentration 
rises) and concentration will decline only if the new emissions are decreased below the level of 
assimilative capacity.  
 
2.4 The benefits and costs of environmental protection 
In order to differently apprehend the possible cause of the EKC, another setting related to the costs 
and the benefits of environmental protection is now presented. Such a model is fairly general, but it 
allows to shed light on the crucial assumptions made either towards environmental preferences or 
technology when theoretically explaining the EKC.  
As with any other goods, variations in environmental quality induce benefits and costs. The benefits 
are defined as the welfare people gain or the value-added firms obtain from environmental quality 
enhancement. The benefits are thus equal to the avoided damages, i.e. the avoided external costs, 
resulting from environmental protection and restoration.  The costs of environmental quality, i.e. the 
abatement costs, represent the cost of protecting the environment. They represent the expenditure 
devoted to environmental protection and rest on the characteristic of the abatement technologies. 
Abatement lead to an opportunity cost, the loss of consumption or value-added that results from 
devoting resources to protecting the environment.  
In this setting, the demand for environmental quality is equal to the marginal benefit derived from each 
unit of environmental quality, or identically, from each unit of abatement that decreases the pollution 
level. The supply of environmental is in turn equal to the marginal cost of increasing environmental 
quality, or identically, to the cost of abating emissions by one unit. The current level of environmental 
quality observed in an economy may thus be determined by the interaction of the demand and supply 
of environmental quality (see figure 1.III).  
Munasinghe (1999) proposes a static model and considers the costs (C) and benefits (B) as both 
dependent on pollution (E) and income (Y). Each agent wishes to maximize the net benefit (NB) 
associated with a better environment. The assimilative capacity of the environment is constant and is 
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independent of the prevailing environmental quality, i.e. if pollution decreases by one unit, 
environmental quality increases immediately by one unit 19.  
 max ( , ) ( , )= !NB B E Y C E Y  (1.6) 
 
The first order marginality condition may be derived from equation (1.6) for a given level of income per 
capita (Y*)  
 0! !
! !
" = " =
B C
MB MC
E E
 (1.7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.III  MB, MC and the Environmental Kuznets Curve  
 
At the equilibrium in any income level, the marginal cost of abating one more unit of pollution is equal 
to the marginal benefit derived from environmental protection.     
Small shifts around the equilibrium point (E*, Y*, S*, T*) due to changes in Y yield:  
 ( ) ( ) 0! + ! =Y Y E EMB MC dY MB MC dE  (1.8)  
where 
!
!
=i
MB
MB
i
 and
!
!
=i
MC
MC
i
, for i = Y, E. 
                                                
19 This is very rarely the case as generally, once the pollution stops, the environment may require much time to recover. In some 
cases, the damage may even be irreversible. For a more realist modeling of the assimilative capacity of the environment, see 
Pethig (1994) 
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Rearranging (1.8) yields:  
 [ ]
*
( )
/
( )
!
=
= =
!
Y Y
E E
E E
MB MC
a dE dY dY
MC MB
 (1.9) 
 
The sign of a indicates the evolution of pollution flows and depends on various assumptions 
concerning marginal costs and benefits20. Munasinghe (1999) considers that MBE >0, MBY>0, MCE<0 
and MCY<0.  Thus, the denominator of equation (1.9) is always negative and the sign of a is the 
inverse of the sign of (MBY-MCY).  As long as the marginal cost curve grows faster than the marginal 
benefit curve during the course of economic growth, i.e. MCY > MBY, environmental quality decreases. 
If MCY < MBY, environmental quality increases. If MBY rises faster than MCY (MBYY > MCYY) in the 
course of income growth, the pollution path may result in an EKC, as in figure 1.III.21 Munasinghe 
(1999) argues that both assumptions are plausible. 
The upward shift of the MB curve may be linked to income growth. As seen earlier, a higher relative 
value may be placed on environmental quality when income growth, which results in higher willingness 
to pay for an improved environment. Note however that the increasing scarcity of environmental 
quality induces a displacement along the MB curve. Explaining the shift of the MC curve as income 
rises is not so straightforward. It may come either from the composition effect or technological 
progress.  The increasing rate of growth of MBY and decreasing rate of growth of MCY are however 
less intuitive and rather strong assumptions.  
Note that in the previous model the path resulting from the equilibrium points between MB and MC 
curves may yield non optimal or economically inefficient outcomes. In this case, the private MB and 
MC curves on the basis of which consumers and producers make their decision would differ from their 
corresponding social curves. Such imperfections may indeed affect the demand for environmental 
quality (MB) such as the lack of knowledge about the consequences of environmental damage or the 
supply for environmental quality (MC) such as the presence of distortions in the input price signals. 
Considering the previous simple explanation of the EKC, it is not surprising that theoretical models of 
the EKC rely on the assumption made towards the characteristics of production and abatement 
technologies (Andreoni and Levinson, 2001) and of preferences (McConnel, 1997; Vogel, 1999) and 
their evolution with income growth.  
Vogel (1999) or Selden and Song (1995) use a modified version of the Forster’s (1974) neoclassical 
growth model accounting for the environment and derive and inverted-U shape PIR and J curve for 
abatement that starts when a given capital stock is attained. The appendix 1 redraws their results. 
Contrary to Forster (1974), they do not rule out corner solution for abatement, i.e. null abatement is 
possible along the growth path. Their results show that during a first phase (called the development 
phase), the opportunity cost of abatement exceeds its benefit at the margin. No abatement is therefore 
                                                
20 Others variables might be introduced in cost and benefit functions. Munasinghe (1999) considers that costs also depend on 
technology (T) and benefits on the general public awareness about environmental damages (S). Equ (1.9) becomes:  
[ ]
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21 The EKC is rotated by ninety degrees. 
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carried out and environmental quality decreases. During this first development phase, the opportunity 
cost of abatement (i.e., the loss of utility due to the forgone consumption) declines with output growth, 
which ultimately leads to the environment phase where the marginal opportunity cost of abatement 
equals the marginal benefit. During the following environment phase, abatement growth and 
environmental quality may thus increase leading to an EKC. The model shows that the large direct 
effect of growth on pollution as well a high marginal efficiency of abatement lead to a more rapid and 
earlier increase in abatement and hence in environmental quality. Preferences also play a role; 
abatement increases faster the more quickly marginal utility of consumption declines with increased 
consumption and the more rapidly marginal concern over pollution increases with increases in 
pollution. In those models, assumptions made either on the evolution of abatement costs and of 
preferences towards environmental quality are crucial for the shape of the PIR. Consequently, both 
the characteristics of preferences or abatement may also hinder the downturns of emissions. If no 
abatement is possible, i.e. if the technologies were “Leontief –type” with zero elasticity of substitution 
between conventional factors and pollution, economic growth necessarily leads to ever expanding 
pollution levels regardless of the nature of preference (Lopez, 1994). Similarly, if abatement becomes 
increasingly costly, abatement is delayed since its offset the demand effect associated with rising 
income (Selden and Song, 1994). On the contrary, when the impacts of pollution are unknown, i.e. 
markets failures affect the demand for environmental quality; a very low or even a null willingness to 
pay (or to abandon some consumption) for abatement may result. In such situations, even if 
abatement is cheap, environmental quality will not increase. 
The structure of this thesis rests directly on the simple model of Munasinghe (1999) as chapters 3 and 
4 intend to shed some empirical light on the evolution of marginal benefits and opportunity costs of 
abatement with income growth or, in other terms, on the supply and demand of environmental quality. 
The third chapter examines environmental preferences and explores how the income of individuals 
influences their support for environmental policies. The fourth chapter intends to determine how the 
costs of abatement of CO2 emissions differ among developing and developed countries. However, 
before turning to these latter subjects, the second chapter of this dissertation focuses on the actual 
empirical evidence on the EKC by conducting a meta-analysis. The remaining part of this chapter is 
thus devoted to an overview of the estimation techniques and data used in the EKC empirical 
literature. 
 
 
3 The EKC in empirics 
The EKC has generated a large volume of empirical studies aiming to estimate the relationship 
between pollution levels and income. The following section is devoted to the examination of the 
principal characteristics of the empirical studies on the EKC. It constitutes a necessary step for 
realizing the meta-analysis of chapter 2. The empirical studies examining the existence of the EKC 
offer generally two types of results. First, they indicate, for particular pollutants and countries, the 
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shape of the pollution-income path. Secondly, when an EKC is observed, it computes the income-
turning point (ITP), i.e. the income level at which pollution starts declining.  
 
3.1 The econometric relationships 
The EKC studies have generally estimated a polynomial regression of the following general form: 
 
1 2 3 4
2 3! " " " " #= + + + + +
it it it it it it
P Y Y Y X  (1.10) 
  
where Pit is an environmental indicator measured either in concentration or in per capita terms; Yit is 
the per capita income, i is the index for the country and t an index for time. Sometimes, a vector X of 
additional explanatory variables is included. A time trend is included in most panel estimations. Some 
EKC studies estimated the previous equation without the cubic income term. The betas (β) are the 
estimated parameters and ε the error term. The functional forms are either in level or logarithmic. Four 
different functional forms have thus generally been estimated. They are presented in Table 1.1. 
 
Tab. 1.1 Functional forms 
Functional forms Estimated equations 
1. level quadratic 
1 2
2
it it it
it
P Y Y! " " #+= + +  
2. Logarithmic, quadratic )1 2
2ln( ) ln( ln( )it it it
it
P Y Y! " " #+= + +  
3. level cubic 
1 2 3
2 3
it it it it
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P Y Y Y! " " " #+ += + +  
4. Logarithmic cubic )1 2 3
2 3ln( ) ln( ln( ) ln( )it it it it
it
P Y Y Y! " " " #+ += + +  
 
 
The shape of the pollution-income path depends on the signs and relative value of the income 
parameters. The shapes that have been identified by the studies result from the functional forms used 
and are given in figure 1.IV and table 1.2. ITP marks the income turning point. One last possible path 
is not presented in figure 1.IV and table 1.2. It is the flat relationship characterized by all income 
parameters equal to zero. 
Obviously, results may vary following the use of different functional forms. Most studies explore 
several functional forms and select the one that offers the better fit. However, even if the estimations 
resulting from two studies are basically the same, the conclusions the authors draw upon may vary. 
For example, Grossman and Krueger (1995) results show a cubic relationship for SO2 (N-shape), with 
concentration starting to increase again at high income ($16’000). They nevertheless conclude to an 
inverted-U shape curve since the number of observations for sites with such high income is relatively 
small. On the other hand, Shafik  (1994) does not reject the N-shape curve for fecal coliforms even if, 
as in Grossman and Krueger (1995), only a small part of the observations (38/1467) are responsible 
for the final rising portion of the curve. 
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Tab. 1.2 Results from EKC studies 
 Signs and relative value of the coefficients Shape of the pollution-income path 
1 β3 = 0, β2 = 0 and β1 < 0 linear, downward sloping 
2 β3 = 0, β2 = 0 and  β1 > 0 linear, upward sloping 
3 β3 = 0, β2<0 et β1>0 and Iβ2I << Iβ1I quadratic, inverted-U 
4 β3 = 0, β2 > 0 et β1< 0 and Iβ2I << Iβ1I quadratic, normal U 
5 β3 > 0, β2 < 0 et β1> 0 and Iβ3I << Iβ2I << Iβ1I cubic, normal N 
6 β3 < 0, β2 > 0 et β1< 0 and Iβ3I << Iβ2I << Iβ1I cubic, inverted-N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. I.IV Possible shapes of the pollution-income path 
(Ekins, 1997) 
 
The studies that have estimated quadratic functions are favorable to the EKC and imply a symmetric 
curve, which does not seem a theoretically plausible assumption. For these reasons, we should not 
directly compare results of quadratic and cubic specifications. The functional form (either in level or 
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logarithmic) used may also have consequences on results, especially on the estimated ITPs (see the 
results of Galeotti and Lanza, 1999)22. 
The equation (1.10) is usually estimated using cross-country or panel data. Studies use either ordinary 
least squares or generalized least squares. Cross-country estimates have been criticized as they 
might show an EKC whereas this pollution-income path is artificially created by combining in a 
database a positive relationship in low income countries and a decreasing one in high developed 
countries (Vincent, 1997). However, as pointed out by Borghesi (2000), this critique may also be 
addressed to panel estimation because of the short length of the available time series.  
When using panel data, most studies attempt to estimate both the fixed effects and random effects 
model. In a fixed effects regression specification there is a binary variable (also called dummy or 
indicator variable) marking cross section units and/or time periods. The fixed effects model treats 
these variables as regression parameters, whereas the random effects model treats them as 
components of the random disturbances. It the effect of these variables and the explanatory variables 
are correlated, the random effects model cannot be estimated consistently (Stern, 2004). Most studies 
on the EKC having estimated both fixed and random effects model use a Hausman test to control for 
inconsistencies in the random effects model by comparing the fixed effects and random effects slope 
parameters. They find generally that the random effects models cannot be estimated consistently. 
Thus the estimated parameter are conditional on the country and time effects in the selected sample 
of data. Results may thus vary according the countries analyzed and may not be extrapolated to other 
sample of data. 
                                                
22 Three studies (Galeotti and Lanza, 1999; Bradford et al., 2000; Azomahou and Van Phu, 2001) have estimated alternative 
functional forms. Galeotti and Lanza (1999) use the functional form of the Gamma and Weibul distribution. After transformation, 
the estimated equations are: 
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α, β and γ are the parameters to estimate. α gives the shape of the curve, β its height and γ its position along the X-axis. An EKC 
is found if α>1, the ITPs are: 
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Their results show an EKC for CO2 emissions. This is contrary to the evidence of most other studies that find monotonically 
increasing relationships for CO2 emissions per capita. 
Bradford et al. (2000) estimate their own specification, called BSS (first letter of the authors’ names). The estimated equations 
are: 
Quadratic specification: *( )! "= # +P y y gt  
Cubic specification: * * *( )( )! "= # # +P y y y y gt  where y is income per capita and g the growth rate of income; α, y*, y** 
and β are the estimated parameters.  For the cubic specification, an EKC is found if α<0 with an ITP equal to y*. For the cubic 
specification, when α>0, TP1 is equal to y* and TP2 is equal to y**. 
Finally, Amazohou and Van Phu (2001) use a non-parametric approach. In the non parametric approach, the value of pollution 
P0 for a give income level Y0 is given by (Amazohou and van Phu, 2001): 
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where K[.] is the standard normal density function, s is a smoothing parameter, and n is the sample size. Hence P0 is a weighted 
average of all observed Pi where the weight is smaller when the corresponding income level is farther away from Y0. 
Their results show a raising pollution-income path. 
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When examining the empirical literature on the EKC, one may fear the problem of multicollinearity 
(Lieb, 2002). Multicollinearity refers to the situation where explanatory variables are highly correlated. 
In the EKC frameworks, since GDP, GDP squared and GDP cubed (and sometimes lagged GDP as in 
Grossman and Krueger, 1994 or Harbaugh et al., 2000) enter the regression, there is reason to 
believe that multicollinearity is present. In such a situation, small changes in the data can have a 
drastic effect on the results. It is not clear how the EKC studies have generally controlled for the 
presence of multicollinearity. Most declare that the results appear robust to change in the specification 
and data. However, many of the studies do not report statistics in this regard. Stern et al. (1996) find 
evidence of multicollinearity while Ansuategi (2000) do not. Results of Harbaugh et al. (2000) as well 
as of Islam (1997) show multicollinearity problems, as the estimated ITPs seem to be sensitive to 
slight variations in the data and to moderate changes in the specifications. However, the extent to 
which multicollinearity is a problem is hard to assess when examining the current evidence since most 
of them only indirectly address the issue without offering precise statistical answers. 
The standard EKC framework also ignores the fact that even if income influences pollution, pollution 
also has an impact on income. For example, poor environmental quality may reduce the productivity of 
labor and decrease harvests and fish catch (McConnel, 1997; Jansson et al, 1994). If pollution has an 
effect of income, there is a simultaneity bias and estimating single equation relationship by ordinary 
least squares where simultaneity exists produces biased and inconsistent estimates (Stern et al., 
1996). However, most empirical studies23 investigating the presence of simultaneity find similar results 
as with the traditional model (Lieb, 2002). Hence, even if pollution affects income, the effect remains 
insignificant.  
One final econometric consideration has been raised by Perman and Stern (1999). They show that 
test for integrated variables find that pollutions and GDP per capita may be integrated variables. This 
means that if the EKC regressions do not cointegrate, the estimate will be spurious. The studies on 
the EKC don’t test usually for integration of the variables or cointegration of the regression (at least, 
the studies do not report the relevant diagnostic statistic).  
 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Pollution data 
One of the main difficulties in estimating the pollution-income path is finding reliable and comparable 
data for pollution (Ansuategi, 2000). Even if larger databases have been constructed throughout the 
90’s, the representativeness as well as the quality of the pollution measures remains questionable. 
Shafik (1994) points out that the environmental data are patchy at best… Comparability across 
countries is affected by definitional differences and by inaccuracies and unrepresentativeness of 
measurement sites. Furthermore, sufficiently long time series needed for observing one single country 
thought different development stages are lacking.  
                                                
23Hung and Shaw (2000) are the only study that finds some evidence of simultaneity. However, the result does not change when 
a simultaneity model is estimated. No simultaneity is found by Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1992), Cole et al. (1997) as well as List 
and Gallet (1999). 
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Furthermore, only a few types of pollution have been monitored, the available evidence on pollution is 
limited to only about twenty indicators. Therefore, even if one considers all pollution measures 
available24, the evidence will be limited to a few environmental dimensions and does not allow the 
formulation of conclusions as far as the environmental quality as a whole is considered. One may 
argue that the environmental measures available might be correlated with the rest of environmental 
quality dimensions. However, we may rather consider that the available measures present a biased 
image of environmental quality since countries have principally monitored well-known pollutants that 
have been regulated. The use of aggregate indicators of environmental quality (such as the 
Environmental Sustainability Index, see Raymond, 2004) cannot overcome this limit since aggregate 
environmental indicators are ultimately a weighted average of the current available measures. They 
thus are problematic since the weights used are subject to controversies.  
The EKC studies consider that the results emanating from pollutant levels measures constitute a 
giving guidance on the wider environmental situation. As Raghbendra and Whalley (1999), equating 
environmental problem with pollutants ignores environmental issue where the physical emissions are 
less meaningful such as the problem of environmental degradation (soil erosion, congestion and open 
access resource). The picture remains thus incomplete especially when the situation of developing 
countries is examined25. 
The quality of environmental data is also deficient. Most EKC studies overlook this issue. However, 
when data for measurement sites are considered (as the GEMS data), the representativity of these 
measures for a country remains doubtful as environmental authorities tend logically to locate 
measurement sites next to the most polluted area. Furthermore, it is likely that emissions are 
measured only imperfectly and that measurement errors persist across time, especially in developing 
countries where knowledge and the necessary investments are lacking (Kaufman et al., 1998). A 
detailed examination of the original measured data reveals that the number of measurement sites as 
well as the precision of the measurement tools increase throughout time. This might lead to 
heteroscedastic error terms and biased estimations. 
Other environmental databases are constructed from production and consumption data. Contrary to 
direct measures, these data cannot assess the variation in the environmental carrying capacity of 
ecosystems (which depends on the climatic conditions and the current state of the environment)26. 
When economic statistics are used in order to construct emissions data, estimations may lead to a 
tautology when the same economic statistics are used as a regressor. For example, data on 
deforestation from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) are based in particular on 
demographic statistics (mainly population growth). Therefore, the EKC studies that included 
                                                
24 These indicators offer evidence on air pollution (SO2, suspended particle matter, smoke and dark matter, volatile organic 
compound, NO2, ozone, CFC, lead emissions, toxic releases, CO2) on water pollution (dissolved oxygen, biological oxygen 
demand, chemical oxygen demand, heavy metals such as Hg, Cd, Ni, As and coliforms bacteria), on waste as well as on 
deforestation, biodiversity and protected area. Some studies have also used WB data relating to the absence of basic services, 
i.e. % of people with or without access to clean water and to sanitation. Strictly speaking, these are not pollution indicators. 
However, as they are correlated with water quality, they may constitute a proxy for water pollution.  
25 The Asian Development Bank compendium (1997) reports several studies on environmental damages in developing 
countries. China studies conclude that 70 to 80 % of damages occurs through degradation, largely in rural areas (see also the 
1998 Human development report of the UNO). 
26 In many cases, the physical and chemical knowledge are lacking. For example, according to CO2 emissions, the process of 
carbon sequestration is complex and badly understood. Several questions remain as to the impact of the vegetation type or size 
as well as the ambient concentration on the speed of carbon sequestration.  
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population growth as an additional explanatory variable are inappropriate (Barbier, 2000). However, 
Crooper and Griffiths (1994) use a population size variable (which is logically highly significant) when 
examining the FAO dataset. To our knowledge, no database is constructed from income data. 
Therefore, the EKC studies are not tautology. However, income data may be correlated with the data 
used for constructing pollution data.  
As frequently hypothesized by theory, the PIR may vary across pollutants. The explanation rests either 
on environmental preferences (people have a stronger concern for dangerous pollution) and 
technology (some pollution can be abated more easily than other). The literature reviews generally 
conclude that the evidence is more likely to support the existence of the EKC for a local pollutant 
rather than for a global one. There are however contradictory results regarding CO2 emissions which 
in some cases appear to follow an EKC (Dijkgraff and Vollebergh, 2001; Carson et al., 1997) while 
many other studies conclude to the inexistence of the EKC for local pollutants (for example, SO2 in 
Kaufman et al., 1998; industrial water pollution in Hettige et al., 1997; local air pollutant in Carson et 
al., 1997; dissolved oxygen in Shafik, 1994).  
Most EKC studies use data either on emissions per capita or the concentration of pollution. Borghesi 
(1999) and Ekins (1997) consider that the use of a measurement unit is not neutral and has an impact 
on the estimations. For example, Shafik et al. (1994) and Grossman and Krueger (1994) using 
pollution concentration data in urban areas find quite low ITP. Selden and Song (1994) consider that 
the ITPs are likely to be underestimated since urban pollutants concentration generates important 
nuisances, which raise the attention of politicians and generate large public pressure for reductions. 
Furthermore, it is also generally cheaper to reduce concentration levels than emissions per capita. For 
example, constructing taller chimneys reduces concentration levels in the neighboring community 
without reducing nation-wide emissions per capita. Note that even if emissions per capita decrease, 
pollution levels can continue to rise since the population is growing. Furthermore, they may not 
decrease enough to lie under the assimilative capacity of the environment so that concentration 
continues to rise (see above, section 2.3). In this regard, the EKC indicates a relative decline in 
emissions or concentration, i.e. the growth rate of emissions is lower than the growth rate of the 
population27.  
Overall, the datasets on pollution flows and concentration remain rare and of dubious quality. No one 
can actually predict how strongly they are biased. However, the results presented by Harbaugh et al. 
(2000), which compare the GEMS data (used for example by Grossman and Krueger, 1995) and the 
same data revised and completed by the EPA (AIRS dataset) on SO2 emissions are striking as the two 
PIR have widely different shapes. Such large differences are however not found for SPM and smoke. 
Similarly, Stern et al. (1994) find an EKC for energy consumption per capita when using UN data while 
the EKC disappears in the WB dataset.  
 
 
 
                                                
27 When considering the pollutants’ intensity (i.e. emission per unit of GDP), the OCDE (2001) distinguishes between weak 
decoupling (emissions decline relative to GDP) and strong decoupling (absolute decrease of emissions). 
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3.2.2 Economic data 
Income data come generally from the Penn World Table (PWT) or World Bank. These income data 
are computed according to either the purchasing power parity rates28 or exchange rates. However, 
these two data sources differ systematically and exchange rates GDP tend to overestimate income in 
high-developed countries and underestimate income in developing countries. Panayotou (2000) 
shows in this regard that the choice of the income data has an effect on the results. Using an identical 
set of countries, his result tends to find higher ITP when income data based on PPP rates (instead of 
exchange rates) are used. 
 
3.3 Additional explanatory variables 
The conventional approach has been to estimate a reduced form relationship, with per capita income 
intended to capture both the direct and indirect consequences of economic growth (Arrow et al., 1995; 
Stern et al., 1996 and Panayotou, 1997). It is basically a black box. It hides rather than reveals since 
income levels are used as a catch-all surrogate variable for all changes that take place with economic 
development29.  
Much empirical work has thus explored the inclusion of additional explanatory variables, which may 
also explain environmental quality change (see 2.2). They have generally focused on various factors 
such as openness to trade, income inequality, population density, technological changes or 
environmental awareness that corresponds to the theoretical links between income and environmental 
quality evoked in section 2.2.  
Overall, the influence of additional explanatory variables remains ambiguous. Suri and Chapman 
(1998) regress per capita energy consumption on income and income squares controlling for changes 
in manufactured imports and exports. They conclude that larger imports contribute to emission 
decreases and that including both import and export variables decreases the significance of the 
income levels and increases the estimated ITP from 56000 US-$ to 144000 US-$. The findings from 
Hettige et al. (1997) showed that toxic intensity decreases with openness of the economy but 
increases with income (Stagl, 1999). For a wider range of environmental indicators, the effect of 
openness to trade on the pollution-income relationship remains however mixed. 
The empirical evidence for income distribution is scarce. Most studies use the Gini coefficient as an 
additional regressor. The coefficient on income inequality generally remains insignificant even if it had 
the expected negative effect of higher income inequalities on the environmental quality (Magnani, 
2000a; Gangadharan and Valenzuela, 2001).  Results controlling for the distribution of political power 
and the type of political regime tend to show that greater inequality and poor democratic institutions 
aggravate pollution (Harbaugh et al., 2000; Torras and Boyce, 1998). 
                                                
28 Data are expressed in an identical currency taking account of the number of currency units of a comparison country required 
to buy goods equivalent to what can be bought with one unit of the currency of a base country (the U.S. in our study). Thus, a 
PPP is simply a rate of equivalence for comparable goods in local currency prices. 
29 However, to the extent that one speaks of a development path that involves a systematic relationship among these variables 
and per capita GDP growth, one would want to exclude these variables from the analysis (Selden and Song , 1994) 
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Panayotou (1997) includes population density as an additional variable in the EKC relationship. For 
SO2 emissions, his results show that when controlling for population density, ITP are higher. A similar 
result is found by Cropper and Griffiths (1994) for deforestation. Selden and Song (1994) get however 
opposite results for most air pollution concentrations. Kaufman et al. (1998) examine SO2 
concentration and test the hypothesis that the effect on environmental quality of the density of the 
population may change with development30. Their estimates conclude to a convex (U-shape) PIR.  
Several authors include also a time trend into the estimation to account for changes in technology and 
environmental awareness that are not related to income. When negative, the time trend indicates that 
the PIR shifts downward over time. However, when positive, we may find an EKC although the true 
PIR is monotonically increasing. Hence, the turning point estimates may be biased upward if the time 
trend is negative or biased downward if it is positive (Cole, 2000). 
Overall, results and conclusions regarding the EKC appear to vary when additional explanatory 
variables in addition to per capita income and per capita income square are included. Table 1.3 relates 
the results of Panayotou et al. (2000) on CO2 emissions when international trade and population site 
are considered.  
 
Tab. 1.3 Results from Panayotou et al. (2000) 
Dependent variable: (CO2 emissions 
per capita) 1 2 3 4 
Constant -26.52 -27.66 -30.36 -82.86 
 (-13.87) (-12.8) (-11) (-1.249) 
ln(GDP per capita) 5.38 (5.78) 6.32 7.98 
 (11.5) 11.5 (10.1) (15.3) 
ln(GDP per capita) square -0.25 -0.28 -0.31 -0.42 
 (-9.8) (-9.58) (-8.8) (-14.1) 
ln(exportation/GDP)  0.12 -0.22 -0.32 
  7.8 (1.2) (-1.97) 
ln(exportation/GDP)*ln(GDP per 
capita)   0.04 0.06 
   (1.91) (1.3) 
ln(population density)    0.59 
    (9.363) 
EKC non* oui oui oui 
ITP (in 1990 US-$) 47099  30377  26730  13360  
* The ITP estimated is higher than the highest income level in the sample. So no EKC exists. T-stat are in parentheses. 
 
 
Note that other explanatory variables have also sometimes been considered. Gandaharan and 
Valenzuela (2001) and Panayotou (1997) include some measure of the education level, Cropper and 
Griffith (1994) and Agras and Chapman (1999) test for the price level of environmentally related goods 
(such as wood prices in the case of case of deforestation and energy prices in the case of CO2). 
                                                
30 They include a composite variable equal to the product of population density and per capita income. 
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Finally, Grossman and Krueger (1995) take account of the geographical and climatic characteristic of 
the measurement sites.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the first chapter of this thesis was mainly to briefly introduce the principal theoretical 
and empirical researches that have examined the EKC hypothesis. From a theoretical point of view, it 
concludes that the shape of the PIR depends on the factors that shape the demand for and the supply 
of environmental quality. It also gives a brief overview of the characteristics of the empirical studies 
insisting upon the potential reasons that may explain the divergences among them. Several literature 
reviews (Ekins, 1997; Lieb, 2002, Panayotou, 2000) on the EKC indeed show that empirical estimates 
differ across studies. Both the theoretical causes of the EKC and the estimations characteristics may 
explain such an outcome. The theoretical considerations evoked in chapter 1 confirm that the different 
pollutants may follow divergent PIR. Furthermore, national characteristics (such as the political regime 
or the education sector) may also play a role. Empirically, the database, the specifications as well as 
the explanatory variable included in the regression may explain divergent results.  
Actually, conclusions from the literature review seem not uniform. Even if they generally cast doubt on 
the existence of the EKC, they do not formulate precise conclusions nor evoke the factor that may 
potentially favor (or not) its apparition. Therefore, they leave open the questions regarding the effect of 
using a particular functional form, a panel model or considering only rich economies in the estimation. 
In the second chapter of this thesis, we will thus attempt to shed some light on these issues by a 
meta-analytical procedure. 
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Appendix 1: Neoclassical model of growth including the environment 
We follow here Forster (1974), Vogel (1999) and Selden and Song (2001) and derive a dynamic 
optimization growth model accounting for the environment. This latter is introduced in by the disutility 
induce by pollution and the possibilities of diverting some resources to abatement activities.  
The instantaneous utility of the representative is given by U(X,Q) where X≥0 represents current 
consumption of a single homogeneous commodity and Q≥0 is the quality of the environment. Utility is 
increasing and strictly concave in each argument and the marginal utilities of X and Q are 
independent1:   
 
2 2
2 20, 0, 0, 0, 0
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂> < > < =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
U U U U U
X X Q Q X Q
 (A.1)  
 
Environmental quality is modelled as a flow, i.e. pollution does not accumulated but coincides with net 
emissions and is understood as the absence of pollution P: 
 ( , ) = −Q A K Q P  (A.2)  
 
where Q and P are strictly positive and Q (upper bar) is constant and represents the initial pristine 
state of the environment. Pollution increases in the stock of capital K employed in production F and 
can be countered by spending part of output on pollution abatement A. The environmental quality 
function Q(A,K) has the following properties for A≥0 and K>0: 
 
2
2 0
2 2
2
0, 0 , lim   <  
0, 0, 0
→
∂ ∂ ∂> ≤ ∞∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂< ≤ =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
A
Q Q Q
A A A
Q Q Q
K K A K
 (A.3) 
  
Environmental quality is thus increasing and concave in abatement A and decreasing and concave in 
man-made capital stock K. The limit term insures that marginal efficiency of abatement is bounded, 
allowing for corner solution of A2.  Total output F is given by: 
 ( ) α=F K K  (A.4) 
Output is devoted to consumption, saving or abatement. The equation of motion of real capital is 
therefore: 
 α∂ = − −∂
K K X A
t
 (A.5) 
 
The program aim at maximizing the intertemporal U by respect to X, A and the equation of motion of 
K, subject to (A.2), the non-negativity restriction and A and K(0)>0. The intertemporal utility is give by: 
 
0
( , ) ρ
∞
−∫ tU X Q e dt  (A.6) 
                                                 
1 Utility is thus additively separable between C and Q. 
2 This implies that abatement may be null at low income level. 
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where ρ is the constant rate of time preferences. 
The current value Hamiltonian is: 
 ( , ( , )) ( )µ α λ= + − − +H U X Q A K K X A A  (A.7) 
Where µ is the costate variable associate with the state K, and λ  is the Lagrangean multiplier on the 
non-negativity restriction on A. As Vogel (1999) proves that H is concave in X, A, and K, the first order 
conditions are sufficient for a global maximum. 
The first order conditions for optimum state: 
 0 µ∂ ∂= ⇔ =∂ ∂
H U
X X
 (A.8) 
   
 0 µ λ∂ ∂ ∂= ⇔ = +∂ ∂ ∂
H U Q
A Q A
 (A.9) 
   
 µα∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂
H U Q
K Q K
 (A.10) 
  
and the complementary slackness condition λ .0, A.0 and λ A.0. The transversality condition: 
 lim exp( ) 0µ ρ→∞ − =t K t  (A.11) 
provides the second boundary condition. Conditions (A.8) et (A.9) can be equated: 
 µ λ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ⇔ = = + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
H H U U Q
X A X Q A
 (A.12) 
Solving it for λ  gives 
 λ ∂ ∂ ∂= −∂ ∂ ∂
U Q U
X A Q
 (A.12) 
As the positive variation of environmental quality following an incremental increase in abatement 
corresponds to the decrease of emissions due to this latter, i.e, / /∂ ∂ = −∂ ∂Q A E A , (A.12) reads:  
 λ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂
U E U
X A Q
 (A.13) 
The first term of the right-hand side of (A.13) is the marginal utility of consumption. Abating pollution 
induce foregoing consumption, hence the marginal utility of consumption is the opportunity cost of a 
better environment. Under hypothesis (A.1), the higher the level of consumption, the lower is its 
marginal utility and the lower is the opportunity loss due to abatement. The second term of the right-
hand side of (A.13) represents the negative of the benefit of abatement. λ is therefore the difference 
between the marginal opportunity cost and the marginal benefit of abatement and need to vanish 
before abatement occurs. 
Vogel (1999) derives on this basis an EKC by investigating howλ varies with economic growth. During 
early stage of economic development (called the development phase), no abatement is carried 
Chapter 1. Appendixes 
-45- 
sinceλ is larger than zero. Q decline strictly while capital is accumulated. λ  declines with con-
sumption and capital increases.  
Setting A=0 and differentiating (A.13) yields: 
 
2
2 < 0
λ ∂= ∂
d U
dX X
 and (A.14) 
 
2
2 < 0
λ ∂ ∂ ∂= ∂ ∂ ∂
d U Q Q
dK Q A K
 (A.15) 
As soon as 0λ = , the economy enter the environment phase abatement is carried over. 
Differentiating (A.13) with respect to time (t), setting  (A.13) 0λ = , and solving for change in A yields: 
 
2 2
2 2
22 2
2 2
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂−∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
U X U Q Q K
A X t Q A K t
t U Q U Q
Q A Q A
 if 0λ =  (A.16) 
 
Using the time derivative of the environmental quality function: 
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
Q Q K Q A
t K t A t
 (A.17) 
 
Substituting (A.14) into (A.15) leads to: 
 
 
2 2
2 2
22 2
2 2
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂−∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
U Q X U Q Q K
Q X A t Q K A t
t U Q U Q
Q A Q A
 if 0λ =  (A.18) 
 
(A.16) shows that abatement increases with growing consumption and capital stock and (A.18) shows 
that environmental quality increases with growing consumption but decreases with the capital stock 
during the environment phase ( 0)λ = . 
(A.16) allows considering the factors that influence the duration of the development rate and the rate 
at which abatement increases in the subsequent environment phase. Contributing to an early and 
rapid increase in abatement are a high marginal efficacy of abatement ( / )∂ ∂Q A , i.e. the inverse of 
the marginal abatement cost, and a large direct effect of growth on pollution. Abatement increases 
also faster the more quickly marginal utility of consumption declines with growing consumption and the 
more quickly the marginal utility of environmental quality increases with decrease in environmental 
quality. 
The sign of (A.18) remains ambiguous since the two terms in the numerator have opposite signs while 
the denominator is negative. Thus, as long as the negative left hand term dominates the positive right 
hand-term, the numerator is negative and environmental quality increases. The possibility of an U-
shape curve for environmental quality and hence an EKC for pollution, is embedded in the previous 
model. As revealed by Selden and Song (1994), the factors influencing Q are essentially the same as 
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those affecting abatement. However, whether environmental quality increases, remains constants or 
decreases in the environment phase depends on the functional forms of U(X,Q) and Q(A, K).  
For example, if the marginal abatement costs are constant ( / )∂ ∂ =A Q a , (A.18) simplifies to: 
 
12 2
2 2
− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂=  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
Q U U Xa
t X Q t
 (A.18) 
which is unambiguously positive. When abatement is increasingly costly, this result does not hold and 
any increases in Q are delayed. The rate at which increasing abatement cost offsets the s the demand 
effect associated with rising income depends on a number of factors including the pace of growth in K 
and the impact of that growth on environmental quality. Technology advances may lead to a lower 
impact of growth on environmental quality. However, historically, the new technology appears rather 
associated with increase pollution level. Identically, the possibility that development reduces the 
carrying capacity of the environment may necessitate ever greater abatement effort to offset the direct 
effects of growth on environmental quality. 
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Introduction 
When a specific question has generated a large volume of empirical work, when the characteristics 
and results are similar, especially in terms of the question considered and the methodological 
approaches used, a logical question to ask is whether this material can be systematically processed to 
generate comprehensive and concise conclusions. Usually, the researchers respond to this 
expectation by conducting in-depth literature reviews. This chapter aims to investigate an alternative 
statistical approach, called meta-analysis, towards reviewing a variety of empirical results.  In our 
setting, it aims to compare and sort out the empirical results on the Environmental Kuznets Curves 
(hereafter EKC). The short presentation of the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the EKC 
realized in chapter 1 constitutes a prerequisite for constructing the following meta-analysis. 
This chapter is structured as follows. As the meta-analytical approach remains marginal in economics, 
we shall begin by presenting a short overview of the aims, the advantages and the possible 
drawbacks of the meta-analytical procedure (section 1). Section 2 examines the feasibility and the 
pertinence of the meta-analytical tools regarding the EKC’s empirical literature. Sections 3 and 4 
contain the meta-analysis of the EKC. Section 3 is devoted to the construction of the database and to 
the computation of estimates. Section 4 presents and interprets the results. Conclusions follow in 
section 5. 
 
1 Theoretical foundations of the Meta-analysis: an overview 
1.1 Definition and aims of the meta-analysis  
A meta-analysis is a collection of quantitative techniques that aim to derive additional knowledge from 
analyzing a well-defined collection of independent, but similar studies. It is considered the analysis of 
analyses since its primary materials are composed of the previously obtained research results. Glass1 
(1976) provided a widely accepted formal definition of meta-analysis. He states: meta-analysis refers 
to the statistical analysis of a large collection of results from individual studies for the purpose of 
integrating the findings… It connotes a rigorous alternative to the casual, narrative discussions of 
research studies, which typify our attempt to make sense of the rapidly expanding research literature. 
 
The meta-analysis completes two objectives (Van den Bergh et al., 1997). First, the meta-analysis 
integrates the results obtained by various empirical studies, called primary studies, in order to 
elaborate the « best » possible measure of a phenomenon. The term “best measure” is rather 
ambiguous. It simply means that the final unique result is based on the whole body of empirical work 
examining a specific question. However, this result might be biased since it might also rely on 
erroneous empirical estimations. The second aim of the meta-analysis is to compare the previously 
obtained empirical results in order to identify why there are variations between them. In other words, 
this procedure aims to identify if the setting and research design of the primary studies might explain 
                                                 
1 G.V. Glass is considered a pioneer of the meta-analysis. His research has concentrated on the field of psychometrics. 
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their respective results2. Findley and Cooper (1983) illustrate these two objectives in a meta-analysis 
examining the relation between locus of control beliefs and achievement in schools3. In discussing 
their objectives, the authors state: this review has two primary goals: (a) to obtain an estimate of the 
strength, as well as of the direction, of the relation between locus of control and academic 
achievement, and (b) to examine those variations in people, settings and instruments that appear to 
influence the relation’s strength. 
As a research method, the meta-analysis has a longstanding and fairly strong position in experimental 
sciences (medicine, psychology, education). It addresses mainly the first objective: the effects sizes, 
i.e. the measures elaborated by each primary study, are combined in one unique result. Besides that 
one integrated result is easier to interpret, the meta-analysis allows increasing the sample size by 
combining experiments and, therefore, the statistical reliability of the result. In the empirical literature, 
individual studies refer to the statistical significance of their findings. Statistical significance is 
considered good, nonsignificance is considered bad. This focus on significance can be misleading 
since repeated measures in the same direction across several studies, even if not significant, are 
much more powerful statistical evidence than a single significant result. In a meta-analysis, the 
significance of any given effect size will keep the size of the sample considered in perspective. In this 
setting, two studies with exactly the same effect size can vary greatly in their significant level 
depending simply upon the size of the sample used. The meta-analysis thus provides the opportunity 
for even small or nonsignificant effects to contribute to the overall picture of the results of a research 
enterprise (Rosenthal, 1991; Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 2001).  
The second aim of the meta-analysis intends to explore the similarities and differences underlying an 
empirical body of work. Several authors named it meta-regression (Stanley, 2001) where the 
explained variable is a statistical outcome of the primary studies (the value of a parameter, a statistical 
test) and the explanatory variables capture the non-sampling issues such as estimation techniques, 
research design and model specification. In this setting, the meta-analysis completes and verifies the 
conclusions of the traditional literature reviews. The meta-analysis in economics and more generally in 
social sciences, as the one conducted in this thesis, concentrates generally on this second objective.  
 
1.2 Meta-analyses in economics 
While the meta-analytical approach has a long pedigree in sciences, its adoption in economics is 
relatively recent and is still rare. Florax (2002) counts about forty economic meta-analyses between 
1980 and 2001. Around half of them focus on the monetary value of environmental services (amenity, 
pollution disposal). It is not accidental that the early meta-analyses contributions in economics can be 
found in valuation research. The technique of non-market evaluation, using contingent valuation, travel 
cost method, and hedonic pricing obviously raises the question of whether these techniques have 
                                                 
2  Woodward (2001) exposes a third meta-analytical aim that is to conduct a new empirical study by integrating the samples 
used by several primary studies. Other sources (Van den Bergh et al., 1997; Florax, 2002a, 2002b; Wolf, 1986) do not mention 
this procedure. In our opinion, such a process is not a meta-analysis since the results of the primary studies are not considered. 
3 Locus of control may be qualified either internal or external. Some people, labeled internals, feel more responsible for the 
things that happen to them. Other people, labeled external feel that forces beyond their control determine their outcomes in life. 
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sufficient validity and power to be useful in solving the valuation issue intrinsic in most environmental 
policy choices (Florax et al., 2002a). Moreover, because most valuation methods are based on 
extensive surveys and hence elicit information that is costly to acquire, speculation arose as to 
whether estimated values would be transferable. This research area was obviously prone to being 
combined with meta-analyses since this latter technique provides reliable indications on the 
determinants of the value obtained by each primary study and would hence be more effective as a 
prediction for a comparable site that has not been examined in detail4.  
Although environmental economics has been leading the way, the concept of meta-analysis is now 
also being picked up in other areas in economics, more particularly in labor economics (Card and 
Krueger, 1995; Ashenfelter et al., 1999), in industrial organization (Fuller and Hester, 1998), in 
transport economics (Button and Kerr, 1996; Button, 1995; Wardman, 2001) as well as in marketing 
(Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999).  
As said earlier, the economic meta-analysis aims to explore the determinants of the previously 
obtained research results rather than combining them in one unique value. For example, Card and 
Krueger (1995) estimate a meta-regression on the relationship between minimum wages and 
unemployment rates. Loomis and White (1996) examine the willingness to pay estimates for the 
preservation of endangered species. Blaeij et al. (2000) estimate the determinants of the value of 
statistical life in road safety and Sayman and Öncüler (2002) address the question of the disparity 
between the willingness to pay and the willingness to accept estimates. Even if economists rarely 
used the meta-analytical tool in order to construct a unique measure of a phenomenon, some 
exceptions exist. Cavlovic et al. (2001), for instance, use the meta-analytical approach to predict 
EKC’s income turning points (ITP), which are considered as more reliable than ITP obtained by any 
single study. Laroche (2000) computed a unique correlation coefficient between labor union force and 
productivity by integrating the results from 78 primary studies.  
However, as previously mentioned, our meta-analysis will not attempt to draw one unique estimate. It 
rather wishes to examine the determinants of the results obtained by the primary studies. In the 
remaining part of this chapter, we will refer more specifically to the meta-regression approach. 
However, the terms “meta-analysis” and “meta-regression” will be considered as synonymous. 
 
2 Pertinence of a meta-regression analysis  
Several conditions have to be examined for establishing the pertinence of the meta-analytical 
procedure. The theoretical considerations on the meta-analysis are vast (Cooper and Hedges, 1994; 
Wolf, 1986; Glass et al., 1983), but only a subset of contributions (Van den Bergh, 1997; Stanley, 
2001; Florax, 2002) examines its applicability to the field of economics. Two arguments are recurrent 
                                                 
4 The meta-analyses of Button (2003), Shrestha and Loomis (2001) and Rosenberg and Loomis (2000) aim at transferring 
estimates of existing studies to other contexts. However, Brouwer (2000) reveals that the experience with value transfer has not 
been very successful since transfer errors as large as 56% to 475% have been observed. 
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when considering this question. First, the meta-analysis completes rather than replaces the traditional 
economic literature reviews.  Second, several practical constraints might however hinder its use.  
 
2.1 Meta-analyses and literature review  
The meta-regression approach is valuable since it allows to complete and control the conclusions of 
literature reviews. However, it cannot replace them. This is quite obvious since the collection of the 
primary studies as well as the choice of the pertinent explanatory variables necessitate information on 
the “landscape” of a research domain. Usually, this knowledge is elicited by in-depth literature reviews. 
However, the meta-regression avoids the deficiencies of literature reviews since it gives up the purely 
narrative approach and adopts a protocol, which relies on precise methodological rules. In particular, 
the meta-regression moves away from the taxonomies of findings, which often characterize literature 
reviews, and provides a basis for reducing the level of subjectivity inherent in any reviewing activity 
(Van den Bergh et al., 1997).  
According to Stanley (2001), the main problem of literature reviews is that the reviewer may introduce 
a substantial bias by omitting portions of the literature, usually on alleged methodological grounds. 
When reviewing an empirical literature, many economists become (consciously or not) Bayesian, 
holding strong preferences formed on the basis of theoretical considerations and raising high barriers 
to any contrary empirical evidence5. Stanley (2001) gives some proof of this omitted literature bias by 
examining the reviewing activities on Ricardian equivalence. When examining the EKC literature 
reviews (Yandle et al., 2002; Lieb, 2002; Borghesi, 2000; Panayotou, 2000; Ekins, 1995, 1997), similar 
conclusions may be drawn. First, none of them include all the available studies and the selection 
criteria of the studies considered by the reviewers are absent or vague. Ekins (1995, 1997) selects 10 
empirical studies. He neither justifies this selection nor considers the available gray literature. 
Panayotou (2000) considers around 30 studies and Lieb’s (2002) review covers around 40 studies. 
Once again, no justification for this selection is given and no attention is devoted to unpublished 
studies6. Yandle et al. (2002) select only 15 studies that they consider major studies, but do not 
explicit their « major studies » criterion. Strand (2002) and Borghesi (2000), who examine only 7 
studies, have not avoided this selection bias either.  
A second drawback of the reviewing activity lies in the difficulty to keep track of the characteristics of 
the primary studies. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the economic research in nearly 
every field is growing explosively. The literature reviews face a trade-off between the traceability of the 
characteristics of the primary studies and the number of them that may be considered. Copper and 
Hedges (1994) reveals in this regard that the literature reviews tend to be problematic since they use 
very broad and mutually exclusive categories in order to classify the primary studies. The conclusion 
elaborated on this basis may therefore have forgone important distinctions when examining the 
variability of the estimates. When the empirical literature on the EKC is examined in detail, one quickly 
realizes that synthesizing the literature in an exhaustive manner is nearly impossible because 
                                                 
5 In this regard, Demetz (1974) said believing is seeing in some reviewing activity (Demetz, 1974). 
6 Lieb (2002) integrates  
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heterogeneous estimates are obtained using disparate techniques and data. The literature reviews on 
the EKC therefore present the results of the primary studies according to broad and imprecise 
categories such as the type of pollution (Ekins, 1997, 1999), the explanatory variables included 
(Panayotou, 2000; Borghesi, 2000) or the econometric specifications used. None of them determines 
the relative influence of these characteristics on the estimates. The meta-analytical approach 
overcomes these difficulties by using the appropriate statistical tools. The insight it offers is useful to 
researchers since it reveals the degree to which empirical estimates are sensitive to slight modeling 
changes. 
A third criticism that can be addressed to literature reviews stresses the unreliability of the vote 
counting procedure. This latter technique refers to the practice of counting significantly positive, 
significantly negative and insignificant results. The inference that a specific category often occurs is 
taken as evidence for the size and direction of the true effect. The EKC’s reviews presents tables that 
summarize each primary study and may be used in a vote-counting procedure (see for example Ekins, 
1997; Panayotou, 2000 or Lieb, 2002). The problems with vote counting are that one can define a 
positive result in different ways, and more importantly, vote counting treats each study, and thus each 
result, as being equal. A vote derived from a study with a small sample size is equivalent to votes from 
a study using a larger dataset. Furthermore, a vote from a study in which the magnitude of the 
observed effect is very small is equal to a study in which the magnitude of the observed effect is very 
large. Because vote counting does not take into account the sample size of the studies, vote counting 
is biased towards studies with small sample sizes, since studies with large sample sizes and small 
sample sizes are given the same weight. The results of vote counts are thus biased, the method has 
low statistical power, and most importantly it fails to provide critical information on the overall results of 
the body of studies. It is interesting to note that not only are the problems of vote-counting procedures 
not ameliorated by including a greater number of studies in one's synthesis, but that the power of this 
technique actually decreases as more information (more studies) is available, tending to zero as the 
number of studies becomes large (Hedges and Olkins 1980, 1985)7.  
The meta-analysis allows going beyond the vote-counting procedure and may overcome the 
limitations of standard reviewing activities. However, this does not mean that literature reviews should 
be abandoned since they facilitate the access to the information required by the meta-analysis. In the 
case of the EKC, the literature reviews allowed us, for example, to determine some of the explanatory 
variables that should be included in the meta-regression. Panayotou (1997) stresses indeed the 
influence of the inclusion of additional explanatory variables (putting aside GDP per capita and GDP 
per capita squared) on EKC estimates. Borghesi (2000) insists on the influence of the econometric 
technique used. Stagl (1999) puts forward that the unit considered to measure pollution (tons per 
capita or concentration level) might also be part of the story. Even if the literature reviews are not able 
to measure the characteristics of the results obtained, they nevertheless indicate what a researcher 
                                                 
7 This is due to the fact that Type-II errors (i.e., the effect is nonzero, but the reviewer fails to count the effect as positive and 
significant) do not cancel (for the proof, see Hedges and Olkins, 1985). Consequently, the vote-counting method tends on 
average to lead to the wrong conclusion more often as the number of studies increases. 
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has to look for when examining the primary studies. In this regard, literature reviews and a meta-
analysis are complementary tools, which allow to draw conclusions from an empirical body of work. 
 
2.2 Limitations of the meta-analysis 
The meta-analytical approach has its advantages. Unfortunately, it has also, like any statistical tool, its 
own weaknesses. The meta-analysis is plagued by several methodological problems (Glass et al., 
1981; Stanley, 2001): the selection or publication bias, the presence of heterogeneity among studies 
and dependence of study result. 
 
2.2.1 Selection and publication bias 
The first drawback of the meta-regression approach is concerned with attaining a representative 
sample of the literature. Even if access to modern bibliographical tools (Econlit, for example) and the 
availability of many working papers through the web have greatly facilitated the research of pertinent 
primary studies, it remains very challenging to assess that a particular sample of studies appropriately 
represents the population of studies.  
Meta-analysts are particularly afraid that the process of literature retrieval is such that the likelihood of 
sampling a study is correlated with the result it contains. This may be due to a restrictive sampling 
over time, within a country or a language or alternatively because of focus on a specific theoretical or 
modeling approach. In this regard, one principal aggravating factor is the possibility that the well-
known published (and easily accessible) studies present a biased sample of what has been found by 
researchers. As Olkins (1990) points out, there might be a « statistical star wars » effect if journal 
editors tend to reject insignificant or disappointing results. Furthermore, the researchers may actually 
self-censor. Ashenfelter et al. (1999) claim that economists share theoretical presumptions and 
therefore tend to leave their contradictory results in the file-drawer. Consequently, available results will 
tend to overestimate the size and the significance of the effect size. Card and Krueger’s (1995) meta-
analysis presents an example of the file-drawer problem. When examining the relationship between a 
change in minimum wage and the unemployment rate, they observed that a large number of studies 
found a negative employment effect with t-values close to the value of 2. The clear implication is that 
published studies are not a random draw of estimated minimum wage effects. 
Many studies might also stay out of reach. This is the case of the consultancy studies undertaken by 
both the public and private sector since confidentiality problems might exclude them from available 
primary studies. Furthermore, when available, the results may not be presented objectively when they 
are used as vehicles of policy advocacy or simplified for the sake of public comprehension. 
Most economic meta-analyses do not consider the potential emergence of a selection and publication 
bias8. However, in some cases, it is possible to test for its presence. Florax (2001) presents and 
illustrates the available procedures. Common techniques range from graphical funnel graph analysis9 
                                                 
8 This problem also happens in literature reviews. 
9 This is a quasi-statistical technique, introduced by Light and Pillemer (1984), which relies on a graphical analysis where the 
effect site estimates are plotted on the horizontal axis and the sample size of the respective studies on the vertical axis. 
Distortions of the funnel like shape (with the tip pointed up, and centered on the true effect size under the null hypothesis of no 
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(Card and Krueger, 1995) to estimating the number of additional studies that would be necessary in 
order to inverse the conclusion10 (fail-safe N, file drawer test) or the use of a two-stage Heckman 
selection model11. Another approach aims to estimate two separate regressions for published and 
unpublished results or to include a dummy variable catching published studies. A final technique 
consists of using the model of publication bias developed by Hedges (1992). This model is based on 
the assumption that the probability of observing a study is a function of the p-value, whereby studies 
with lower p-values are more likely to be observed (Ashenfelter et al., 1999).  
Overall, the importance of publication bias remains a controversial question, as the distinction 
between published and unpublished studies is time dependent (since numerous working papers may 
finally be published). Furthermore, the focus on publication bias should not be overemphasized since 
the whole selection process of the primary studies is finally at sake (Smith and Huang, 1995). In this 
regard, we have to note that the problem of representativeness is not specific to meta-analyses but to 
the whole non-experimental empirical literature.  
 
2.2.2 Heterogeneity among studies 
The second drawback addresses the comparability of the estimated effect size. This critique claims 
that meta-analyses are comparing and mixing “apples and oranges” and gives as an outcome an 
average value of their weight, perfume or color (Glass et al., 1981). It designates the fact that studies 
examining an identical question may not be directly comparable since their research design, type of 
data, estimator, functional forms and specification may differ.  
This type of heterogeneity is not always straightforward. For instance, elasticity estimates may differ 
as for their estimation method (double logarithmic vs point estimates evaluated at the sample mean of 
prices and quantities) or time horizon (short-run vs long-run). These estimates are incomparable and 
these differences therefore have to be modeled in the meta-regression (by fixed or random effects). 
Identically, the comparison of EKC estimates on logarithmic or linear specifications is problematic. The 
”apples and oranges critique” constitutes a bigger concern in social and economic sciences since the 
degree of heterogeneity of the relevant studies is quite important12.  
The heterogeneity among primary studies might however also constitutes an advantage when one 
wishes to trace the influence of different specifications, data and research designs on the estimates. In 
other words, it might be a good thing to mix apples and oranges if one wants to generalize about fruit 
since studies that are exactly the same in all respects are actually limited in generalizability.  
In addition to this substantive heterogeneity, the distribution of the effect tends to be heteroscedastic, 
because estimated effects sizes are based on studies with different sample sizes. We expect therefore 
                                                                                                                                                        
publication bias) may be taken as an indication that publication bias is present. The selection effect on the basis of significance 
and size is signaled by a graph that is skewed to the right or left, or with the lower center part missing (Florax, 2001). 
10  See Rosenthal (1979). 
11 See Heckman (1990) for a review. 
12 In medicine and sciences, replication is frequent and empirical studies have to follow an established protocol. On the contrary, 
in economics, it seems to be a common desideratum of research that the investigator be original and innovative (Florax et al., 
2002a). This consideration is very subjective. However, when one looks at the research motivations in the abstracts of 
published papers, the terms original, new contribution, new evidences are frequent. Furthermore, many studies put forward in 
their introduction or conclusion that “to the authors’ knowledge, the present study has not already been done”. 
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to find a positive relationship between the sample size and the statistical power or significance of the 
effect size. This heterogeneity may be treated adequately by specifying a fixed or random effect model 
(Jeppessen et al., 2002), the application of either a weighted regression (Cavlovic et al., 2000) or a 
heteroscedasticity robust variance estimator (Woodward and Wui, 2001). 
A third aspect of heterogeneity among studies addresses the fact that the quality of the primary 
studies may differ. However, even if the meta-analytical approach can again weigh primary studies’ 
results according to their quality differences, the problem is that constructing objective quality 
indicators is inherently difficult. As Cooper (1986, 67) points out, even if justified by the analyst, the 
decision to weigh, include or exclude studies on a “a priori” basis requires the analyst to make an 
overall judgment of quality that is often too subjective to be credible. Economic meta-analyses have 
usually not considered this issue. In this regard, one might claim that literature reviews do this better. 
However, even if subjective quality judgments are easier to formulate in a literature review, their 
adequacy remains controversial.  Furthermore, literature reviews usually compare only a few studies 
and do not have to order the whole sample of primary studies according to their quality (as a meta-
analytical quality judgment would require)13.   
The theoretical literature on the meta-analysis offers several options in order to select studies 
according to their quality. The most usual one is the published-unpublished distinction, which 
recommends selecting only the published primary studies since the reviewing process guarantees a 
high qualitative level. However, this procedure might generate a publication bias. Furthermore, 
publication may be a poor indicator of quality since there are now far more academic journals, which 
while offering the scope for easier diffusion of research findings, may also make it easier for poor 
quality research to appear in print (Van den Bergh et al., 1997). Another possibility is to let subjective 
reviewing considerations distinguish between high quality and low quality studies and to control if the 
latter give systematically alternative results. Woodward et Wui (2001) proceed this way by classifying 
the studies in three groups of different quality according to the apparent coverage of the database 
used as well as the methodological and econometric consistency. The meta-regressions then examine 
if the outcomes of high quality studies are systematically different14. 
 
2.2.3 Independence of results 
A final problem of the meta-analytical approach concerns the assumption of independence of the 
observations. In experimental sciences, this assumption may be defended since the tradition of 
replication allows the meta-analyst to select one estimate per study without running into degrees of 
freedom problems. In economics, the number of available studies is generally limited and each study 
examines competitive specifications. The meta-analyst must therefore select several observations 
from the same study. As these observations are usually derived from the same database, the 
assumption of independence of the observations does not hold (Florax et al., 2002a).  
                                                 
13 The literature reviews of Ekins (1997, 194-195) on the EKC illustrate this point. The authors favor the results on air pollution 
obtained by Selden and Song (1994) and disregard the study of Panayotou (1993). Quality differences explain this choice. 
However, they are not compared to other studies on air pollution. 
14 Note that other meta-analysts have selected studies according to other considerations. For example, Nelson (1980) considers 
only the « best » studies, but does not give more precise criteria for this selection. Button and Weyman-Jones (1994) reject the 
studies that do not pass some arbitrary statistical cut-off point. 
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If observations are dependent, one will expect that results emanating from one piece of original 
research will be more similar than those coming from different studies. In econometric terms this will 
manifest itself as correlation in the error terms associated with the estimates from the same studies. 
Most meta-analyses disregard this problem even if it might be shown that this form of 
heteroscedasticity will have a downward bias on the standard errors estimated on the coefficients, 
erroneously increasing the coefficients’ apparent significance. Varying solutions to overcome this 
statistical problem have been proposed15. The solution of Loomis and White (1996) is straightforward 
as he considers only one observation per study and rejects the others16. Espey (1998) examines the 
correlation matrix between error terms for studies offering more than 4 observations. A dummy 
variable is then introduced for every subset of observations whose errors are strongly correlated17. 
Doucouliagos (1995) takes into consideration the average of the observations of each primary study. 
Finally, Day (1999) accounts for the clustering of estimates by study allowing observations to be 
dependent inside a cluster (i.e., a primary study) and independent between clusters. 
 
2.3 Feasibility of the meta-analytical approach on the EKC studies 
Before conducting a meta-analysis on a particular research question, one has to examine its 
feasibility. The following three elements seem essential. 
First, the empirical literature should be vast and well documented. The empirical literature on the EKC 
is large as we can list around eighty empirical studies. However, some of them have not been 
considered since they are poorly documented or remain not comparable. This informational problem is 
not rare in economics and social sciences since empirical studies do not have to follow strict 
standards requiring the researchers to present results and statistics in a precise manner (as it is the 
case in medical sciences)18.  
The second factor is also obvious. It recognizes that the meta-analytical approach is valuable if the 
debate raised by the empirical literature examined is not closed. As a matter of fact, it would not be 
pertinent to devote time and resources for a meta-analysis on empirical literature supporting already 
well-established conclusions. Chapter 1 has shown that many controversial issues concerning the 
EKC are still under discussion.   
Finally, in order to conduct a meta-regression, the empirical literature on the subject should be 
sufficiently diversified if one wants to trace the influence of various estimation techniques, research 
designs, or data used on the results of the primary studies. However, as said earlier, this empirical 
literature must also be sufficiently homogeneous in terms of size effect and statistical information in 
order to allow adequate comparisons. In other words, there is a trade-off between the inclusion of 
                                                 
15 In a meta-analysis, the familiar Durbin-Watson statistic cannot be used to test for autocorrelation since the structure of 
autocorrelation is not identical to time series analyses. The latter have a unidirectional structure going from past to present 
whereas multidimensional autocorrelation apply in the context of meta-analysis (Florax, 2002). Therefore the time-series 
estimators for autoregressive and moving average models are not appropriate statistical tools for meta-analyses.  
16 Such a procedure however is problematic since one has to decide quite subjectively which observation to select.  
17 As far as this dummy variable is not correlated to another variable of the model. 
18 Most economic meta-analyses have to reject some studies due to the absence of crucial information, see for example 
Sayman and Oncüler (2002). 
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heterogeneous studies and the comparability of the size effect measure. When examining the 
empirical literature on the EKC, one may decide to examine either the form of the relationship between 
environmental indicators and GDP per capita or to focus only on the value of the income turning points 
for the studies resulting in an EKC. We choose to conduct several estimations in order examine these 
two effects sizes.  
Overall, the empirical literature on the EKC fulfills the conditions required for conducting a meta-
analytical approach. Moreover, Van den Bergh (1997) mentions the EKC as a pertinent domain for a 
meta-analysis. To our knowledge, one meta-analysis on the EKC has been realized (Cavlovic et al., 
2000). However, this previous work did not ruin our interest for this question since we constructed a 
larger database and also used alternative empirical models. However, the meta-analysis of Cavlovic et 
al. (2000) will be useful since it allows us to check and compare our results and interpretations. 
 
3 Meta-regression of EKC studies  
Stanley (2001) presents a meta-analytical procedure. This “state of the art” protocol follows from 
experimental sciences but has been adapted to the specificities and characteristics of the economic 
empirical literature. As said earlier, we aim at estimating a meta-regression in order to determine 
which elements of the primary studies influence the results that emanate from them.  
We will use the meta-analytical protocol elaborated by Stanley (2001) and, therefore, the present 
meta-analysis will be constructed according to the 5 following steps: 
1) Construction of the database. 
2) Choice of an effect size and reduction of the evidence to a common metric. 
3) Choice of explanatory, or moderator, variables. 
4) Running of the meta-regression. 
5) Examination of the validity of the results, comparisons with alternative empirical evidence 
rejected from the meta-analysis. 
 
Best meta-analytical practices require giving details on each of these steps in order to avoid the 
subjectivity inherent to traditional literature reviews.  
 
3.1 Construction of the database 
The meta-analysis begins with the construction of a database including the primary relevant studies. A 
resolute emphasis has to be placed on including all studies, published or not, as a way of reducing 
potential selection bias introduced by a nonrandom selection of studies. A typical database has to 
include publication details, the estimates of the effects sizes and information about its distribution, 
estimation characteristics and background variables such as the type of data used or the time period 
on which the study pertains. Even if the construction of a database on EKC primary studies does not 
necessitate much theoretical consideration, it does face, in practice, several difficulties. 
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As explained earlier, the most obvious difficulty is to get access to the whole body of pertinent 
empirical studies on the EKC.  In order to avoid a possible nonrandom selection of studies, we 
conducted an extensive bibliographical research on the EKC. We therefore used several research 
databases (Econlit, Dissertation Abstracts, RePEc19 and JSTOR), we also consulted the websites of 
economic review editors (ELSEVIER, Kluwer, etc.) and of international organizations (World Bank, 
OECD, UNO, and WTO). We also used standard Internet research tools such as Scirus and Google. 
Finally, the bibliography of literature reviews conducted on the EKC completes our search. In each 
enquiry, we used several keywords such as “growth and environment”, “inverted U curve” and 
“environmental Kuznets curve”20. We selected in each case the entire set of available years (until 
December 2002).  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.I Selection procedures 
(Adapted from ANAES, 2000) 
 
Overall, more than 200 sources were found. This first list contained published and unpublished as well 
as empirical and theoretical work. In order to select the pertinent empirical literature on the EKC, we 
followed a selection process composed of three steps. Figure 2.I presents the latter.  
First, we examined the title, abstracts and keywords of each study. This allowed us to check all the 
purely theoretical work and to focus only on studies that offer empirical evidence on the EKC. 
Secondly, we examined the empirical estimations available in each study. At this stage, we rejected 
                                                 
19 Research Papers in Economics 
20 One may note that the term Environmental Kuznets curve is not an adequate keyword for pinpointing the earliest studies as 
they do not refer to it in this manner. Indeed, the original studies examining the relationship between environmental quality 
indicators and GDP per capita used the term inverted U curve. 
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studies presenting incomplete statistical results. Our database reduced to 67 primary studies 
composed of published papers, working and discussion papers as well as PhD dissertations. Finally, 
we carefully read the available studies and rejected part of them in order to preserve the homogeneity 
of our database. For this last cut, we adopted the following criteria. 
• The primary studies examining time series evidence (i.e. examining the pollution path of one 
individual country through time) have been excluded. The following reasons justify this choice. 
First, as these studies examine only one country, they do not address the general occurrence 
of the EKC relationship. Furthermore, time-series estimates are not comparable to the ones 
issued from the majority of studies that use panel or cross-countries data. Overall, 8 primary 
studies have been omitted.  
• Secondly, we considered only the studies based on one of the 6 econometric specifications 
presented in chapter 1 (quadratic and cubic specification in level or logarithm). Therefore, the 
observations relying on non-parametric analyses in Amazohou et al. (2001), the observations 
of Bradford et al. (2000) based on the BSS specification and those of Galeotti et al. (2001) 
based on Weibull and gamma specifications have been excluded (see chapter 1, section 3.1). 
Once again, the impossibility of properly comparing them with the rest of the literature 
explained this choice.  
• Finally, we rejected some observations that examine very particular types of pollution. For 
example, Heerink et al. (2001) is the only study that examined the concentration of 
phosphorus and nitrogen nutrients in the soil of sub-Saharan countries. As pollution type tends 
to influence the pollution-income path observed, the meta-regression has to control for the 
pollutant considered in primary studies. We therefore rejected these «isolated» observations 
in order to limit the number of moderator variables.  
Tab. 2.1 Rejected observations  
Studies excluded Causes of exclusion 
Tharakan et al. (2001) Times series analysis of China, India, Indonesia, Japan and Pakistan, lack of statistical information 
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) Replicated in the study of Shafik (1994)  
Roberts and Grimes (1997) Lack of statistical information 
Unruh and Moomaw (1998) Lack of statistical information, the study is based on a graphical analysis (phase diagram)  
Egli (2002) Time series analysis of Germany 
Lindmark (2002) Time series analysis of Sweden 
Mhenni (2002) Time series analysis of Tunisia 
Roca et al. (2001) Time series analysis of Spain 
Lim (1997) Time series analysis of South Korea 
Raymond (2004) Unique study using the environmental sustainability index as an indicator of environmental quality 
Heerinks et al. (2001) The observations on nitrogen and phosphorus in the soil are rejected This is the only study using those indicators. 
Cole et al. (1997) 
The observations on methane emissions are rejected This is the only study using this 
indicator. Furthermore, methane emissions are mainly due to non-anthropic causes 
(fermentation) and therefore are a very poor indicator of pollution due to economic 
activities.  
Frankel and Rose (2002) Observations on energetic losses are rejected 
Galeotti and Lanza (1999) Weibull estimations are rejected 
Bradford et al. (2000) BSS (named after authors’ initials) estimations are rejected 
Amazohou and Van Phu (2001) Non-parametric estimations are rejected 
Shi (2001) Observations on total pollution instead of pollution per capita or concentration are rejected.  
Levinson and Hilton (1998) Observations on lead emissions in the air are rejected.  
Hauer and Runge (2002) Lack of statistical information 
Barbier (2004) Observations on total agricultural area are rejected.  
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Table 2.1 presents the rejected observations. However, the latter will not be completely omitted since 
we will compare their findings with the conclusions emanating from the meta-analysis later on (see 
section 4.5).   
Another obvious difficulty we faced throughout the literature retrieval process was to access to a 
concrete paper version of the references found. Usually, primary studies are easily accessible. 
However, some references have not been found either because the working paper series was 
exhausted or their authors could not been contacted21.  
Overall, the final database counts 49 studies (from 1992 to 2003) emanating from 44 researchers or 
group of researchers. 72% of them are published22. These 49 studies offer overall 286 observations 
on the EKC. Figure 2.II presents their time distribution. 
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Fig. 2.II Empirical studies and observations on the EKC 
 
3.2 Choice of the effect size and reduction to a common metric  
The second step of the meta-analytical approach is twofold. First, an effect size measure has to be 
chosen according to the empirical question examined. Then, the effect size measure considered 
needs to be reduced to a common metric in order to ensure its comparability across studies. Choosing 
an appropriate effect size rests on the empirical questions at sake. As explained in the first chapter of 
                                                 
21 This happened mainly for quite old papers, whose authors have left the institutions in which the paper is referenced. 
Sometimes, it might also be due to the fact that female authors have changed their surname as a consequence of their marital 
status. 
22 However, this number may vary since some working papers might be published in the future. 
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this dissertation, the empirical studies on the EKC mainly examined the two following research 
questions: 
• Does the EKC exist, i.e. do we systematically find an inverted U shaped PIR? If not, which 
pollution income path is found? 
• When an EKC exists, what is the value of the income turning point (ITP), i.e. at which income 
levels do emissions start declining?  
In order to address both questions, we construct two effects sizes. The first captures the shape of the 
pollution-income path found by each observation. The second considers the value of the ITP (when 
the latter exists). 
 
3.2.1 Shape of the pollution–income path 
Figure 1.III in chapter 1 listed the six possible shapes of the pollution-income path emanating from 
empirical EKCs. From these six possibilities, we constructed 4 categories:  
I. The observation confirms the existence of an EKC. 
II. The observation does not lead to an EKC but a monotonically decreasing relationship between 
pollution and income per capita (monotonically decreasing environmental quality). 
III. The observation does not lead to an EKC but a monotonically increasing relationship between 
pollution and income per capita (monotonically increasing environmental quality). 
IV. The observation does not lead to an EKC and no other statistically significant relationship is 
observed (the pollution income path is flat).  
 
In order to ensure a homogeneous categorization of the primary studies, we used two rules. First, we 
took into consideration only the statistically significant income parameters (10% confidence level). 
Secondly, an observation belongs to the first category only if the observed ITP lies inside the income 
range considered by the study. If the ITP is higher than the maximum income level of the sample, the 
relationship is considered monotonically increasing (category 3). Identically, if the ITP is lower than the 
minimum income level of the sample, the relationship is considered monotonically decreasing 
(category 2). The strict application of these rules allowed to categorize every observation. Figure 2.III 
indicates the number of observations in each of the four categories.  
The following elements deserve attention. First, choosing a 10 % confidence level is subjective and 
not usual. However, doing so ensures a good consistency with the authors’ primary study conclusions 
on the EKC. If we had chosen a more restrictive level, several observations would be classified in the 
fourth category whereas the primary study, even if the non-significance of the parameter is observed, 
calculates an ITP and seems to conclude to the existence of the EKC (see for example, Grossman 
and Krueger, 1995). 
Furthermore, several observations conclude that the PIR follows a U, an N or an inversed N path. In 
those cases, we classified these observations by examining where the ITPs are located. In most 
cases, one of the ITPs lies outside the pertinent income range and the relationship could be put in one 
of the categories. However, 5 observations (2 from Panayotou, 1997 and 3 from Kaufman et al., 1998) 
on SO2 concentrations follow an unambiguous U path. We classified these 5 observations in the 
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second category since the pollution growth rate appears to be positive on the largest part of the 
income range examined. 
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Fig. 2.III Pollution income path 
 
3.2.2 Income turning point (ITP) 
The second effect size measure captures the value of the ITPs. When primary studies did not explicitly 
compute the ITP, we calculated it by partially differentiating the estimated equation with respect to 
income, setting the equation to zero and solving. Cavlovic et al. (2000) proceed quite identically. 
However, they ignored all higher income terms than the quadratic. We did not take such a shortcut 
because ignoring higher income terms had a considerable impact on the value of the calculated ITP. 
When no income turning point can be calculated, the observation is described as either positive, 
negative or flat by the first effect size measure. 
The ITPs are expressed in 1985 U.S.-$. ITPs were converted to 1985 U.S.-$ using the U.S. GDP 
deflator23.  As shown in Figure 2.IV24, the estimated ITP vary considerably between a few hundred to 
millions of dollars. Note that when one looks at the database, it might be confusing to see that an ITP 
had been calculated whereas the pollution-income path is considered monotonically increasing. This is 
due to the fact that, even if an ITP can be calculated, the relationship is unambiguously positive when 
we consider only the pertinent income range. For example, the ITP calculated in Shafik (1994) 
amounts to $102 millions. As the highest income level considered in this study is around $30'000, the 
estimated ITP lies well outside the pertinent income range and the relationship is considered 
monotonically increasing. 
                                                 
23 Source:  Economic Report of the President 1993 Table B-3 
24 As the ITPs vary considerably across pollutant types, we present the logarithmic transformation of the ITPs and group them 
according to pollutant categories (these categories are described in section 3.3.3).  
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The two effects sizes summarize the principal results of the 49 primary studies. However, at this stage, 
the statistical power of these measures is not taken into consideration. In other words, nothing 
distinguishes a highly significant result from a poorly significant one. One possible approach used by 
Cavlovic et al. (2000) consists in estimating the variance of each ITP25. Since ITP are calculated from 
parameter estimates from econometric studies whose estimated standard errors are available, 
estimated variances may also be calculated using the Delta method (see Greene, 1997 and appendix 
1 for further details). These variances may then be used for weighting observations. However, in order 
to apply the Delta method properly, one needs to know the covariance between parameter estimates. 
This information is usually lacking and this gap prevents us from using the Delta method. Cavlovic et 
al. (2000) overcome this problem by assuming zero covariance between income parameter estimates. 
As pointed out by Plassman and Khanna (2002), the income parameters are usually highly correlated 
in a polynomial regression and setting covariance to zero will give unreliable estimations26.  
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Fig. 2.IV  Income turning point (logarithmic scale) by pollutant categories 
 
 
                                                 
25 The majority of studies have not calculated the variance of the ITPs. However, Cole et al. (1997) and Grossman and Krueger 
(1995) report standard errors for their ITP estimates that are derived from linear approximations of the turning point estimators 
(Delta method). List and Gallet (1999) mention the use of 95 % confidence intervals around their ITPs, but they neither report 
them nor do they explain how they constructed these intervals. 
26 We thank Florenz Plassman (State University of Birghamton) for helpful and valuable explanations and comments on this 
issue. 
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3.3 Choice of moderator variables 
The two effect size measures will serve as the dependent variables in a meta-regression analysis. The 
explanatory variables, called moderator variables, are the study characteristics that are thought to be 
consequential. At a minimum, the meta-analyst will wish to code dummy variables for the use of 
different data sets (such as pollutants types in the EKC literature) and econometric modeling choices 
(panel vs cross section estimates, for example). However, because the number of studies is limited 
and most economic studies entail a unique combination of techniques, independent variables, data, 
time periods and other research choices, not every study characteristic can be coded and analyzed. 
Nor should a researcher wish to do so. Variations due to minor modeling choices may be treated as 
part of the random study-to-study background (Stanley, 2001). 
In the case of the EKC, the choice of the moderator variable was made after careful reading of the 
individual empirical studies and the information found in literature reviews on the EKC. As each 
primary study has to be carefully codified, the construction of a meta-analytical database is time-
consuming. 
We chose three types of moderator variables. The sampling variables capture the type of data used 
and the principal characteristics of the sample observed. The methodological variables indicate 
differences in econometric specification and capture the additional explanatory variables included in 
the model. Finally, the environmental variables consider the type of pollution examined. 
 
3.3.1 Sampling variables 
The sampling variables capture the sample size (size) and the source of the income data used (pwt). 
This latter variable is justified since the income data may influence the effect size measures (see 
chapter, section 3.2.2). Two other variables (dvp and ldvp) control for the Borghesi (1999) and Vincent 
(1997), critique which says that the EKC arises from the combination of an increasing pollution-income 
path in developing countries and a decreasing one in developed countries. Therefore, when only high-
income countries are considered, the corresponding primary studies may present more systematic 
EKC relationships or decreasing PIR. On the contrary, when developing countries are exclusively 
considered, monotonically increasing PIRs are more likely to emerge. Table 2.3 gives the precise 
definition of the 4 sampling moderator variables. 
 
3.3.2 Methodological variables  
The methodological variables capture the type of econometric specifications and the additional 
explanatory variables considered by the primary studies. An important concern was to ignore pertinent 
variables since the methodological differences across studies are numerous. We finally adopted 12 
methodological variables controlling for the use of panel data (panel), the use of random-effect models 
(re), the use of first-difference estimates (diff), the inclusion of a cubic income term (cub) and the use 
of the logarithmic specification (log). Furthermore, the variables pop, trade, pol, educ, equ, eco and 
price grasp the type of additional variables the primary studies control for. Their precise definition also 
appears in table 2.2. 
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Tab. 2.2 Sampling and methodological variables 
Sampling variables  
Mean 
(standard 
error) 
size The natural log of the sample size of the primary study 5.8 
pwt Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study used Penn World Table data, 0 otherwise 0.74 
dvp Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study used developed countries only, 0 otherwise 0.32 
ldvp Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study used developing countries only, 0 otherwise 0.12 
Methodological variables  
panel Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study used panel data, 0 otherwise 0.69 
re Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study used a random effect model, 0 otherwise 0.21 
diff Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study used a first difference model, 0 otherwise 0.07 
cub Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study  included a cubic income term, 0 otherwise 0.33 
log Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study used the logarithmic specification, 0 otherwise 0.41 
pop Dummy variable - 1 indicates the study controlled for population size or population density, 0 otherwise 0.31 
trade Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study controlled for trade policy and trade flows, 0 otherwise 0.17 
pol Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study controlled for political characteristics (democratic level, quality of institutions and efficiency of political actions), 0 otherwise 0.17 
educ Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study controlled for the level of education, 0 otherwise 0.09 
equ Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study controlled for equity measures (Gini index), 0 otherwise 0.08 
eco Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study controlled for the economic activities of geographical areas, 0 otherwise 0.32 
price Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study controlled for the price of goods and behavior closely linked to environmental quality considerations (price of energy, wood), 0 otherwise 0.06 
 
 
3.3.3 Environmental variables  
The environmental indicators considered by primary studies were divided into nine categories, which 
could be supported by the data, i.e., contained multiple observations. The two first categories capture 
the distinction between global stock pollution (global) and local air pollution (air). This distinction is 
justified since numerous studies (Ekins, 1997; Panayotou, 2000; Lieb, 2002) conclude that global 
pollutant indicators are more likely to follow a monotonically increasing pollution-income path. Global 
pollution includes CO2 emissions, other greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption and CFC. 
Local air pollution covers the emissions of CO, NO2, VOC, SPM and smoke. A specific category 
controls for SO2 concentration since numerous observations examine this particular pollutant.  
Another distinction has to be made between pollutants measured through concentration levels and 
pollutants measured by emissions per capita. The variable conc therefore captures the environmental 
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indicators measured in concentration levels. Finally, the variables tox, waste, res et water control 
respectively for heavy metal and toxic pollution, hazardous waste, deforestation and biodiversity loss, 
water pollution (DBO, DCO, OD, nitrates, coliforms, access to safe drinking water and sanitation). 
Note that the pollutant categories (except for the variable conc) are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
Exhaustive means that there must be enough categories that all the observations will fall into some 
category.  Mutually exclusive means that the categories must be distinct enough that no observations 
will fall into more than one category. The category water serves as the referent group (and will be 
excluded from the estimation) so that the effect of the other environmental variables are estimated 
relative to water pollutants.  
 
 
Tab. 2.3 Environmental and background variables  
Environmental variables  
Mean 
(standard 
error) 
global Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the pollutant has a global and long term impact, 0 otherwise 0.22 
local Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the pollutant is a local and short term air pollutant (heavy particles, smoke, nitrogen oxide), 0 otherwise 0.26 
so2 Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the pollutant is sulfur dioxide, 0 otherwise 0.24 
tox Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the pollutant is toxic emissions, 0 otherwise 0.06 
waste Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the pollutant is hazardous waste, 0 otherwise 0.03 
res Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the pollutant is deforestation, park area, or biodiversity loss, 0 otherwise 0.11 
water Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the pollutant is biophysical oxygen demand, chemical oxygen demand, dissolved oxygen, nitrates, coliforms, access to safe drinking water and sanitation (%), otherwise 0 0.10 
conc Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the pollutant is measured in concentration level, 0 otherwise. 0.28 
Background variable  
pub Dummy variable  - 1 indicates the study has been published before June 2003, 0 otherwise 0.72 
 
 
A last background variable controls for published studies (pub). It has been added in order to check for 
the existence of a publication bias and control for systematic differences between published and 
unpublished studies.  
The construction of pollutant categories appears to be a complex issue since some pollutants could 
enter several categories. We test a categorization according to environmental media (air, water, soil 
and landscape, energy and materials, global environment). However, the latter is unsatisfactory since 
it ignores the economic characteristics of pollutants. Ideally, pollutants should be grouped into 
categories that seize the level of damage and/or abatement costs they generate. However, actual 
available studies on damage and abatement costs show that these costs vary sharply from case to 
case. Establishing a hierarchy among pollutants seems therefore too subjective to be credible. The 
variables global, local and conc try however to catch part of the difference in abatement costs. It is 
argued that global pollutants face higher abatement costs since a drastic emission reduction requires 
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less energy consumption and therefore a reduction of economic activities. On the contrary, lowering 
concentration levels can be done at a low cost (by constructing a taller chimney, for example).  
Moreover, we did not exactly replicate the pollutant categories constructed by Cavlovic et al. (2001). 
The following differences are noticeable. First, energy consumption is considered a global pollutant 
and not a toxic emission because energy consumption is generally used as a proxy for CO2 emissions 
(Gandaharan and Valenzuela, 2000).  Identically, as water quality is correlated with the existence of 
public infrastructures (sewers, purification facilities) the “access to sanitation and to safe drinking 
water” environmental indicators are put in the category water. The urban quality category of Cavlovic 
has therefore been dropped.  Finally, the construction of two separate categories for urban pollutants 
(one grouping “smoke” and “dark matter” and the second capturing “SPM”) does not appear 
necessary.   
 
3.4 Conclusions on the database 
The complete database counts 286 observations. The database indicates for each study the years 
covered, the type of countries (developed, developing or mixed) and the environmental indicators 
analyzed. The two effect size measures are computed and the sample size, the econometric 
specification, the explanatory variables considered and the data sources are also coded. 
The size of the database is large relative to other economic meta-analyses27.  The meta-analysis of 
Cavlovic et al. (2000) counts 155 observations. Since Cavlovic et al’s study, 17 new empirical studies 
(containing about 90 observations) have been realized on the EKC. This recent literature examines 
new and larger databases (Stern and Common, 2001 on SO2; Mason and Swanson, 2001 on CFC) 
and takes into account the critiques addressed to its predecessors (Stern and Common, 2001 on SO2; 
Meyer et al., 2003 on deforestation). The present database offers therefore new opportunities for 
conducting a meta-analysis. 
Table 2.4 shows some summary statistics.  More precisely, it gives for each pollutant the total number 
of observations, the number of observations presenting an EKC, a decreasing, an increasing or a flat 
PIR. It also gives the mean value of the estimated ITPs. 
                                                 
27 Woodward and Wui‘s meta-analysis (2001) on the value of wetlands considers 39 primary studies (65 observations). Card 
and Krueger’s meta-analysis (1995, minimum wage effect) considers 15 studies (15 observations). Sayman and Oncüler (2002, 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept) consider 34 primary studies (145 observations). Smith and Osborne (1996, 
willingness to pay for an increased visibility in national parks) count 5 studies (115 observations). To our knowledge, Shresta 
and Loomis (2001, value of recreational area) have constructed the largest database used in an economic meta-analysis. 131 
primary studies (682 observations) are considered. 
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Tab. 2.4 Summary statistics by pollutants 
Pollution type Pollutants Observations EKC Mean ITP Decreasing Increasing Flat 
Energy 11 1 116411 22826*  10  
CO2  (or other GHG, except methane) 52 18 
13811 
2666711* 1 30 3 
CFC 4 2  14083 19079*  2  
SO2 and SOx 66 36 
7271 
1949110* 5 16 9 
SPM 29 17 7345  5 4 3 
Smoke 8 5 5516  2 1 
Toxic emissions  12 8 7737 18265* 1 2 1 
Air pollution 
CO, VOC, NOx, NO2 29 13 
11401 
12203* 3 10 3 
BOD, COD, DO and nitrates 13 5 11263 13960* 2 2 4 
Coliforms (fecal or total)  5 3 4155  1 1 Water pollution 
Heavy metals (Pb, Ni, Hg, Cd, As) 5 3    6140   2 
Urban quality Access to sanitation and safe water 11 1 691 10   
Waste Hazardous waste 8 5 16758  3  
Deforestation 28 15 3566   13 
Resources 
Biodiversity 5 4 6219  1  
* Mean ITP calculated from all observations presenting a turning point even if the latter lies outside the pertinent income range.  
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3.5 Modeling considerations  
This current section presents and explains the econometric modeling approach chosen and shows the 
related results. As three different models will be estimated, the results will be discussed and 
interpreted in section 3.6.  
The meta-regression aims to explain variations in the outcomes of the primary studies. The general 
form of the models is therefore: 
1 2 3ij i i i iY c m p eβ β β= + + +  
where Yij is the effect size (i.e. either the shape of the pollution-income path or the natural logarithmic 
transformation of the ITP) of observation i, ci is a vector of sampling variables, mi a vector of 
methodological variables and pi a vector of pollutant categories. β1, β2, and β3 are vectors of the 
corresponding parameters to be estimated. Their sign and significance will show how the 
characteristics of the primary studies influence the results. 
In selecting an estimation approach, an important issue was whether to examine both effect size 
measures selected and whether to include all observations, i.e. those that demonstrate an EKC, those 
that show a monotonically increasing or decreasing relationship and those that demonstrate a flat 
relationship. Therefore, we considered three econometric models in our meta-analysis. 
I. a discrete choice multinomial logit model in order to examine the determinants of the four 
different pollution-income paths; 
II. a weighted regression model (WLS) and a weighted censored tobit (WT) model aiming to 
explain the variation in the ITPs observed and; 
III. a nested logit model (NL) that integrates the two previous alternatives. 
 
3.5.2 Discrete choice multinomial logit model (ML) 
The first effect size measure, i.e. the shape of the pollution-income path of each observation, is 
described according to four discrete categories. Therefore, a simple and logical way to examine the 
determinant of the pollution-income path observed is to use a discrete choice multinomial logit model 
(ML). The 4 discrete outcomes Yij are: 
(1) j = 0, the pollution-income path follows a EKC; 
(2) j = 1, the pollution-income path is monotonically increasing; 
(3) j = 2, the pollution-income path is monotonically decreasing and; 
(4) j = 3, the pollution-income path is flat. 
 
Under the general form of the ML model, the probability that the outcome j is observed is (Greene, 
2000, 861) : 
21 3
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Tab. 2.5  Multinomial logit model 
Multinomial logit  (reference category: EKC) 
 Increasing Decreasing Flat 
size 0.311* 0.149 0.291 
 1.87 0.36 1.40 
pwt 1.502** -3.498*** 2.154** 
 2.28 -3.35 2.29 
dvp -0.528 -1.619 -0.094 
 -0.99 -1.43 -0.12 
ldvp 1.423 -3.344 2.488*** 
 1.58 0.01 3.02 
pub 1.588** 0.486 0.341 
 2.40 0.40 0.45 
panel -0.927* -2.290** -1.341* 
 -1.71 -2.41 -1.78 
re 0.070 -0.189 -0.459 
 0.14 -0.21 -0.66 
diff 1.374 -3.098 0.572 
 1.44 -0.00 0.39 
conc -0.237*** 0.785 0.976 
 -2.32 0.88 1.32 
cub -0.812 -0.181 0.391 
 -1.35 -0.14 0.51 
log 0.907* -0.688 0.448 
 1.88 -0.62 0.71 
pop 1.021* 0.394 -1.310* 
 1.78 0.47 -1.87 
trade 2.116** -1.426 -0.554 
 0.83 -0.79 -0.64 
pol -2.810*** -1.529 0.011 
 -2.72 -1.17 0.01 
educ 3.620*** -4.045 2.294** 
 2.93 0.03 2.30 
equ -3.086** 0.543 0.587 
 -2.46 0.41 0.68 
eco -0.282 0.309 0.613 
 -0.32 0.31 0.83 
price -5.829*** -3.522 -1.557 
 -2.84 -0.01 -1.13 
tox -1.219 -6.207*** 0.298 
 -0.85 -2.91 0.27 
res -2.981** -4.819 0.897 
 -1.96 0.02 0.87 
local 0.725 -2.270** -0.329 
 0.83 -2.18 -0.38 
so2 -0.705 -3.854*** -0.203 
 -1.78 -3.04 -0.24 
glob 3.070*** -5.038*** 0.359 
 2.92 -2.99 0.29 
waste 1.756** -4.489 -3.780 
 1.96 0.01 0.00 
Constant -5.103*** 5.391* -5.131*** 
 -3.28 1.80 -3.15 
R2 0.3818   
Obs. 286   
Log likelihood -215.17251   
t-stat in italics, * statistically significant at a 10% percent probability threshold, ** 5 %, *** 1% 
Estimated by Stata 7 
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The estimated equations provided a set of probabilities for the j outcomes. In order to identify the 
parameters of the model, we impose the normalization β1,2,3=0. Therefore, each probability lies 
between 0 and 1 and their sum is equal to 1. The reference category is composed of observations 
resulting in an EKC.  
The previous LM model therefore identifies the determinants of the probability of observing an 
increasing, decreasing or flat relationship relative to the probability of observing an EKC.  In order to 
take into account the fact that the primary studies offer estimates of different statistical power, 
observations are weighted according to the sample size of the primary studies. Table 2.6 presents the 
results. It is striking that the type of pollutant considered as a dramatic impact on the shape of the PIR. 
Waste and global pollutant appear more likely to follow a monotonically increasing relationship than an 
EKC. Almost all pollutants are less likely to follow a decreasing path relatively to water pollutants (the 
reference category). The use of GDP in PPP rates (variable pwt) has an impact on the estimation as 
well as the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. Note also that published studies are more 
likely to present monotonically increasing relationships. Further details on the results are given in 
section 3.6.  
 
3.5.2 Weighted least squares (WLS) and weighted tobit model (WT) 
The previous ML model examined the first effect size: the shape of the PIR. The second series of 
econometric estimations will focus on the variation in ITPs between observations. We hence follow the 
empirical approach proposed by Cavlovic et al. (2000).  
As we now examine a continuous variable, we refer to the traditional meta-regression model based on 
some least squares estimators of the form (Stanley and Jarell, 1989): 
( ), , , , ε= +Y f p x r t l  
 
where Y is the effect size, p the specific underlying cause, x moderator variables affecting cause-effect 
relationship and r, t and l moderator variables representing differences among research designs, time-
periods considered, and locations covered by the initial studies. When the standard meta-regression 
model is applied to the ITP estimates, the previous relationship becomes: 
0 1 2 3( ) β β β β= + + + +i i i i iln Y c m p e  
 
Where Yi are the estimated ITPs from primary studies, ci sampling variables, mi methodological 
variables and pi pollutants categories. β1, β2 and β3 are the estimated parameters and ei is the error 
term. Since there were large differences in the ITPs, the natural log specification is used. Furthermore, 
as only the observations presenting an ITP (lying or not inside the pertinent income range) may be 
taken into consideration, an important concern was to decide whether to include all observations. In 
order to address this problem, a series of least squares estimates as well as weighted Tobit models 
are computed.  
 
a) Weighted least squares (WLS) 
For the WLS, the usable sample consisted of 203 observations, which included observations with an 
estimated ITP or decreasing income-environment relationship. Observations with an extremely high 
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ITP where not truncated from the data. Furthermore, we include monotonically decreasing 
relationships by setting arbitrary ITPs at $500. This procedure might be justified since the pollution-
income path must begin at the origin as we are considering man-made pollution. Therefore, we may 
interpret a falling relationship as evidence of the EKC, but the turning point of the EKC occurs at such 
low-income levels that it could not be observed with the data at hand. The choice of this minimum 
income level was based on a review of the lowest income levels included in the primary studies. 
However, when the ITP was set at either $100 or $1500 the results vary marginally28. Overall, the 
WLS model rejects 65 observations29. 
This model examines the determinant of the observed ITPs. However, positive significant parameters 
lead to unclear conclusions since they might be interpreted as a positive impact on the estimated ITPs 
and on the existence of a monotonically increasing PIR since observations with extremely high ITPs 
are not truncated. In other words, the model does not inform us precisely on the variation of ITPs 
when a well-defined EKC exists. This is quite disturbing since our primary objective is to examine the 
probability of finding an EKC and, then, to determine the impact of the study-to-study differences that 
influence the value of the estimated ITPs. 
As the precision of estimated ITPs varies through the primary studies, the error terms of the meta-
regression are likely to be heteroscedastic (de Blaeij et al., 2000). The estimated parameters and their 
standard errors might therefore be biased if the ordinary least squares method is used. In order to 
overcome this estimation bias, one solution consists in weighing observations according to the primary 
studies’ sample sizes. This procedure is customary in meta-regression and is based on the hypothesis 
that estimations of primary studies with large sample sizes have lower variances and should therefore 
have a higher weight (Mulatu et al., 2001; Day, 1999). In order to control our estimation, the White’s 
estimator of variance will also be used. As previously mentioned, we did not pursue this particular 
aspect of the meta-analysis made by Cavlovic et al. (2000), who estimated the variance of ITPs, since 
the required information on the covariances between income parameters was generally lacking. 
Finally, we corrected for the potential dependence among observations30 coming from the same 
primary study by clustering the observations by study and pollutants31. This procedure treats 
observations as dependent inside a cluster and independent between clusters and the variance 
estimators. Finally, we did not control for quality variations between the primary studies since we could 
not establish sufficiently objective criteria. Furthermore, as the meta-analysis controls for the model 
used, publication and the type of data, many potential quality indicators are already included in the 
meta-regression.  
Results are in Table 2.6 and as usual will be discussed in section 3.6. The first column presents the 
model where the parameters are estimated by weighing observations according to the sample size of 
                                                 
28 This result has also been found by Cavlovic et al. (2000) 
29 They are composed of 40 observations with falling pollution-income paths and 25 increasing relationships with no ITPs (the 
latter could not be estimated from the primary studies’ parameters). 
30 In the case of dependent observations, the error terms associated with observations of the same primary studies are 
correlated. This might bias the error term of the parameters of the meta-regression and wrongly enhance their significance. 
31 We generated 91 clusters by creating groups of observations issued from the same studies and examining an identical 
pollutant. 
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the primary studies.32 The second column presents parameter estimates resulting from ordinary least 
squares with White's estimators of variance. Finally, the third column accounts for the dependence 
among observations by clustering the observations on a particular pollutant issued from the same 
study. The results are rather homogeneous among specification even if the significance of some 
parameter varies considerably. The adjusted R2 is around 0.5, which is typical for meta-analyses33 
(Sayman and Öncüler, 2002).  
 
Tab. 2.6  WLS models 
VARIABLES WLS t-STAT OLS robust t-STAT t-STAT with clustering 
size 0.178* 1.81 0.186* 1.7 1.3 
pwt 0.467 1.51 0.354 1.06 0.9 
dvp -0.886*** -2.89 -0.972** -2.41 -2.05 
ldvp -1.031** -2.1 -1.069* -1.75 -1.42 
pub 0.662** 2.08 0.816** 2.36 2.17 
panel 1.161*** 3.25 1.121*** 2.92 2.3 
re 0.567* 1.87 0.598* 1.84 2.28 
diff 0.682 1.08 0.494 0.63 0.59 
conc -0.773** -2.11 -0.931* -1.77 -1.36 
cub -0.755** -2.13 -0.683** -2.06 -1.73 
log 0.362 -1.3 0.559** -2.03 -1.96 
pop -0.143 -0.46 -0.197 -0.72 -0.64 
trade -0.042 -0.12 -0.12 -0.38 -0.3 
pol 0.808* 1.97 0.993* 1.67 1.59 
educ 0.459 0.72 0.356 0.59 0.49 
equ -0.848* -1.81 -0.936** -2.11 -2.41 
eco -0.519 -1.49 -0.45 -1.4 -1.08 
price 0.054 -0.08 -0.316 -0.42 -0.32 
tox 2.188*** 3.4 1.764*** 2.92 2.03 
res 1.888*** 3.06 1.696*** 2.69 2.01 
local 1.364*** 3.19 1.368** 2.33 1.68 
so2 1.466*** 3.56 1.442** 2.42 1.79 
glob 3.039*** -6.37 2.944*** -4.63 -3.5 
waste 3.721*** 4.26 3.489*** 6.12 4.47 
C 5.167*** 7.96 5.167*** 7.1 5.3 
Obs 203 203 
Adj.R2 0.5 0.49 
F(B1and B2=0) 4.51 3.86 
restr.-unrestr. 
chi2(6) 36.06 36.06 
* Statistically significant at a 10% percent probability threshold, ** 5 %, *** 1%. 
 
 
We also estimated a restricted model (by excluding the methodological and sampling variables) and 
two hypothesis tests were performed to evaluate the joint significance of sampling and methodological 
differences on ITPs. The χ2 likelihood ratio test (restricted specification vs unrestricted model) and the 
                                                 
32 In Stata 7, the weight associated with each observation is ln(n) where n is the sample size of the primary study. 
33 The adj. R2 in Cavlovic et al. (2000) is 0.69 
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F-statistic (testing linear restriction on the methodological and sampling variables) reject the 
hypothesis that both β1 and β2 are null. Thus, the methodological and sampling differences explain a 
non-negligible part of the variation between the ITP estimates of the primary studies. 
As in the multinomial logit model, the pollutant categories appear to have a considerable impact on the 
results of the primary studies. Furthermore, the composition of the sample (variables dvp and ldvp) is 
important, as unbalanced sample tend to find lower ITPs. There is also some evidence that show that 
the specification used influences the results. For instance, logarithmic specifications tend to find higher 
ITP while cubic specifications estimate lower one. Note that the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables seems to have no impact (expect for distributive characteristics) on the ITPs. Finally, 
published studies appear less favorable to the EKC since they tend to present higher ITP values. 
 
b) Weighted Tobit model (WT) 
The previous WLS model ignores 30% of available observations. If one considers that rejecting the flat 
relationships might be acceptable, rejecting part of the monotonically increasing pollution income path 
may be problematic. The rejected studies might indeed share common features and therefore a non-
random selection of studies emerges. As an alternative to the WLS, a weighted tobit approach may be 
used in order to include all usable observations and thus increase the sample size to 244. Specifically, 
an upper-censored model is used and observations outside the date range (i.e., those demonstrating 
monotonically increasing relationships) are included.  
The tobit technique estimates a regression line using more usable observations as both those 
censored at the limit and those within the limit are considered. It is therefore a mixture of a continuous 
distribution for the non-limited observations and a discrete distribution for the limited values34. Let 
ln(ITPi) indicate the natural logarithm of the ITP of observation i, then: 
1 2 3 1 2 3( )     if β β β β β β= + + + + + + <i i i i i i i i iln ITP c m p e c m p e T  
1 2 3( )                                     if β β β= + + + ≥i i i i iln ITP T c m p e T  
where T is the censoring limit, i = 1, 2, …, N, and N is the number of observations. The censoring limit 
for the dependent variables is set at ln(ITPi) . 12.2 (ITPi . 200’000) for those observations where the 
environmental indicators get worse with income. Otherwise, ITPi = 500 [ln(ITPi)=6.21] is set for 
monotonically decreasing relationships. Since it is unclear at what income level censoring begins, we 
performed a sensitivity analysis by testing other thresholds levels (100’000, 300’000 and 500’000).  
The results remain stable.  
Table 2.7 presents the results. The first column weighs observations according to the sample size of 
the primary studies. The second corrects for heteroscedastic error terms using White’s estimator of 
variance. Finally, the last column groups the observations by primary studies and pollutant types 
                                                 
34 The log-likelihood for the censored regression model is (Cavlovic et al., 2000) : 
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(clustering) in order to correct for potential dependence among them. As expected, the significance of 
the parameter decreases (since observations inside a cluster resemble each other). We again tested 
the restricted model (excluding the methodological and sampling variables). Unrestricted models are 
systematically preferred. Thus, the methodological and sampling variables could not be ignored since 
they explain a non-negligible part of the variation between the estimated ITPs. 
 
Tab. 2.7  Weighted Tobit model 
VARIABLES Tobit (1/lnn) t-STAT Tobit robust t-STAT t-STAT with clustering 
size 0.150* 1.66 0.098 1.23 1.87 
pwt 1.366*** 4.69 1.223*** 4.45 3.76 
dvp -0.043** -2.15 -0.14** -2.5 -1.83 
ldvp 0.679 1.45 0.442 0.86 0.91 
pub 0.368 1.22 0.421 1.38 1.19 
panel 0.101 0.33 0.156 0.46 0.31 
re 0.076 0.26 0.128 0.49 0.49 
diff 1.046* 1.7 0.946* 1.68 1.16 
conc -0.372 -1.55 -0.262 -1.63 -1.45 
cub -0.184 -0.57 -0.222 -0.81 -0.6 
log -0.023 0.09 0.078 0.31 0.24 
pop 0.262 0.9 0.22 0.74 0.74 
trade 0.519* 1.67 0.424 1.35 0.97 
pol -0.362 -0.92 -0.223 -0.5 -0.43 
educ 2.005*** 3.86 1.845*** 3.39 2.62 
equ -1.225*** -2.61 -1.261*** -2.62 -2.56 
eco -0.168 -0.52 -0.219 -0.76 -0.55 
price -0.477 -0.67 -0.754 -1.21 -0.9 
tox 1.732*** 2.75 1.089 1.63 1.14 
res 0.497 0.81 0.369 0.54 0.47 
local 1.564*** 3.68 1.350** 2.43 1.81 
so2 1.442*** 3.48 1.282** 2.53 1.92 
glob 3.148*** 6.9 3.015*** 5.78 4.73 
waste 3.657*** 5.63 3.255*** 6.09 4.63 
C 5.486*** 8.38 6.020*** 9.37 6.85 
obs 244 244 244 
cens 21 21 21 
F Chi2(17) 21.37 42.5 37.64 
r-unr Chi2(6) 62.30 52.92  
* Statistically significant at a 10% percent probability threshold, ** 5 %, *** 1%. 
 
 
3.5.3 Nested logit model (NL) 
The previous models are unfortunately limited, as they do not allow for the formulation of specific 
conclusions for the two effect size measures considered in the primary studies. Remember that we 
would like to know, on the one hand, which elements favor the apparition of the EKC and, on the other 
hand, what influences the value of the ITP when the EKC exists.  
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The multinomial logit model just examines the shape of the pollution-income path and does not offer 
evidence on the value of the ITPs. The weighted least squares and weighted tobit models focus on the 
value of the ITPs. However, as monotonically increasing and decreasing relationships are included, 
they don’t allow us to formulate conclusions on the variation of ITPs when a well-defined EKC is 
found. In other words, a positive and significant coefficient in the tobit model indicates that the variable 
linked to this coefficient has both a positive impact on the value of the ITPs and/or on the probability of 
finding a monotonically increasing relationship. Even if the WLS and WT models offer new results 
compared to the multinomial models, they are still too aggregated to completely fulfill the aim of our 
meta-regression.  
In order to overcome the actual limits of the WLS and WT models, we constructed a nested logit 
model (NL)35. This constitutes an interesting alternative since it allows to combine in one unique 
setting both effect size measures. A nested logit is constructed according to a tree structure by 
grouping the alternatives into subgroups. Such a structure allows to examine first which explanatory 
variables favor or not the apparition of the EKC and then which variables have a positive/negative 
impact on the ITPs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.V Structure of the NL model 
 
 
                                                 
35 A second limit addresses the property of Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) of the multinomial logit model. 
Succinctly stated, the IIA property states that the ratio of the choice probabilities of any two alternatives is entirely unaffected by 
the inclusion of any other alternatives.  This property arises from the assumption in the derivation of the logit model that the 
error terms across observations are independent.  In other words, it is assumed that unobserved attributes (error terms) of 
alternatives are independent.  In many cases this is an unrealistic assumption, and the estimated coefficient will be biased and 
inconsistent (McFadden; 1984). In the case of our meta-analysis, it is unclear if the IIA property is respected. However, we could 
have defined additional categories (as for N shape curves) and it seems obvious that excluding a category would change the 
relative percentage of observed alternatives. We examined whether the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
assumption of the multinomial logit model is violated or not by using two types of tests for IIA: the Hausman-McFadden (1984) 
and Small and Hsiao (1985) tests. The former Hausman-McFadden test leads to a near singularity and could not be completed, 
which is a common empirical occurrence. The Small-Hsiao test rejects the IIA property. 
 
Decreasing  
relationship 
ITPi >T 
EKC  No EKC 
ITPi < T Increasing  
relationship
Branch 1 
Branch 2 Branch 3 
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The structure of the nested logit model is presented in Figure 2-V. Firstly (branch 1), the model 
examines the determinants of the existence of an EKC. Secondly (branch 2), it examines the 
determinants of monotonically increasing and decreasing relationships when no EKC is observed. 
Thirdly (branch 3), it computes the determinants of the value of the ITPs when an EKC is obtained. 
The flat relationships are excluded. Furthermore, the nested logit model allows the variance to differ 
across groups while maintaining the IIA assumptions within groups. In our case, as only two 
alternatives will be considered in each subgroup, the IIA assumption is never violated.  
The NL model allows to estimate 3 groups of parameters, i.e. one for each branch: 
• The estimated coefficients of branch 1 capture the impact of a marginal change in explanatory 
variables on the probability of finding an EKC (relative to the case where no EKC is found).  
• The estimated coefficients of branch 2 capture the impact of a marginal change in explanatory 
variables on the probability of finding an increasing relationship (relative to the case where a 
decreasing pollution-income path is found) knowing that no EKC has been observed.  
• Finally, the estimated coefficients of branch 3 capture the impact of a marginal change in 
explanatory variables on the probability of observing an ITP higher than a given value T 
knowing that an EKC is observed. 
 
The three groups of estimates are shown in Table 2.8. As the flat relationships are excluded, 244 
observations are considered. The NL model allows the use of different explanatory variables for each 
branch. We indicated when a variable predicts a specific outcome perfectly, i.e. a dummy variable 
solely defined one outcome. Those variables have thus been dropped.  We fixed the value for the limit 
T at $6’700, which corresponds to the average ITP of the sample. In appendix 2, we checked for other 
T values by conducting a sensitivity analysis with T set at the median ITP ($7’300), at $4’582 (the 
income level separating the two first quartile) and $12’581 (the income level separating the third and 
last quartile).  
The results of the nested logit model are broadly consistent with one obtained previously. They are 
however far more precise since they allow to capture the impact of the primary studies characteristics 
on the shape of the PIR and on the estimated ITPs. For this reason, the nested logit is our preferred 
model and its results are discussed and compared with the other models below. 
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Tab. 2.8  Nested logit model 
VARIABLES EKC Branch 1 t-Stat 
Increasing 
Branch 2 t-Stat 
ITP > T 
Branch 3 t-Stat 
size -0.11 -0.78 1.01 1.31 0.55* 1.92 
pwt 0.24 0.51 5.81** 2.19 0.59 0.63 
dvp 1.14** 2.52 4.15** 2.28 0.34 0.30 
ldvp -1.12 -1.41 #  -3.21* -1.89 
pub -1.58*** -3.07 -2.03 -1.09 0.32 0.32 
panel 1.04** 2.11 3.61* 1.72 0.82 0.75 
re 0.41 0.93 -0.95 -0.61 2.05** 2.01 
diff -0.68 -0.76 #  #  
conc 0.95* 1.64 -3.84** -2.09 -1.68* -1.94 
cub 0.58 1.17 -5.83* -1.89 -0.10 -0.10 
log -0.16 -0.40 0.01* 1.81 -0.11 -0.13 
pop -1.04** -2.15 -0.27 -0.14 -1.23 -1.40 
trade -1.15** -2.13 5.82** 2.35 0.72 0.81 
pol 1.18* 1.81 -1.65 -0.85 0.08 0.07 
educ -1.38 -1.48 #  -0.43 -0.30 
equ 1.38* 1.69 1.77 0.62 -3.51** -2.21 
eco 0.39 0.70 7.52** 2.36 -3.98*** -2.92 
price 1.36 0.86 #  -1.79 -0.46 
tox 4.87*** 3.78 5.64* 1.65 -0.41 -0.38 
res 5.60*** 4.18 -2.52 -0.85 ##  
local 1.43*** 2.07 2.19 1.24 0.32 0.29 
so2 1.95* 2.83 0.53 0.23 -1.48 -1.37 
glob 0.40 0.49 8.63** 2.45 1.15** 2.67 
waste 1.38 1.22 4.5 ** 1.98 #  
C -1.06 -0.93 -11.98** -2.27 -2.08 -1.18 
Log likelihood 
(starting value) -337.21     
Log likelihood 
(final value) -198.84     
Obs. 244     
T sets at the mean income level (T = $ 6700), * Statistically significant at a 10% percent probability threshold, ** 5 %, *** 1%. 
Estimated with TDA ; # : predicts success perfectly ; ## : predicts failure perfectly 
 
 
4 Results 
We estimated three classes of models. As explained earlier, the nested logit model is our preferred 
model since it allows us to examine both the determinants of the EKC and those of the value of ITPs. 
However, even if more attention is given to the NL model, the results from the other models are not 
ignored. Indeed, estimates are rather stable across specifications and there is no large inconsistency 
across models. Therefore, we conclude that our results do not seem flawed due to empirical 
inconsistencies or the use of biased and inadequate estimation methods. Note that the clustering of 
data by studies and pollutants in WT and OLS tend on average to increase the variance of the 
estimates. This confirms that there are positive correlations between the residuals within the clusters, 
i.e. extreme observations concerning one pollutant tend to come from the same study.  
In the rest of this section, results will be discussed by type of explanatory, or moderator, variables. 
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4.1 Environmental variables 
A striking feature lies in the recurrent significance across models of some environmental variables. In 
every model, they play a dominant role and explain much of the variation between the shapes of the 
pollution-income path and the values of the ITPs.  
Above all, the distinction between local and global air pollutants appears crucial. Indeed, the variable 
global is significant in all models. When considering the shape of the PIR, the primary studies that 
have observed the evolution of a global pollutant tend ceteris paribus to find a monotonically 
increasing relationship. Cavlovic et al’s (2000) meta-analysis results as well as the major literature 
reviews on the EKC confirm this finding. Furthermore, the NL model shows that global pollutants 
possess higher ITPs when a well-behaved EKC is found. The existence of an increasing relationship 
for global pollutants is supported by theoretical expectations as the reduction of global pollutants 
possess the characteristics of a global public bad and thus require coordinated international actions. 
Furthermore, no abatement technology may be available for global pollutants, their abatement costs 
may also be higher than for other pollutants and, finally, as damages resulting from global pollutants 
are not directly visible and will happen mainly in the future, the impetus for current action is lower.  
The NL model also shows that the estimated PIR for hazardous waste is more likely to be 
monotonically increasing. Furthermore, as far as one EKC exists, the ITPs for hazardous waste are 
higher than for other pollutants. The other estimates (from the ML, WLS and WT models) as well as 
the literature reviews (Lieb, 2002) confirm this result. However, the theoretical reasons for an 
increasing relationship in the case of hazardous waste have been less examined. Common arguments 
put forward that waste is rising with income since it is a stock pollutant that accumulates in waste 
disposal facilities. Furthermore, as pointed out by Gawande et al. (2001), richer households move 
away from disposal facilities and only poor people with little political power might be concerned (see 
also Shafik, 1994). In other words, a rising relationship appears since the waste problem can be easily 
externalized and impetus for abatement consequently remains low. 
When considering other environmental variables, the NL model shows that local pollutants causing 
severe health risks and characterized by relatively low abatement costs (such as SO2 and other air 
pollutants) are significantly more prone to follow an EKC than other pollutants. However, ITP 
estimates for this pollutant are not statistically different from the ITPs of water pollutants (the reference 
category) when an EKC is observed. One may note that literature reviews do not offer precise 
conclusions on this subject. Finally, even if indicators of biodiversity loss and deforestation appear to 
follow an EKC (variable ress), their ITPs are systematically lower than the mean ITP. The WT and 
WLS models broadly confirm these findings. Their results also show that the ITPs are higher for global 
pollutants and hazardous waste than for local air pollutants, SO2, toxics, resources and water 
pollutants. On a general level, these results logically resemble the means for pollutants calculated 
from the summary of prior ITP results. However, they do not allow distinguishing between the pollutant 
categories that have a significant impact on the shape of the relationship from those that have a 
significant influence on the estimated ITPs. 
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The environmental variable conc coding environmental pollutants measured in concentration levels 
(instead of emissions per capita) also deserves attention. When reviewing EKC studies, authors 
usually argue (see Ekins, 1997, 186 or Selden and Song, 1994) that concentration levels can be 
improved more cheaply than reducing emissions. Furthermore, as air pollutants measured in 
concentration levels capture mainly urban pollution, the pressure for environmental action happens 
sooner in the course of economic growth since urban pollution affects large populations and urban 
residents, who have greater than average incomes, and are thus more likely to have greater than 
average political power.  Indeed, our meta-analysis shows that pollutants measured in concentration 
levels are significantly less prone to follow an increasing PIR, and are characterized by lower than 
average ITPs (however, for this last consideration, we remain cautious since the coefficient is only 
significant at a 10 % confidence level in the NL models and is not significant in the WT models). 
Overall, pollutant type appears to have a large influence on the observed PIR and the estimated ITPs 
also vary according to pollutant types. We may therefore conclude that the EKC is not a stable 
relationship across environmental indicators. It is therefore indispensable to account for pollutant 
differences in economic modeling. The traditional distinction between stock and flow local and global 
pollutants in theoretical models seems therefore useful but may remains too broad to capture all the 
characteristics of particular pollutants. This also raises doubt on the possibility of constructing 
aggregate indicators of environmental quality that properly grasp the evolution of pollution levels with 
income growth.  
 
4.2 Sampling variables 
When the coefficients linked to the sampling variables are examined, the following results may be 
underlined. 
First, the sample size does not have a large influence on the primary studies’ results. This constitutes 
a good new so long as one considers the reliability of studies that are based on a small and maybe 
less representative database. However, the prior conclusion remains questionable since some weak 
empirical evidence from the NL and ML models (at a 10% confidence level) tend also to show that 
when the sample size increases, monotonically increasing (ML model) and higher ITPs (NL model) are 
more likely to be found.  
Second, the income data used influences the results of EKC studies. Indeed, the coefficient on 
pwt appears to be significant in all models (except for the WLS) and shows that using the PPP (PWT) 
income per capita data has a positive impact on the estimated ITPs and the finding of increasing 
pollution-income data. This feature is quite unexpected as authors have usually ignored this 
occurrence. However, Panayotou (2000, 24) points out that lower ITP figures may be due to the use of 
official exchange rates rather than PPP rates as in the PWT (see chapter 1, section 3.2.2). The meta-
analysis of Cavlovic et al. (2000) did not consider this moderator variable. 
The two last sampling variables dvp and ldvp controlled for the composition of the sample. We 
therefore expect that studies composed of only developed or developing countries may present 
statistically different results. More precisely, one might expect that when the primary studies consider 
Chapter 2. Meta-Analysis of the EKC 
 
 
-82- 
exclusively developed countries the EKC or decreasing relationships are more likely to be found 
because the developed countries have already reached sufficiently high income levels in order to 
devote resources to abatement.  Even if our results confirm that the composition of the sample 
influences the results, there are inconsistencies across models. In the NL models, selective sampling 
(either in favor of developing or developed countries) favors the appearance of a monotonically 
increasing relationship36 but does not influence the ITP (knowing that the EKC has been found). The 
variable dvp is also significant and positive according to the existence of the EKC while studies 
composed of developing countries exclusively (variable ldvp) are more likely to find a flat relationship 
(ML model). In the WT and WLS models, the impact on the ITPs appears rather negative and 
contradicts the finding of the NL model. This result is confirmed by Cavlovic et al. (2000). It suggests 
that ITPs as well as the shape of the pollution-income path are not representative across nations, but 
sensitive to the nations included in a study. 
Overall, the sampling variables cast doubt on the reliability of primary studies on the EKC since both 
the type of income data used and the composition of the sample influence the results.  
 
4.3 Methodological variables 
The last set of moderator variables included in the meta-regression intends to grasp the influence of 
methodological divergences across primary studies. As mentioned earlier, alternative specifications 
excluding the methodological variables show that the methodological variables explain a non-
negligible part of these divergences.  
The results conclude that including additional explanatory variables generally has an impact on the 
estimate. This might be due to the presence of colinearity between explanatory variables, so that small 
changes in the specification lead to radically different results or to the presence of an omitted variable 
bias in the EKC specification37.  
When individual coefficients are considered, Cavlovic et al. (2000) conclude that including trade 
effects as an explanatory variable will yield higher ITPS. Our WT model may confirm this result. 
However, the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on trade is low. Nevertheless, in the 
NL model, the trade coefficient is significant and allows to conclude that the primary studies that 
control for trade effects are more likely to result in an increasing relationship between income per 
capita and pollution. However, contrary to the evidence in Cavlovic et al. (2000), our models identify 
other relevant moderator variables. More particularly, the WT model shows that EKC studies including 
explanatory variables capturing differences in education level yield higher ITPs estimates. The NL 
model confirms this as the variable educ perfectly predicts monotonically increasing pollution-income 
paths. The distribution of income (equ) as well as the variables eco and price also appear to influence 
the result of the primary studies. More precisely, studies controlling for the distribution of income are 
                                                 
36 Actually, when no EKC are obtained, all samples composed exclusively of developing countries present a monotonically 
increasing pollution-income path.  
37 An alternative specification has been tested for the ML model where a unique dummy variable (grasping the observations, 
that include any type of additional explanatory variable) instead of the seven variables grasping each type of additional 
explanatory variables. The estimated parameter was insignificant. 
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more likely to find an EKC. This allows to conclude that the empirical evidence on the pollution-income 
path is sensitive to the addition of supplementary explanatory variables.  
The results of the meta-analysis encourage further theoretical and empirical works, that consider the 
other determinants of pollution levels such as political and educational systems (Boyce, 2003; Torras 
and Boyce, 1998), the distribution of power and income (Magnani, 2000) as well as openness to trade 
(Agras and Chapman, 1999).  
Finally, the NL model shows that the use of panel data is more likely to yield the EKC. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of a cubic income term enhances the probability of obtaining a decreasing relationship 
when no EKC exists. The variable log (capturing logarithmic specification) and re (for the use of 
random effects) do not appear to influence significatively the result of the primary studies. 
Overall, when examining the methodological variables, we might conclude that the results of the 
empirical literature on the EKC are not stable across studies even those including different explanatory 
variables and studies based on divergent specifications.  
 
4.4 Publication bias 
In order to check for the presence of a publication bias, we include in our meta-regression model a 
dummy variable for published studies. Our effect size measures did not allow for the use of other 
procedures for testing the presence of a publication bias.  This variable is significant in all models and 
shows that published studies are more likely to conclude to the absence of the EKC and to the 
existence of a monotonically increasing pollution-income path.  
However, interpreting this finding remains difficult since the publication dummy variable may grasp 
varying effects. For example, the publication process might control for the quality of studies and 
therefore, one might consider that high quality studies tend to conclude to the inexistence of the EKC. 
On the contrary, one may interpret the significance of the publication variable as the general tendency 
of a publisher to reject studies presenting evidence in favor of the EKC. Indeed, when considering that 
most literature reviews examining the EKC hypothesis raised strong doubts as to its existence, 
contrary results may be considered doubtful and face editors’ disapproval. 
 
4.5 Robustness of results 
In order to preserve the homogeneity of our database, we reject several studies (see section 3.1). 
Even if we may justify their exclusion, these studies may share particularities and results and, 
therefore, their exclusion might bias our meta-regression. In order to examine the robustness of this 
decision, we draw in this section several comparisons between the excluded studies and the 
conclusions emanating from the meta-analysis. This enquiry seems particularly necessary since 
studies based on time-series analyses have been excluded. Indeed, all single-countries analyses tend 
to show that countries do not share regularities according to the pollution-income path and the most 
recent empirical studies are devoted to the analysis of the environment-income relationship in a single 
country over time. 
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Table 2.9 presents the results emanating from the excluded studies. This review is separated into 
three parts. First, the studies based on alternative environmental indicators are reviewed. Second, we 
focus on the time-series studies and finally we consider the studies based on alternative 
specifications.  
Tab. 2.9 Results of excluded studies 
Studies Results 
Tharakan et al. 
(2001) 
Time-series analyses of China, Pakistan, Indonesia, India and Japan show that CO2 emissions, fertilizer use 
and energy consumption are increasing. Pollution intensity (emission per $ of income) decreases except for 
fertilizers. 
Roberts and 
Grimes (1997) CO2 emissions per capita are increasing. The intensity of CO2 emissions is decreasing. 
Unruh and 
Moomaw (1998) 
CO2 emissions per capita are flattening. This study put forward the impact of the 1970s oil crisis since an 
attractor point appears in 1974-1975.  
Lindmark (2002) 
Swedish CO2 emissions are decomposed into 3 periods: 
 - 1970-1920: emissions are growing (at a decreasing rate) due to structural and technological change 
- 1920-1960: emissions are growing due to economic growth (scale effect) 
- 1960-1997: emissions are decreasing due to technological change and increased energy prices. 
From 1970 to 1997, CO2 emissions and economic growth are positively correlated. 
Roca et al. (2001) 
Time series analysis of Spain from 1973 to 1997. 
SO2 emissions follow an EKC 
NH4 and CO2 emissions have increased 
VOC and NOx are flattening. 
Overall, economic growth and environmental degradation appear to be positively correlated 
Lim (1997) 
Time series analysis of South Korea from 1973 to1997. 
Local air pollutants, hazardous waste and water pollutants follow an EKC. 
CO2 emissions, the deforestation level and industrial waste increase  
This study asserts that the EKC for waste, local and water pollutants prove the success of environmental 
programs  
Raymond (2004) No EKC exists when the environmental sustainability index is used as a proxy for environmental quality. When decomposing the index, it appears that local pollutants have slightly decreased.  
Heerinks et al. 
(2001) 
Nitrogen and phosphorus concentration in the soil of sub-Saharan countries follow a flat relationship with 
income per capita. When the authors control for income distribution, the relationship tends towards an EKC.  
Cole et al. (1997) Flat relationship between methane emissions and income per capita 
Galeotti and 
Lanza (1999) 
Gamma specification: 
CO2:    EKC with ITP = 16646 for all countries in the sample 
EKC with ITP = 17855 when developing countries are excluded 
Increasing relationship (ITP = 21757) when developed countries are excluded. 
Weibull specification: 
CO2:    EKC with ITP = 15073 for all countries in the sample 
EKC with ITP = 17961 when developing countries are excluded. 
Increasing relationship (ITP = 19340) when developed countries are excluded  
Bradford et al. 
(2000) 
BSS specification: 
EKC for water pollutants, SO2, lead. flat relationship for other heavy metals and SPM.  
Amazohou and 
Van Phu (2001) 
Non-parametric estimation: 
CO2 emissions increase in all countries.  
Shi (2001) Total CO2 emissions increases monotonically 
Hauer and Runge 
(2002) Global pollution increases, local one follows an EKC 
Barbier (2004) Agricultural area is examined as a proxy for deforestation. No EKC are obtained when the authors control for the size of the agricultural sector and demographic characteristics.  
Latest version:  June 2003 
 
 
4.5.1 Alternative environmental indicators 
As explained in section 3.1, we rejected observations that examined particular pollutants that did not fit 
into our pollutant categories. As far as comparisons hold, these observations supported mainly the 
conclusion of the meta-regression. 
The study of Heerinks et al. (2001) examined the nitrogen and phosphorus concentration levels in the 
soil of sub-Saharan countries. The estimated income coefficients are non significant. As only 
developing countries are considered, these results appear to confirm the meta-analysis as studies 
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examining only developing economies are more likely to result in flat relationship (model LM). 
However, when the authors control for income distribution, the estimated coefficients confirm the 
existence of an EKC. The meta-analysis also supports this result. The studies including explanatory 
variables capturing the income distribution are more likely to support the EKC hypothesis. 
Cole et al. (1997) examine the methane emissions. The estimated relationship appears to be non 
significant. As methane is a global pollutant, the meta-analysis would rather have concluded that 
methane emissions are increasing. However, the quality of methane emissions data is poor and is 
available only for a few years (Shafik, 1994).  Furthermore, as methane emissions are generated 
mainly by the agricultural sector (around 60%), it appears that developing and agricultural economies 
are large emitters of methane. 
Barbier (2004) analyzes the annual growth rate of the agricultural area in tropical countries. This 
indicator is used in order to capture the deforestation rate. Additional explanatory variables 
(institutional, structural and demographic) are included in the estimations. His results show a positive 
correlation between the size of the agricultural sector and the deforestation rate. Structural and 
demographic variables are also significant. However, the evolution of income per capita marginally 
explains the deforestation rate.  Furthermore, the influence of this last variable varies across regions. 
Weak evidence supporting the EKC hypothesis is found for Asia and Latin America. However, the 
EKC disappears when the additional explanatory variables are dropped. This study confirms therefore 
the presence of the omitted variables bias in EKC studies. Shi (2001) also testifies to the importance 
of including alternative explanatory variables. Indeed, his estimation of the pollution-income path for 
total CO2 emissions appears to follow an increasing path and is mainly explained by the high rate of 
population growth in developing countries. The importance of income per capita is secondary.    
Pollution intensity is another measure of the environmental impact of an economy. It is defined as the 
ratio between an indicator of pollution to GDP. Roberts and Grimes (1997) examine the CO2 
emissions intensity from 1965 to 1990. They obtained an EKC. However, the EKC is due to the 
decreasing emission intensities in a few highly-developed economies and not to a general pattern 
across countries. Accordingly, the emissions intensity increases in the great majority of countries. 
Furthermore, the authors note that the R2 of the yearly cross-sectional regressions decreases each 
year. From the authors’ point of view, this indicates that when development proceeds, other factors 
have a growing incidence on pollution intensity levels. This latter evidence confirms the meta-
analytical result according to the influence of additional explanatory variables. 
Raymond (2004) is, to our knowledge, the single attempt to use an aggregated indicator of 
environmental quality.  The environmental measure considered is the environmental sustainability 
indicator. The estimated coefficients lead to conclude that environmental damage is steadily 
increasing with income. However, when the ESI is decomposed, evidence supporting the EKC 
hypothesis appears for the pollutant having direct health impacts (water and local air pollution).   
 
4.5.2 Time series analysis 
A few studies have examined individual countries time series. These studies remain quite rare since 
environmental data is not available for a long time period. Individual countries analyses do not allow 
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for generalization. Indeed, generalization might not be supported by the data since homogeneity tests 
(Koop and Tole, 1999; List and Gallet, 1999; De Bruyn, 2000) support the evidence that individual 
countries do not share the same slope coefficients. Therefore, panel estimation may be biased. 
However, the available time series analysis tends to support the conclusions of the meta-regression. 
Lim (1997), for example, concludes that global pollutants rise in South Korea. However, local air 
pollutants follow an EKC. The evolution of urban and industrial waste is however more confusing since 
the former also follows an EKC (and not an increasing path as the meta-analysis would predict). The 
authors explain the EKC for waste (with a peak in 1980) as due to the adoption of a strict 
environmental regulation. Identically, Roca et al. (2001) explain the EKC for SO2 emissions in Spain 
by controlling for legislation (European standards were set in 1985 and 1994 for SO2 concentration 
levels). It appears therefore that environmental regulations play a role in the pollution-income path. 
Further work concerning the determinants of environmental regulations may therefore be interesting in 
future research. 
Two exceptions to the increasing emission path for global pollutants may be noted in time-series 
analysis. Lindmark (2002) found that CO2 emissions in Sweden have diminished with income growth 
since 1970. However, the causes of the amelioration lie in technological development and increased 
energy prices. Identically, Unruh and Moowaw (1997) also confirm the importance of rupture in 
pollution trajectories. Their graphical analysis shows that CO2 emissions per capita tend to have 
flattened in sixteen OECD countries since the second oil crisis. 
 
4.5.3 Alternative functional forms 
Most studies use a quadratic or cubic polynomial to estimate the pollution-income path. As it is clear 
that in reality the latter in not exactly a quadratic or cubic function, a few studies have tried to find 
better functional forms.  
Amozohou and Van Phu (2001) use non-parametric approaches. It is not surprising that this work 
yields significantly better results since they allow for a very flexible functional form. In most cases, the 
results are similar to those from the traditional polynomial. Nevertheless, Amozohou and Van Phu 
(2001), find a monotonically increasing relationship for CO2 emissions when a non-parametric 
functional form is used and an EKC when a traditional cubic function is used. However, this 
contradictory result seems due to outliers in the data (Lieb, 2002).  
Galeotti and Lanza (1999) use the functional form of the Gamma or Weibull distribution. Their results 
show that CO2 emissions follow an EKC and therefore contradict the conclusion of the meta-analysis. 
However, the Gamma and Weibull distribution can be monotonically falling or an inverted U-shape, 
where the inverted U-shape is more or less asymmetric (rising fast and falling slowly). But they cannot 
be monotonically rising or N-shaped. This favors the EKC hypothesis and biases the results since we 
will unquestionably find falling pollution at high-income levels. Furthermore, although Galeotti and 
Lanza (1999) state that Gamma and Weibul are better than the traditional technique, their results also 
show that it is not always the case and differences remain small. Thus, we will not give priority to the 
results of Galeotti and Lanza (1999). Bradford et al. (2000) also use an alternative functional form 
(BSS for the authors’ names). Their results do not contradict the results obtained by the meta-
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analytical approach (an EKC is found for SO2, smoke, water pollutants, flat relationships are obtained 
for heavy metals). 
 
Conclusion  
In order to examine the empirical literature on the EKC, this chapter has conducted a meta-analysis. 
The advantages of this methodology are numerous compared to traditional literature reviews. More 
particularly, the statistical approach used in this meta-analysis allows to keep track and estimate the 
influence of the various and numerous characteristics of the primary studies on the results. We 
construct a large database (286 observations) including most of the studies providing empirical 
evidences either for or against the EKC.  
Three econometric models have been estimated. The first multinomial logit model focuses exclusively 
on the shape of the PIR. The second class of models (weighted least squares and weighted tobit) 
attempts to estimate the influence of the primary studies’ characteristics on the ITPs. However, as 
artificial ITPs are set for monotonically decreasing and increasing relationships, the results do not 
allow us to derive conclusions on the ITPs values when a well-behaved EKC exists. In order to 
overcome this drawback, we estimated a nested logit model which determines in one unique setting 
both the determinants of the pollution-income path and, when an EKC is observed, the value of the 
ITPs. 
The meta-analysis shows that the primary studies results appear unstable across pollutants, countries 
and econometric specifications. If one examines the conclusion of the literature reviews, this result is 
not surprising. However, as the literature reviews may handle only a few points of comparison 
between primary studies, the meta-analytical approach offers many complementary and more precise 
results in so far as one is interested in finding the factors that seem to have the largest impact on the 
estimates. In this regard, the type of pollutant examined is crucial for the estimated PIR. Other 
characteristics of the primary studies such as the inclusion of additional explanatory variables, the type 
of countries examined and the econometric model used also exert a non-negligible influence on the 
PIR and the estimated ITPs. The result of the meta-analysis finally indicates directions for future 
empirical research on the EKC. 
However, the present meta-analysis could not considered all available empirical evidence on the EKC. 
For example, time series estimates have been rejected in order to preserve the homogeneity of the 
literature examined. Even if we try to control and compare the results of the meta-analysis with the 
ones of the excluded studies, such a procedure remains subjective and ad hoc. Further progress 
would thus require developing alternative effect size measures allowing the comparison of a larger set 
of primary studies.  
 
 
 
  
APPENDIXES 
 
Chapter 2. Appendixes 
 
 
-91- 
 
  
Appendix 1: The Delta Method 
Most studies use a quadratic or cubic polynomial to estimates the pollution-income path. However, the 
great majority of them do not report standard error of the income turning points estimators (ITPs). In 
order to calculate them, the Delta method may be used. 
Also known as the Taylor Series method, the delta method is a procedure for finding estimates and 
approximate standard errors of arbitrary functions of normally distributed random variables. More 
precisely, the delta method expands a differentiable function of a random variable about its mean, 
usually with a first-order Taylor approximation, and then takes the variance. For example, by the delta 
method, the variance of G(X) where X is a random variable with mean u and G(.) is differentiable, may 
be approximated by: 
G(X) = G(u) + (X-u)G'(u) which yields: 
Var(G(X)) = Var(X)*[G'(u)]2       
where G'() = dG/dX. 
 
Variance of the ITPs 
For the linear quadratic functional form, the ITP is given by: 
1
22
α
α
−=RS  
where α1 and α2 are the estimated coefficients on income and income square. 
Given var(α1) and var(α2) the variances of α1 and α2. The variance of the ITP is equal to: 
1( ) ( )= ΣTVar RS C C
n
 
where C is a 1x2 matrix composed of the partial derivatives dRS/dα1 and dRS/dα2, Σ is the  variances-
covariance matrix of α1 and α2, CT is the transpose of C and n the number of observations. 
More precisely, 
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For the quadratic linear functional form, the variance of RS is equal to: 
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For the cubic linear functional form, the variance of RS is equal to: 
22
1 21
2 2
2 2
1 1 2
2 3 4
2
,cov( ) var( )var( )
4 2 4
1( ) α α α α ααα α α
   
− += RS RSRSVar RS n  
 
For the logarithmic transformation, the confidence interval may be determined by raising the 95 
percent confidence interval in level by exp. This is straightforward since the logarithmic transformation 
yields a monotonic transformation. 
Following the delta method requires that all the information necessary to determine the true 
distribution of the ITP is available. It is quite frustrating therefore that almost no paper in the EKC 
literature provides the necessary covariance to let do the exact calculations. Cavlovic et al. (2000) 
overcome this drawback by postulating that the covariances are zero. However, as shown by 
Plassman and Khanna (2003), this is not satisfactory since the correlations between the coefficients of 
polynomial regression are typically high. We test the stability of variances estimates by using different 
value for the covariances matrix (0, 0.5, 0.7, 0.99). As the results vary considerably (and thus the 
weight of each observations), we did not use the Delta method. 
Furthermore, because of the symmetry of the normal distribution, this approximation by the delta 
method is not well suited to describe the distribution of the ITPs, which is usually asymmetric. 
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Appendix 2: Supplementary results from the nested logit model 
 
Nested logit model 
(T sets at the median ITP = $7300) 
 Branch 1 Branch 2 Branch 3 
 EKC t-Stat Increasing t-Stat ITP > T t-Stat 
size -0.11 -0.78 1.01 1.31 0.61 2.01 
pwt 0.24 0.51 5.81 2.19 -0.36 -0.40 
dvp 1.14 2.52 4.15 2.28 -0.10 -0.10 
ldvp -1.12 -1.41 #  -2.91 -1.72 
pub -1.58 -3.07 -2.03 -1.09 0.15 0.15 
panel 1.04 2.11 3.61 1.72 1.19 1.06 
re 0.41 0.93 -0.95 -0.61 2.09 2.30 
diff -0.68 -0.76 #  #  
conc 0.95 1.64 -3.84 -2.09 -0.46 -0.41 
cub 0.58 1.17 -5.83 -1.89 -2.05 -1.88 
log -0.16 -0.40 0.01 1.81 -1.49 -1.90 
pop -1.04 -2.15 -0.27 -0.14 -1.53 -1.79 
trade -1.15 -2.13 5.82 2.35 1.09 1.11 
pol 1.18 1.81 -1.65 -0.85 0.23 0.19 
educ -1.38 -1.48 #  -1.57 -0.88 
equ 1.38 1.69 1.77 0.62 -2.62 -1.61 
eco 0.39 0.70 7.52 2.36 -3.21 -2.51 
price 1.36 0.86 #  -1.69 -0.41 
tox 4.87 3.78 5.64 1.65 -0.38 -0.35 
res 5.60 4.18 -2.52 -0.85 ##  
local 1.43 2.07 2.19 1.24 0.89 0.82 
so2 1.95 2.83 0.53 0.23 -0.92 -0.87 
glob 0.40 0.49 8.63 2.45 2.48 1.43 
waste 2.38 2.22 #  #  
C -1.06 -0.93 -11.98 -2.27 -2.00 -1.11 
Log likelihood 
(starting value) -338.21     
Log likelihood 
(final value) -201.07     
Obs. 244     
*Statistically significant at a 10% percent probability threshold, ** 5 %, *** 1% 
Estimated by TDA ; # : predict success perfectly ; ## : predict failure perfectly 
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Nested logit model 
(T sets at the first quartile ITP = $4582) 
 Branch 1 Branch 2 Branch 3 
 EKC t-Stat Increasing t-Stat ITP > T t-Stat 
size -0.11 -0.78 1.01 1.31 0.77 1.70 
pwt 0.24 0.51 5.81 2.19 0.90 0.75 
dvp 1.14 2.52 4.15 2.28 -0.68 -0.54 
ldvp -1.12 -1.41 #  -1.33 -0.77 
pub -1.58 -3.07 -2.03 -1.09 -0.78 -0.77 
panel 1.04 2.11 3.61 1.72 -2.43 -1.33 
re 0.41 0.93 -0.95 -0.61 1.06 0.91 
diff -0.68 -0.76 #  #  
conc 0.95 1.64 -3.84 -2.09 -6.14 -3.21 
cub 0.58 1.17 -5.83 -1.89 1.53 1.07 
log -0.16 -0.40 0.01 1.81 -1.92 -1.49 
pop -1.04 -2.15 -0.27 -0.14 0.27 0.26 
trade -1.15 -2.13 5.82 2.35 -0.51 -0.42 
pol 1.18 1.81 -1.65 -0.85 2.35 1.86 
educ -1.38 -1.48 #  0.81 0.46 
equ 1.38 1.69 1.77 0.62 -3.78 -1.97 
eco 0.39 0.70 7.52 2.36 -2.98 -2.94 
price 1.36 0.86 #  4.75 1.98 
tox 4.87 3.78 5.64 1.65 0.23 0.19 
res 5.60 4.18 -2.52 -0.85 -8.91 -2.93 
local 1.43 2.07 2.19 1.24 -1.50 -1.08 
so2 1.95 2.83 0.53 0.23 -1.84 -1.46 
glob 0.40 0.49 8.63 2.45 #  
waste 2.38 2.22 #  #  
C -1.06 -0.93 -11.98 -2.27 4.22 1.61 
Log likelihood 
(starting value) -333.95     
Log likelihood 
(final value) -189.8     
Obs. 244     
*Statistically significant at a 10% percent probability threshold, ** 5 %, *** 1% 
Estimated by TDA ; # : predict success perfectly ; ## : predict failure perfectly 
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Nested logit model 
(T sets at the third quartile ITP = $12581) 
 Branch 1 Branch 2 Branch 3 
 EKC t-Stat Increasing t-Stat ITP > T t-Stat 
size -0.14 -1.20 0.94 2.25 0.65 2.80 
pwt -0.18 -0.42 3.08 2.53 0.70 0.81 
dvp 0.82 2.05 2.50 2.48 1.47* 1.67 
ldvp -1.08 -1.92 #  1.30 1.03 
pub -1.30 -2.91 -0.65 -0.65 -1.87 -1.69 
panel 0.88 2.04 0.76 0.84 -0.50 -0.52 
re 0.35 0.91 0.45 0.61 0.92 1.24 
diff -0.57 -0.70 #  #  
conc 0.17 0.34 -1.66 -1.64 -0.59 -0.57 
cub 0.62 1.44 -2.55 -2.13 -0.79 -0.87 
log -0.19 -0.54 0.72 0.83 -0.63 -0.97 
pop -0.32 -0.82 1.18 1.16 -2.42 -2.32 
trade -0.48 -1.04 3.92 2.92 1.12 1.09 
pol 0.57 1.11 -2.85 -2.08 -0.43 -0.40 
educ -1.12 -1.59 #  ##  
equ -0.07 -0.11 0.38 0.26 0.92 0.66 
eco 0.27 0.58 2.09 1.49 ##  
price 1.54 1.62 #  1.33 0.73 
tox 3.19 3.16 2.67 1.34 ##  
res 2.06 2.60 -4.26 -2.29 ##  
local 0.56 0.96 1.09 1.13 1.40 1.27 
so2 1.14 1.99 -0.66 -0.65 -0.02 -0.01 
glob -0.40 -0.55 4.32 3.01 1.06 0.84 
waste 1.58 1.62 #  #  
C 0.14 0.15 -9.22 -3.18 -4.59 -2.80 
Log likelihood 
(starting value) -401.50     
Log likelihood 
(final value) -267.18     
Obs. 244     
*Statistically significant at a 10% percent probability threshold, ** 5 %, *** 1% 
Estimated by TDA ; # : predict success perfectly ; ## : predict failure perfectly 
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Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the demand related explanations of the EKC. It is therefore devoted to the 
empirical analysis of the determinants of the demand for environmental quality. It more precisely 
intends to control if households’ demand for environmental quality rises with their income level as 
postulated by the EKC hypothesis.  
Even if the pertinence of this problematic is widely recognized by environmental economists, empirical 
analyses devoted to this issue remain rare. This may be due to the lack of data capturing expressions 
of the demand for environmental quality. Environmental quality is indeed a public good1 and any 
attempts to estimate its demand function are confronted with difficulties that are absent when studying 
private goods, notably, the fact that individual price-quantity transactions are not observed. 
In order to examine empirically the relationship between income levels and the demand for 
environmental quality, we will consider citizens’ support for environmental policies in initiatives and 
referenda. However, as we will see, numerous other variables are susceptible to interfere with the 
relation between people’s demand for environmental quality and their level of income. Thus, 
identifying the income effect on environmental quality requires controlling for other relevant observable 
characteristics. 
This problematic is addressed by using voting data on environmental initiatives and referenda. The 
latter are available for a series of Swiss referenda held at the federal level, which present voters with a 
simple yes-or-no choice of whether to increase the provision of a particular environmental good or to 
impose constraints on environmental degradation. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The first section is devoted to a brief review of theoretical 
considerations on the demand for environmental quality. It does not focus exclusively on the link 
between income levels and the demand of environmental quality, but extends the discussion to other 
relevant determinants of environmental preferences. Section 2 describes the existing empirical results. 
Section 3 presents the model of voting behavior. Section 4 is devoted to the empirical model and the 
description of the dataset. A model accounting for a selection bias is used since whether one votes 
may influence how one votes. Section 5 relates and interprets the results. A conclusion follows in 
section 6. 
 
1 Determinants of the demand for environmental quality 
The present section reviews the principal theoretical considerations on the determinants of the 
demand for environmental quality. In accordance with the EKC hypothesis, particular attention is 
devoted to the influence of income levels on environmental preferences (section 1.1). However, the 
literature reveals that other variables, such as age, gender and education may also be pertinent when 
                                                 
1 A public good is defined as a good that is non-excludable (people cannot be prevented from using it) and non-rival (one 
person’s use does not diminish another person’s use). However, one has to keep in mind that some environmental services or 
aspects of environmental quality are not pure public goods, since they may have some degree of excludability (entrance fee in a 
national park) and rivalry (natural resources availability). 
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one intends to explain the variation of environmental preferences between individuals. Section 1.2 
therefore reviews the principal theoretical hypotheses addressing these alternative determinants. 
 
1.1 Income and the demand for environmental quality  
One possible cause of the EKC may lie in the relationship between income and the demand for 
environmental quality. Grossman and Krueger (1991) highlight the idea that the most privileged 
groups of society mainly demand a better environmental quality. As the members of a society become 
richer, they may intensify their demand for a more healthy and sustainable environment in which case 
the government may be called upon to impose more stringent environmental control. This hypothesis2 
rests historically on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory which assumes that concern for environmental 
quality is something of a luxury, which can be indulged after more basic material needs are met 
(Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978). 
Several authors have thus emphasized the role of the income elasticity of demand for environmental 
quality as the theoretical underpinning of the EKC (Beckerman, 1992; Antle and Heidebrink, 1995; 
Chaudhuri and Pfaff, 2002). Economic theory states that as incomes increases, economic agents are 
willing to and able to devote more resources (in absolute terms) for all normal goods, including 
environmental quality such as clean air and water. Some even argue that the percentage increase of 
the demand for environmental quality would be greater than the percent rise in income (Coursey, 
1992). In economic terms, this would lead environmental quality to be a luxury or superior good. 
However, from a theoretical point of view, what really matter when considering the EKC hypothesis is 
not that environmental quality is a luxury, but that it is a normal good: when income grows by one 
percent, the demand for environmental quality must increase, but not necessary by more than one 
percent. Thus, the luxury argument is not a prerequisite for the EKC relationship and remains a purely 
empirical question (Lieb, 2002; McConnell, 1997).  
Most models examining the evolution of environmental quality with income growth rest on a 
combination of assumptions concerning environmental preferences and abatement technologies. In 
other words, the EKC hypothesis refers to an equilibrium relationship between income and pollution 
based on the interaction between consumer preferences and the cost of reducing exposure to 
pollution. As shown in chapter 1, most models posit a tradeoff between environmental quality (or 
abatement) and consumption3. If preferences are non-homothetic, i.e. income affects the marginal 
utility over goods, and, moreover, that at a certain income level a relatively higher value is placed on 
environmental quality and a lower value on consumption, then it is more likely that more environmental 
quality will be purchased (more spending on abatement), even though this means a lower level of 
consumption than would otherwise be possible.  
                                                 
2 This hypothesis is sometimes called the Ruttan hypothesis because it seems to have been formulated for the first time by 
Vernon Ruttan in 1971 during his presidential address to the American Agricultural Economic Association (Antle et Heidebrink, 
1995, 604-605). 
3 More precisely, using a standard model of a single infinitely living consumer, the equilibrium PIR depends on the relative 
change in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and pollution (the slope of the indifference curve), and the 
marginal rate of transformation between consumption and pollution (the slope of the consumption possibilities frontier, or the 
opportunity costs of reducing pollution) as the consumer’s income increases (Lieb, 2002). 
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As most aspects of environmental quality are public goods, rising demand for environmental quality 
needs to be translated into environmental policies. Many authors have therefore put forward the prime 
importance of policies since they allow the internalization of external effects and the fulfillment of the 
growing demand for the environment (Cole et al., 1997; Panayotou, 1997; Hettige et al., 1998; Hilton 
and Levinson, 1998; de Bruyn, 2000). Therefore, the issue at stake is not only that the demand for 
environmental quality rises with income but also that the government is able to ensure that this 
demand is met. In democracies, this statement requires that citizens’ support for environmental 
policies in election and referenda also increases with their income level. We will therefore focus on the 
following question: are the richer voters within an electorate the greenest voters? 
The model of Vogel (1999) derives the relationship between the environmental policy choice of an 
individual and his income level. It shows that the rich tend to support stricter environmental legislations 
since they face, with their higher consumption level, a lower marginal opportunity cost of 
environmental protection. In other words, the forgone consumption due to allocating resources to 
abatement generates a lower loss of utility for the richest classes of a society. However, when the 
model also considers the structure of income between profit share and salary, the middle-class may in 
fact constitute the principal supporter of environmental policy when two conditions hold. First, a 
household’s opportunity costs of environmental protection increase with its profit share. Second, the 
richer derive their income from a relatively larger part of profit than the middle-class. McAusland 
(2003) derived similar results. An income effect leads richer people to support more environmental 
policy. The income composition effect acts in the opposite way if richer citizens possess a larger stake 
in dirty activities. 
A third effect may also reduce the support of the richest households for environmental policies. Richer 
households are susceptible to improve their own endorsement of environmental quality through private 
measures and may thus prefer more lenient environmental policies. This private demand effect is 
especially expected when environmental quality is rivalry in use and that the exclusion principle 
applies to some extent. For example, richer people may choose their place of residence according to 
environmental considerations or equip their house, car or office with air conditioning systems which 
cleanse the air of soot particles, dust and exhaust fumes.  For the poorest classes of society, such 
expenditure is not affordable and they may therefore be more supportive of environmental policies, 
especially if the latter are financed by a progressive fiscal structure. Some evidence confirm that rising 
incomes first increase the demand for fuel wood but that at higher income levels, fuel wood is 
increasingly replaced by modern energy sources, which lead to a sharp decrease in indoor air 
pollution (Chaudhuri and Pfaff, 2002). However, such examples are likely to be limited to cases where 
the benefits due to the increases in environmental quality are completely internalized by the 
households bearing its cost. In other words, indoor air quality is a private good. Another classic 
example of private substitution of an environmental good is South Korea’s bottled water ban (Eder, 
1996). Bottled water was banned in South Korea because the government feared that private bottled 
water supply would aggravate social class differences. As the public water supply was unsafe, a 
strong incentive existed for substituting tap water by bottled water. However, as the richest could 
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easily bear the cost of bottled water while the lower classes could not, the government perceived this 
unequal exposure to risk as a threat for social stability and imposed a ban on bottled water. 
Overall, the theoretical considerations remain ambiguous regarding the effect of income on the 
environmental policy choice of households. Three effects, acting in opposite directions, can be 
identified: 
 An income effect: the richest classes of society may be more willing to support environmental 
policy since their marginal opportunity cost of abatement is lower. Furthermore, they are also 
susceptible to give a higher value to environmental quality. 
 An income composition effect: the income of the richest classes of society may be more sensitive 
to the strictness of environmental policies (especially if they own a larger stake of dirty industrial 
activities). Thus, they may be less prone to support environmental policy. 
 A private demand effect: the rich may get environmental quality by their own means and do not 
require state intervention. Thus, they may be less prone to support environmental policy. 
Which of these effects dominates constitutes an empirical question that the present chapter intends to 
explore.  
 
1.2 Other determinants of the demand for environmental quality 
Quite obviously, income level is not the only relevant household or individual variable influencing 
environmental policy choices. Other determinants have been examined and several hypotheses have 
been considered. We list here the most frequently quoted in the literature.  
 
1.2.1 The education hypothesis 
Educational attainment is generally considered an important determinant of environmental preferences 
and, more generally, of the demand for public goods. More educated people may be more concerned 
about environmental quality since they are more informed about risks and more aware of the 
consequences of exposure to pollution for their own health and of the social costs of environmental 
degradation (Kahn, 2002).  
Education is also an important determinant of patience, or it may simply reveal greater patience by 
those who extended their schooling (Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Thalmann, 2004). Given that 
environmental preservation is often characterized by immediate costs and future benefits, increased 
patience is likely to translate into greater support for environmental quality. 
 
1.2.2 The age hypothesis 
Another demographic indicator of concern for environmental quality is age. Its effect remains however 
controversial.  
On the one hand, the age hypothesis states that young people are more concerned about 
environmental quality and more willing to support environmental protection programs or laws (Van 
Liere et Dunlap, 1980). Its theoretical underpinnings rest on what Malkis and Grasmick (1977) called 
age-group differences, i.e. differences associated with the ageing process, which presumably can be 
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outgrown. They argue that the younger are presumed to be less integrated in the dominant social 
order and are thus more likely to support substantial changes in traditional values, habitual behaviors 
and existing institutions. In this regard, the young are seen as more idealistic and less materialistic 
(Inglehart, 1990). In addition, the Mannheim’s (1990) theory of generation4 leads to expect that 
continued exposure to alarming information on environmental deterioration and disasters (Chernobyl, 
Bhopal accidents) left an indelible imprint on many young people5. The elderly may care less for the 
environment since they have less to loose from environmental degradation and may give greater 
priority to economic stability having endured the Great Depression and World War II (Kanagy et al., 
1994 cited by Kahn, 2002). The middle-aged groups may also offer less support to environmental 
actions since they support the largest share of the tax burden associated with government regulation 
and may be more cynical about the government’s effectiveness in solving environmental externalities. 
Identically, the seniors are on fixed incomes and may be especially unsupportive of the tax increases 
associated with environmental preservation. In this setting, we expect that the younger citizens more 
readily accept pro-environmental ideology and offer a larger support to actions favorable to 
environmental quality enhancement. 
On the other hand, Kahn (2002) states that older people may support environmental preservation as a 
form of capital stock sustainability in order to leave a legacy. They may also be more prone to 
environmental action since they often particularly suffer from the degraded health conditions caused 
by noise, air and water pollution6. Furthermore, seniors may support environmental quality 
preservation because they are likely to have more leisure time to enjoy its recreational benefits. Young 
people are also more exposed to unemployment risk and may therefore be opposed to environmental 
legislation that may deteriorate their job opportunities (Thalmann, 2004). 
 
1.2.3 The political hypothesis 
The political preferences of citizens are also an important determinant of their voting behavior. Three 
reasons are usually advanced for expecting a split among the traditional left-right partisan division on 
environmental policies. First, business and industry leaders oppose environmental protection policies 
because of the abatement costs such legislation involves. Second, the traditional right wing parties 
counter environmental reforms since they entail an extension of government activities and size. 
Finally, conservatives also resist environmental reforms, as environmental protection policies require 
innovative actions and a rupture with the traditional governmental behavior.  
A cursory glance at the programs of political parties in Europe reveals that leftist parties are more 
prone to support environmental policies than right-wing parties and business organizations. However, 
this statement is not obvious since some environmental measures may place a disproportionate 
burden on the constituencies of left-of-center parties. Energy taxation has been criticised because of 
its regressivity (OECD, 1994; Thalmann, 2004). However, the distributive impacts of environmental 
                                                 
4 This theory states that historical events occurring at the crucial adolescent and young adulthood phases of the life cycle can 
permanently affect an individual throughout his existence. 
5 This commitment to environmental action will not disappear with age. 
6 This might be another version of the « differential-exposure » theory: people facing objective environmental problems are more 
concerned about environmental quality (see 1.2.4). 
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taxation appear heavily dependent on the exoneration measures, tax rates, the type of fuels 
concerned and the income measures used (Pearson and Smith, 1991; Poterba, 1991; Shah and 
Larsen, 1992). In Switzerland, the taxes on non-renewable fuels proposed in September 2000 were 
criticised for redistributive reasons. The leftist parties nevertheless support the initiatives. 
 
1.2.4 The urban-rural hypothesis 
The rural-urban split may also have an impact on the citizen’s degree of environmental concern. 
Tremblay and Dunlap (1978) offer two possible explanations for urban-rural differences in support for 
environmental protection7. The first one, called the differential-exposure theory or challenge-response 
model (Inglehart, 1995), considers that urban residents are more prone to support environmental 
legislation since they are exposed to greater pollution. This explanation assumes that the place of 
residence is an indicator of objective physical conditions and that exposure to poor environmental 
conditions leads to environmental concern.  
The second explanation, named the extractive-community theory, rests on occupational differences 
between rural and urban communities, with residence acting as a proxy for extractive/non-extractive 
activities. It suggests that rural residents will place their economic interest above environmental 
protection, since they are involved mainly in extractive occupations such as farming, logging and 
mining. Thus, because of their heavier dependence on the free access and use of the natural 
environment, rural residents may be less prone to accept environmental regulations (Salka, 2001). 
Both explanations may be challenged. Several scholars suggest that urban-rural differences are not 
as stark anymore. People may in fact vote “with their feet” and choose to reside in a rural area in order 
to enjoy a cleaner environment. In this situation, people sharing the greater concern for environmental 
quality may be located in rural pristine areas and stimulate environmental action (Fortman and Kussel, 
1990). Their locational choice is motivated by the high quality of life in those areas rather than by the 
resource-related jobs found there. This may be especially the case when traveling time between the 
cities and the countryside is small (as in Switzerland). Furthermore, recent evidence has shown that 
rural areas are more economically diverse than expected and the once dominant extractive industries 
have shrunk (Bennet and McBeth, 1998)8. Finally, Salka (2001) also suggests that rural environmental 
support may be strong according to some specific environmental issues. It seems indeed that the 
issues rural residents do care about are simply different from those concerning urban areas. 
 
1.2.5 The gender hypothesis 
Most empirical works examining the determinants of preferences for environmental quality include a 
variable capturing gender. However, they have often overlooked the theoretical presumptions 
according to its effect (Loomis and Lee, 2002).  
Peterson and Merchant (1986) argue that women feel more concerned about the environment since 
females, in their role as mother and nurturer, and nature have been linked historically. Identically, men 
                                                 
7 For an in-depth review of those explanations, see Salka (2001) 
8 In Switzerland, the importance of the primary sector has been declining over the last few decades. In 1999, agricultural 
production accounted for only 1.5% of gross domestic product and less than 4.5% of total employment. 
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may feel less concerned about environmental quality than about jobs and economic wealth since they 
are usually held responsible for the fulfillment of the familial needs (Passino and Lounsburry, 1976).  
The previous arguments rest on a traditional image of the social role of men and women and we could 
not imagine other reasons why men and women may value differently the costs and benefits linked to 
environmental preservation. Gender may rather act as a proxy capturing other characteristics like the 
variation in professional status, education level, occupations or leisure activities between sexes. We 
therefore expect that gender has no effect on voting behavior when we appropriately control for other 
relevant variables. 
 
 
2 Empirical evidence  
Several economic, political and sociological studies have addressed the issues raised by this paper. 
These studies attempt to determine if the characteristics of individuals, households or communities are 
related to their concern and demand for environmental quality.  
As the methodologies used for capturing the demand for environmental quality vary across studies, we 
presented the empirical literature according to 4 categories. The first category groups the studies 
based on contingent valuation estimates (CV). The second category focuses on the studies using 
opinion surveys and the third reviews the studies based on the voting behavior of individuals. More 
attention is devoted to this group since the present article is also based on individual-level voting data. 
Finally, the last group reviews the studies examining various alternative measures, which may be 
considered as proxies for the demand for environmental quality. They range from direct measures of 
environmental quality such as variations of some pollution level to measures of environmental 
regulatory stringency and plants’ location decisions. This last group of measures (based on the directly 
measurable aspects of environmental quality) rests on strong assumptions. For example, surveys 
using some measures of pollution levels in order to catch the demand for environmental quality 
postulate that when demand is high observed pollution levels are lower. These studies ignore the role 
of abatement costs, which may hinder the decrease of emissions even if the demand for a clean 
environment is high. Similarly, some hypothesize that the strictness of environmental laws (a proxy for 
the demand for environmental quality) is related to the location decisions of polluting plants even 
though several studies have revealed that environmental regulatory costs are only a marginal factor 
for the implementation of the production units9 (Albrecht cited in Nordström and Vaughan 1999; 
Eskeland and Harrison, 1997; Tobey, 1990; Xu, 1999).  
The studies using CV and opinion surveys are not immune to criticism either. In surveys, a 
hypothetical situation is presented to people since people know that they will not have to pay their 
stated WTP or respect their word. Thus, people may not state their real preferences and behave 
strategically. When voting individuals are indeed aware that if the popular initiative is accepted, some 
                                                 
9 Several factors such as the availability and quality of the labor force, the fiscal scheme, the proximity with consumers, 
intermediary goods and raw materials are dominating. 
Chapter 3. The Demand for Environmental Quality 
-106- 
changes will take place and there is no hypothetical bias. One could refute this argument by saying 
that data on the voting decisions of individuals are collected throughout a survey asking people ex 
post what they voted. People may thus also not reveal their real voting decision. Schläpfer et al. 
(2001) by comparing answers to CV surveys and real voting behavior, show however that hypothetical 
values suffer from a strong upward bias, possibly indicating that many CV respondents failed to 
realistically consider their budget constraints in the hypothetical situation10.  
Finally, referenda and initiatives appear more suited to such study than analyses of election outcomes. 
In elections of representatives, issues are not one-dimensional and what will be done for the 
environment in the event of electing a politician remain fuzzy and benefit-cost calculations are heavily 
uncertain. 
 
2.1 Willingness to pay or to accept  
The most popular technique for inferring demand for environmental quality is perhaps contingent 
valuation (CV). The CV method invokes a framework of a contingent (that is “hypothetical” sometimes 
also referred to as “constructed”) market, used to elicit a valuation from individuals based on two 
primary assumptions. First, the respondent is the best judge of his interests, and secondly that his 
ability to rank preferences is both rational and knowledgeable. This valuation technique asks people 
directly what their willingness to pay (WTP) for a change in environmental quality is.  Theoretically, the 
WTP is the amount of money that, if extracted from the individual after the amelioration of 
environmental quality, will leave him, in terms of his level of well-being; as well off as he was before 
the change. In other terms, it is the money equivalent of environmental improvement, i.e. the value of 
the benefits (or avoided damages) from improving, preserving or protecting the environment. 
On the basis of contingent valuation studies, it is straightforward to analyze the determinants of the 
individuals’ WTP by regressing the WTP on a vector of explanatory variables (income and other socio-
economic characteristics of the respondents to the CV survey). This process allows to investigate the 
magnitude of the income elasticity of willingness to pay for an increased provision of environmental 
quality, i.e. a measure of how willingness to pay is affected by changes in income11. Evidence 
resulting from CV studies is abundant (see McConnell, 1997). They generally tend to conclude that 
income has a positive effect on the WTP for environmental preservation (reduction in morbidity risks, 
visibility) even if many ambiguous results remain (water quality, urban sanitation). 
Kristrom and Riera (1996) have estimated the income-elasticity of the willingness to pay for a variety 
of environmental goods in several European countries (Finland, France, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden), and found that in the majority of the cases, environmental goods were not a 
                                                 
10 Harrison and Rutström (1999) found that 34 out of 39 SP observations had an average hypothetical bias of about 338 
percent. The NOAA panel recommendations suggest that hypothetical values be divided by two, and List and Gallet (2001) 
found that on average, subjects responding to hypothetical situations overstated their preferences by a factor of about three.  
11 However, note that estimating the income elasticity of WTP for one particular good does not allow to infer the income elasticity 
of demand for that good (Flores and Carson, 1997). For example, a rich man may buy proportionally more loaves of bread than 
his poorer neighbor, but this does not mean that he is willing to pay proportionally more for the same loaf. 
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luxury.  Höbky and Söderqvist (2001) found similar results for the income elasticity of WTP for marine 
euthrophication effects in the case of the Baltic Sea.  
Apart from income, other variables appear to influence the elicited WTP by individuals. By examining a 
CV study on the values of the benefits (swimming, fishing, and boating) of remediation efforts leading 
to a clean up of a harbor in Canada, Dupont (2004) found that parents, either men or women, have a 
usually higher WTP. However, some evidence shows that men without children share a greater WTP 
than women without children. This may be due to the fact that men are less time constraints and can 
thus enjoy the recreational opportunities such as swimming, boating and fishing examined by this 
study. On the contrary, the studies of Loomis and Lee (2000) show that women were more risk averse 
and were more sensitive to the perceived risk of environmental hazards. Evidence concerning the 
respondent’s age and place of residence remain ambiguous. 
 
2.2 Opinion surveys  
The third type of studies looks for answers to the prior difficulty of opinion survey dealing with 
environmental attitudes.  
Several social surveys examining public concerns and attitudes towards the environment have been 
mainly realized in the U.S. and European countries. As some of these surveys include specific 
questions about items related to the demand for environmental quality (support for environmental 
policy, expenditure, degree of concern about the environment, etc.), they allow to derive empirical 
evidence about the demographic, social and political characteristics of the supporters of environmental 
protection.  
One of the oldest studies was conducted by Coursey (1992). He correlated income levels in the United 
States with Gallup opinion polls taken in the United States between 1940 and 1990 and with federal 
environmental legislations. He found that as income levels went up, concern about the environment 
increased. He concluded that the demand for environmental quality has an income elasticity of 2.5, 
similar to the demand for new cars and private education. Another founding study is Inglehart’s (1995). 
He uses the World Values Survey, which was carried out in 43 developed and less developed 
societies. The results show that even if the vast majority of the general public approves environmental 
protection (especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe and noticeably less in the Nordic countries, 
the U.S. and the Great Britain), people are far more reluctant to support it when they are asked about 
how much they are willing to pay. Inglehart identifies two sets of causes for public support of 
environmental protection. First, the country’s objective environmental circumstances explain why 
citizens facing severe pollution (South Korea, Japan, Mexico, and Czechoslovakia) are relatively more 
inclined to devote resources to abatement. Second, the rise of a post-materialistic attitude since World 
War II enhances environmental concerns in prosperous and secure societies (Nordic countries). When 
individual characteristics are examined, post materialistic attitudes appear to be stronger among well-
educated and young people. 
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The analysis emanating from Eurobarometer surveys12 (EORG, 2002) on the environment reveal that 
women and highly-educated people are in general more worried about environmental issues. Contrary 
to Inglehart’s (1995) conclusions, young people appear less concerned about the environment (except 
for natural disasters, chemicals and pesticides). Finally, ideological and political positions also play a 
role as the left feels generally more worried than the right (especially about the topics of nuclear 
power, pollution from farming and industrial disasters).  
Baldassare (2002) offers similar evidence on the basis of the Special Survey on Californians and the 
Environment (from the PPIC13 Statewide Survey Program). His results show particularly that the 
specific local environmental conditions and problems faced by an individual in his living region have an 
impact on his environmental attitude. Furthermore, even if the survey concludes that the majority of 
Californians support stricter environmental laws, the degree of support differs across regions and 
political and demographic groups. Support for stricter laws decreases with age but increases with 
education and is unrelated to the household income. Republicans and people not registered to vote 
also offer a weaker support than average to stricter environmental policies.  
Dasgupta and Wheeler (1996) examine citizen complaints regarding the state of the environment in 
China. Their results show that more educated and richer people complain more and may thus possess 
a higher demand for environmental quality. Furthermore, complaints are also positively related to the 
current environmental quality, i.e. provinces with high SPM density count more citizen complaints.  
Rasinski and Smith (1994) explore the determinants of support for government environmental 
spending. They use the 1990 International Social Survey Program (ISSP), which contains questions 
about government spending for a variety of social concerns in 9 nations (Australia, West Germany, 
Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the United States, Hungary, Italy, Norway, and Israel). Their results 
show a considerable variability across countries. However, within countries, the young and more 
educated are more supportive of environmental spending, even at the expense of other social policies. 
Greater income (except for Israel) also means more support for environmental public spending. 
Furthermore, pro-socialist values are associated with a higher level of support for environmental 
spending, while pro-business values are associated with less support. 
 
2.3 Voting data  
The voting decisions of individuals at environmental referenda or general elections offer another 
opportunity for examining the demand for environmental quality. As most studies do not have, for 
confidentiality reasons, access to the individual choice, they generally use data aggregated at the 
county levels.  
                                                 
12 The results presented in this publication come from two opinion polls, chiefly Eurobarometer 58.0, supplemented with the 
most relevant data from Flash Eurobarometer 123.  The Eurobarometer 58.0 survey (The attitudes of Europeans towards the 
environment) is the largest in terms of the number of respondents and is part of the Eurobarometer series. A representative 
sample of 16,000 citizens from the 15 European Union countries was asked a series of questions about the various facets of the 
environment in a one-on-one situation. The Flash Eurobarometer 123 survey (Perception of sustainable development and 
environmental concerns of Europeans) was conducted on a sample of 7500 Europeans by telephone. 
13 Public Policy Institute of California 
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Deacon and Shapiro (1975) analyze two Californian environmental initiatives (addressing the 
conservation of the coastline and public transportation). Their results show a high degree of 
consistency across the two initiatives and their estimates demonstrate that the counties with a higher 
average level of education and a stronger support for Democrats are more inclined to accept the 
initiative. The income coefficient is positive but not significant for conservation of the Californian 
coastline initiative. Furthermore, the workers that might see their income adversely affected by the 
initiative are significantly less prone to vote positively. In the case of the public transportation initiative, 
the population densities as well as the size of land area are also positively linked to the probability of 
accepting the initiatives.  
Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) and Kahn (2002) extend the analysis of Deacon and Shapiro (1975) by 
analyzing sixteen environmental ballot propositions in California. These cover a wide range of subjects 
from protecting mountains lions, expanding parklands to imposing a bottle deposit and tightening 
restrictions on pesticides and toxic waste. Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) found that the average county 
incomes as well as the price of environmental protection (measured in terms of the county percentage 
of people working in an occupation potentially harmed by those legislations) explain most of the 
variation in voting, and there is little need to introduce preference variables such as political ideology. 
The relationship between income and voting for environmental goods appears to be significant and 
concave for ten initiatives. Concerning the price variables, counties with a larger share of industrial, 
construction, manufacturing, forestry and farming workers, are significantly more opposed to 
environmental initiatives when the latter threaten their income. More educated and urban Californian 
counties tend to support more environmental protection measures. However, the effects of these 
variables appear unstable across initiatives.  
Kahn (2002) analyzes six Californian environmental initiatives and two non-environmental issues. His 
results confirm the education hypothesis and that the counties possessing a greater share of workers 
in endangered occupations are significantly more reluctant towards environmental regulations. His 
findings contradict the concave income relationship: richer counties exhibit less support for 
environmental regulation. The county’s average citizen’s age is not significant and higher-density 
areas are more likely to vote in favor of environmental initiatives.  The two non-environmental 
initiatives show clearly different patterns than environmental ballot propositions. Kahn (2002) also 
examines the demographic determinants of local government expenditures, which confirm the 
education hypothesis. The variables income and age are also positive and significant. Finally, when 
comparing U.S. states congressional voting outcomes between 1974 and 1994, Kahn concludes that 
states whose population is richer and more educated tend to vote “greener” and that states heavily 
involved in resource-extractive activities are more likely to be anti-environment.  
Salka (2001) examines 20 environmental initiatives and focuses on the “rural-urban divide” hypothesis 
held in California, Oregon and Colorado. His findings tend to support that urban counties offer greater 
support to environmental protection measures. However, when other determinants are examined, the 
population density variable is not significant. Higher income and education explain significantly greater 
support for most Californian and Coloradoan initiatives (but not in Oregon). The dependence on 
resource-extractive industries is negatively related to the probability of approval; the coefficient is 
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systematically significant in Oregon but results are mixed in California and Colorado. Finally, political 
preference variables are significant in all cases (the percentage of republican votes is negatively 
associated with approval). 
Another relevant study on the determinants of the demand for environmental quality is Fort and Bunn 
(1995). They analyze several referenda intending to limit the use of nuclear power in various U.S. 
states. They test for the presence of a participation bias in order to control if how individuals vote is 
influenced by the fact that they vote at all. Their results show that while both economic variables and 
environmental preferences have a role in explaining voting choices, when the latter are held constant, 
the ability of voters to successfully participate in referenda swamps these other effects. The probability 
that anti-nuclear referenda pass is almost four times as responsive to voting participation as it is to 
income, and nearly thirty times more responsive to participation than it is to changes in the intensity of 
environmentalist preferences. However, as far as we consider the variables of interest, richer counties 
and counties with a larger share of college graduates favor nuclear power. On the contrary, higher 
population density contributes to higher anti-nuclear votes. The electricity prices, the share of people 
over 65 years old and the share of people employed in electric services and primary non-ferrous metal 
production are insignificant. The type of restrictions imposed by the legislation (either against all 
existing plants or only addressed to future power-plants) does not influence the voting decision. 
Power (2004) examines the determinants of the demand for public open space (a dataset composed 
of 796 referenda held in the US is used). Education and income appear positively correlated with 
demand for open space. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that the instrument proposed influenced 
the results; tax increases are less likely to be approved than bond issues. 
To our knowledge only two studies have used individual-level data collected from a voter survey. 
Fischel (1979) analyzes the outcomes of eight New Hampshire towns asking residents whether they 
would allow a pulp mill to be located in their town, an environmental “bad”. The income and college 
attendance variables are significant predictions of a “no” vote. Citizens employed in construction 
industries are more likely to vote “yes”. 
Thalmann (2004) analyzes three Swiss popular initiatives for a tax on non-renewable fuels. Individual-
level data from the VOX survey are used. The author controls for the presence of a selection bias by 
estimating a bivariate probit model as many people choose not to participate at all. These estimates 
show no correlation between error terms of the selection and outcome equation and, therefore, we 
may conclude to the absence of a selection bias14. The findings tend to show that better educated 
people, citizens with leftist affinities and living in the largest municipalities appear to be the most 
favorable to the environmental propositions. Household income and gender do not appear to be strong 
determinants of voting decisions. Since the tax proposition would increase the gasoline price, car 
owners are logically less favorable to the environmental taxes (especially if the tax rate is high). The 
elderly also appear to be less inclined to cast a “yes” vote. Finally, the author controls for citizens’ 
concerns for unemployment (no impact), income inequality (negative impact) and government 
intervention (positive impact) but the results are weakly significant. By comparing the three referenda, 
                                                 
14 However, as no exclusion-restrictions are included in the participation equation, the estimates may be biased and this 
conclusion invalid (see section 5.2). 
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the magnitude of the tax rates appears to increases rejection in groups particularly concerned, but for 
most voters it is not decisive and the quest for the second dividend (i.e. recycling tax revenue by 
decreasing social security contributions) does not favor the acceptability of the green tax. 
In the empirical analysis hereafter, we will use the same dataset as Thalmann (2004). It offers 
therefore a reference in order to compare our results. However, as we will also consider other 
initiatives and referenda, we will be able to check for the robustness of results across voting sessions.  
 
2.4 Other relevant evidence 
Several studies examine the determinants of environmental regulatory activities by providing empirical 
estimates of the impacts of political boundaries, demographics and political activism on exposure to 
pollution. These studies use either data on the evolution of emissions, the stringency of regulatory 
activity or the location (and the capacity enlargement) of polluting activities and relate them to various 
community characteristics (median income, nonwhite population percentage, age, proximity to other 
jurisdictions, etc.). 
Helland and Whitford (2001) used the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data at the county-level. 
Changes in exposure to toxic emissions aim at grasping the benefits linked to pollution abatement and 
therefore may be interpreted as some expression of the demand for environmental quality. 
Interestingly, emissions appear to be larger when they are partially supported by people located 
outside of the political jurisdiction. They find that facilities located in counties on state borders emit 
more air and water pollutants than facilities located in non-border counties, suggesting a 
transboundary externalities problem. Similar evidence is given by Kahn (1999) on SPM and Sigman 
(2002) on water pollution. 
Hamilton (1995) relates the capacity expansion or contraction of commercial hazardous waste facilities 
in the U.S. to race, income, educational level and voter turnout at the zip-code level. His results show 
that expansions of the site capacity are negatively correlated with voter turnout. In other words, a 
politically active community accepts less hazardous waste facilities in its neighborhood. Jenkins et al 
(2002) find that the host fees received by communities for the sting of landfills are lower in minority 
communities. Kreisel et al.’s (1996) estimates are quite contradictory as they find that minorities (Black 
and Hispanic) are not disproportionately exposed to TRI emissions. However, poor communities face 
systematically higher levels of emissions. Arora and Cason (1999) resolve part of the controversy by 
determining that black communities are more exposed to TRI releases in non-urban areas of the 
South, but not elsewhere in the U.S. 
Been and Gupta (1997) and Wolverton (2002) relate the location decisions of polluting plants to the 
neighborhood characteristics. They offer weak evidence suggesting that polluting plants tend to be 
located in poorer neighborhoods with large minorities. However, when the location decisions of 
hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities are examined more closely, the prior 
evidence disappears. Been and Gupta (1997) even find that those facilities are less likely to be located 
in poor communities and are more prone to be sited in Hispanic areas. The results of Wolverton 
(2002) tend finally to suggest, when controlling for the community characteristics at the time the plant 
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was originally sited, that minorities did not matter and that poorer communities may actually have 
attracted fewer polluting plants.  
The studies of Deily and Gray (1991), Viscusi and Hamilton (1999) and Gray and Shadbegian (2004) 
examined the determinants of regulatory activities. Deily and Gray’s (1991) results suggest that steel 
mills facing economic difficulties (on the verge of closing) face fewer air inspections. Viscusi and 
Hamilton (1999) find that superfund sites15 face more stringent environmental regulations in 
communities characterized by greater voter turnout and belonging to pro-environmental states. On the 
same subject, the results of Sigman (2001) show that the time it takes the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to process Superfund sites is positively affected by voter turnout and the median 
income of the community. Finally, Gray and Shadbegian (2004) show that the percentage nonwhite 
near the plant does not reduce the level of regulatory activity and is indeed associated with more 
regulatory action and lower emissions. Furthermore, when the surrounding communities are 
composed of more children, elderly and fewer poor people, plants tend to emit less pollution. 
Overall, when demographic and income variables are examined, these sets of studies do not seem to 
offer clear evidence on the determinants of the demand for environmental quality. Indeed, results do 
not appear to be stable across studies and methodologies. More particularly, the community’s median 
income does not appear to be a major determinant of the demand for environmental quality. The 
relative dissimilarity of results may be easily explained when one considers that these studies focus on 
different types of environmental goods and different areas. The meta-analysis has already implied that 
environmental actions are mainly directed towards local pollutants that have direct health effects. 
Furthermore, the nuisances of one pollutant may be widely different across regions due to different 
topographic characteristics, water temperatures and current or wind regimes. 
 
 
3 Model of voting behavior  
A model of voting behavior assumes that every voter makes a rational decision which maximizes his 
expected net benefit from the chosen outcome. Here we follow Deacon and Shapiro (1975) and 
Powers (2004). Assume that each voter j consumes a composite private good xj, which price is p, and 
environmental quality q, which is a public good. Voters face a budget constraint G= Ij-Tj, where Ij is the 
income of voter j and Tj is the tax liability. As we are interested in the variation in q, Tj and p due to 
changes in environmental policies, subscripts are added so that qk, Tjk and pk correspond to different 
policy regimes denoted by k.  
The individual’s utility depends upon consumption of the private good and of the quality of the 
environment. The utility function, which is assumed to possess a differentiable quasi-concave utility 
function, therefore reads: 
                                                 
15 A Superfund site is any land in the United States that has been contaminated by hazardous waste and identified by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a candidate for cleanup because it poses a risk to human health and/or the 
environment (see http://www.epa.gov/superfund/index.htm, July 2004). 
Chapter 3. The Demand for Environmental Quality 
-113- 
 ( , )j j kU U x q=   (3.1) 
It is possible to define the highest utility level attainable by the individual subject to the budget 
constraints. Assuming the budget constraint to be satisfied exactly, the solution may be used to solve 
for the vector of private consumption in terms of prices, disposable income and level of environmental 
quality. The highest level of utility may then be written in indirect form as a function of variables, each 
of which may be affected by the choice of public policy: 
 max , , -( , ) ( )
jx
j j j
k k k
j
k
j I TU U x q V q p==  (3.2) 
In making his decision, each voter evaluates the highest attainable utility under each outcome k, i.e. 
the acceptance of the environmental policy (k=1) or its refusal (k=0): 
 0 0 0 0, , -( )
j j jj I T VV q p =  (3.3) 
 1 1 1 1, , -( )
j j jj I T VV q p =  (3.4) 
by subtracting Vj1 to Vj0, a simple decision rule emerges. The self-interested individual will vote yes if : 
 0 01 0 0- , , - , , , 0( )
jj j j j jV V V I T Tq p q p∆ ∆ ∆ >= ∆  (3.5) 
 
and will vote no if : 
 0 01 0 0- , , - , , , 0( )
jj j j j jV V V I T Tq p q p∆ ∆ ∆ ≤= ∆  (3.6) 
 
where ∆ denotes changes in the policy influenced variables. 
For notational convenience, we follow Deacon and Shapiro (1975) in substituting the symbol z for the 
argument in equation (3.6): 
 
1 0
- ( )jj j jV V V z= ∆  (3.7) 
Finally, we assume that the change in utility is also a function of individual taste and preferences, 
which are grasped by a vector of political and socio-economic variables yj. Equation (4.7) becomes 
then: 
 
1 0
- ,( )j jj j jV V V z y= ∆  (3.8) 
The prior decision rule in (3.3) and (3.4) appears incomplete for at least two reasons.  
First, we have simply assumed that unchanged utility levels will lead to a “no” vote. This choice is 
frequent in the literature (Fischel, 1979; Kahn and Matsuoka, 1997; Thalmann, 2004) but ignores the 
fact that a portion of citizens might abstain when the difference in utility under alternative outcomes is 
not perceptible. However, in the following empirical analysis, we will not consider abstentionism as a 
particular issue. Voters who abstain will be considered in the same way as if they had refused the 
referenda. Several reasons may justify this choice. First, this will allow a better comparability with the 
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literature examining environmental referenda, which has usually not taken into consideration the case 
of abstentionism (except for Deacon and Shapiro, 1975). Second, as only a very small proportion of 
voters abstained in the referenda we considered, we may simplify the analysis. Finally, as mentioned 
by Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003), survey data are much more like voting data when undecided 
responses as treated as no. This finding gives some empirical justification for associating undecided 
responses to no response.16 
 
 
4 Data and methodology  
4.1 Environmental initiatives and referenda 
Because of its direct democracy, Switzerland provides a quasi-unique setting for analyzing the 
determinants of voters’ attitudes towards demand for environmental quality. There is scarcely any 
other country in which the people have such far-reaching rights of co-determination. Apart from the 
elections, Swiss citizens may cast votes on popular initiatives17 or on compulsive and optional 
referendum18. Popular ballots are indeed frequent in Switzerland. For example, in 2004 and at the 
federal level only, 4 voting sessions have been held and citizens could cast a vote on 14 issues. When 
state level (i.e. cantons) initiatives and referendums are taken into consideration, this number is even 
larger. 
The subjects of referendum and initiative cover most aspects of the public domain, from government 
spending to abortion law. Since 1971, they have also addressed several environmental issues 
including air and water protection, traffic reduction, taxation of energy and restriction of nuclear power 
electricity production. As said earlier, studies using voting data (Kahn, 2002, Kahn and Matsusaka, 
1997; Deacon and Shapiro, 1975) do not usually dispose of data on the individual level and use 
aggregate responses of groups of individuals. These studies thus require several assumptions on the 
                                                 
16 However, by setting a perception threshold jδ , the issue of abstentionism may be considered and the decision rule 
becomes: 
 votes yes if : ,( ) jj j jV z y δ∆ >    
 votes no if : ,( ) jj j jV z y δ∆ <    
 and abstains if : ,( ) jj j jV z y δ≤∆    
The term δ j is interpreted as a measure of the precision with which an individual is able to distinguish between alternatives and 
may also be dependant on the socio-economic characteristics of the voters. 
17 By the popular initiative, citizens may seek a decision on an amendment they want to make to the Constitution. For such an 
initiative to be organized, the signatures of 100'000 voters must be collected within 18 months. The authorities sometimes 
respond to such an initiative with a counter-proposal (generally less far-reaching) in the hope that the people and States will 
give their preference to it. Popular initiatives do not originate from the Parliament or Government but from the citizens 
themselves. They are therefore regarded as the driving force behind direct democracy. A double majority is needed for 
adoption: firstly, a popular majority by which is meant a majority of the valid votes cast throughout the country, and secondly a 
majority of the States, i.e. a majority of cantons in which the voters adopted the proposal. 
18 Compulsive referendum is compulsory on all amendments to the Constitution and on membership to some international 
organizations. A vote must be held in such cases and a double majority. Amended or new laws and similar decisions of 
Parliament and certain treaties in international law are the subject of a vote only if this is specially requested by an optional 
referendum (100'000 citizens' signatures). In that case, a majority of the votes cast is sufficient for adoption. 
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pattern of preferences (Deacon and Shapiro, 1975).  In our setting, we did not follow such a strategy 
since we could dispose of data relating to the individual-level voting decisions.  
 
4.2 The VOX dataset 
We use micro-economic data referring to the voting decisions and the various characteristics of a set 
of Swiss citizens (i.e., the Swiss over 18 years old) on several environmental initiatives or referenda. 
The Gfs19 institute through a telephone survey (called VOX) collects the data within ten days after 
each referendum asking respondents whether and how they voted.  
In order to grasp environmental initiatives and referenda, we look for ballots that directly or indirectly 
affect the manner and the extent to which human society makes use of non-human resources 
(Congleton, 1996, 3). We select nine recent initiatives, referendums or counter-proposals20 that came 
before the Swiss electorate between 2000 and 2004. These initiatives, if accepted, were expected to 
increase the supply of environmental quality and cover a wide variety of issues. The subjects of the 
initiatives range from traffic reduction to banning nuclear power plants and imposing taxes on energy. 
The environmental dimension of these propositions is clearly assessed in the messages delivered to 
each voter by the Federal Swiss Executive Committee and the Swiss Federal Parliament. The 
environmental dimension of the “liberalization of the electricity market” initiative is however less 
obvious as ecological parties and organizations gave different watchwords to their members. The 
WWF supported the initiative since it enhances the transparency of key ecological information such as 
the origin and production process of the electricity.  The Greens ecological parties21 opposed the 
liberalization since they feared that it would ruin all measures intending to rationalize the production 
and consumption of electricity. Identically, the opponents to anti-nuclear proposition raised ecological 
arguments in defense of the use of the nuclear power plants. They argued that the production of 
nuclear electricity was free of CO2 emissions and green house gases. It is possible therefore that 
some green voters may have voted against such anti-nuclear initiatives. 
We report in table 3.1 the content, the participation rate and the percentages of “Yes” and “No” votes 
for each initiative in the effective vote22 and in the VOX sample. The appendix 1 provides further 
details on the subject of each initiative. Each VOX sample counts around 1000 observations23.   
We consider also two non-environmental initiatives (an initiative requiring the adhesion of Switzerland 
to UNO and an initiative aiming at distributing the Swiss National Bank’s gold surplus to the retirement 
funds and insurance programs). These “placebo” initiatives allow to examine the specificity of 
environmental propositions and the robustness of results.  
                                                 
19 Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für praktische Sozialforschung (see http://www.gfs.ch/,  January 2004) 
20 In the following, we consider the terms initiative, referenda and counter-proposal as synonymous. 
21 Except for the green fraction of the Swiss Socialists Party. 
22 Source: Swiss Federal Administration, see http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/index.html 
23 The sample of the 3 votes of May 2004 (nuclear ban, nuclear moratorium and motorless Sunday) are larger since 2 surveys 
have been conducted because of the unusual number of objects (9 in total) submitted to the citizen on that day. As both surveys 
were sharing the information our study requires, we could combine the 2 surveys and dispose of a larger number of 
observations. 
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The effective participation rates are around 40 – 45 % and are systematically higher in the VOX 
samples. This may be due to the fact that the act of voting is considered a moral duty and people do 
not like to confess that they did not participate. Such low participation rates are quite common for 
Switzerland, where citizens are called upon to vote up to 4 times a years, even though registration is 
automatic and Swiss citizens over 18 years of age are systematically given of a voting card. 
Furthermore, the possibility of correspondence voting exists in Switzerland. There is however no 
obligation to vote except in the canton of Schaffhouse24.  
 
Tab. 3.1 Environmental initiatives and referendum 
Initiatives/referendum Subject Participation Rate of approval* 
Rate of refusal 
to participate in 
the survey  
Traffic halving (March 2000) 41.6% 21.3%  
VOX sample (n= 994)  
To halve road traffic within 10 
years 54.6% 19.3% 57% 
Solar initiative (Sept. 2000) 44.2% 32%  
VOX sample (n= 1015) 
Tax on non-renewable fuel.  
Use: solar energy promotion and 
energy conservation 55.7% 35.2% n.a. 
Energy conservation package (Sept. 2000) 44.2% 47%  
VOX sample (n= 1015) 
Tax on non-renewable fuel 
Use: promotion of energy 
conservation and subsidies for 
hydroelectric power plants 55.7% 37.8% n.a. 
Green tax reform I (Sept. 2000) 44.2% 45%  
VOX sample (n= 1015) 
Tax on non-renewable fuel. 
Use : lower social contribution 55.7% 28.7% n.a. 
Green tax reform II (December 2001) 37.4% 22.9%  
VOX sample (n= 998) 
Tax on non-renewable fuel and 
electricity 
Use : lower social contribution 50.7% 17.1% 61% 
Electricity Market Liberalization (Sept. 
2002) 44.9 % 47.4 %  
VOX sample (n= 1003)  
Introduction of competition in the 
electricity market 60.3% 34.1% 68% 
Nuclear ban (May 2004) 50 % 33.7 %  
VOX sample (n= 2004) 
Interdiction of nuclear power 
plants 59.0% 35.5% 66% 
Nuclear Moratorium (May 2004) 50 % 41.6 %  
VOX sample (n= 2004) 
Temporary interdiction of new 
nuclear power plants construction 59.0% 40.7% 66% 
Motorless Sunday (May 2004) 50 % 37.6 %  
VOX sample (n= 2004) 
Interdiction of road traffic during 4 
Sundays each year 59.0% 39.2% 66% 
UNO membership (March 2002) 54.6% 54.6%  
VOX sample (n=1010)  
Membership to UNO 
70.8% 60.1% 52% 
Surplus gold reserve of SNB (Sept. 2002) 44.9 % 47.6%  
VOX sample (n= 1003) 
Allocation of the surplus gold 
reserve of Swiss National Bank 60.3% 39.3% 68% 
* for the VOX samples, abstentions are considered a negative vote 
 
                                                 
24 People from 18 to 65 years old have to vote except if they present a valid excuse during the 3 days following the referendum 
or election. A penalty of 3 Swiss francs (around 1.9 euros) has to be paid by non-participants.  
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Most initiatives have been unsuccessful from the environmental point of view. Initiatives aiming at 
banning nuclear power plants, taxing non-renewable fuels or reducing traffic have not gained the 
popular and the cantons’ majority25. The refusal of the “electricity market liberalization” referendum is 
therefore exceptional since it may be considered, as far as we adopted some ecological arguments, 
as a vote favorable to the environment.  
The rate of approval diverges between the effective vote and the VOX samples. In the case of the 
green tax reform I, the rate of approval in the VOX sample appears even to be 15 % lower. However, 
when observations are weighted in order to make the sub-sample of surveyed citizens representative 
of the population according to the socio-demographic characteristics26, the proportions of approvals 
are quite identical. 
One final interesting feature of the VOX surveys is that they also contain information on people who 
did not participate in the vote. Only observing voters may induce the presence of a selection bias in 
the estimates (see above 4.3.1). Thus, just as in Thalmann’s study (2004), we shall learn not only 
about who votes in favor of environmental initiatives and referendum but also on who participates in 
such ballots.  In our empirical strategy, we will therefore simultaneously model the participation and 
the voting decisions27 and be able to extrapolate the result of the pool as if everyone in the sample 
had participated. Unfortunately, as a large proportion of the citizens interviewed refused to participate 
in the surveys (on average 60 %), it will not be possible to extrapolate the results of the whole 
population since we cannot control if the participant in the survey shares the unobservable 
characteristics of the non-participants. Another drawback of the VOX data sets is that they obviously 
concern only a single democratic jurisdiction while the EKC theory would rather imply the analysis of 
the variation of the demand for environmental quality throughout developing and developed countries.  
One should also take into consideration that the majority of the Swiss parliament and Executive 
Committee has considered the green tax reform II and the halving traffic initiative as unrealistic. These 
objects remain very imprecise since the voters were not able to know how such objectives would be 
implemented and the cost they would generate. Both initiatives were doomed to failure, as the voters, 
even the more informed and educated, could not correctly evaluate the consequences of an 
acceptance of those ballot propositions. The low rate of approval they got confirms that many voters, 
even if they may be concerned by environmental quality, decide to penalize the vagueness of those 
initiatives.  
Finally, it is frequent that several initiatives are submitted to citizens’ approval on the same voting 
session in Switzerland. Overall, the eleven initiatives we examine come from six voting sessions28. 
One initiative may thus attract more attention and political debate and consequently influence the 
participation (and, thus, the voting decision) on other objects judged less important. We may therefore 
expect that the results on initiatives held on the same voting day share larger similarities.  
 
                                                 
25 In order to succeed, the double majority of the Swiss states (cantons) and people is required in Switzerland. 
26 The VOX studies (see Milic et al., 2000; Ballmer-Cao et al., 2000; Zürcher et al., 2001; Mahnig et al., 2002; Hirter et al., 2002; 
Blaser et al., 2003) provide the weight and compute the % of YES and NO votes of each sample. 
27 Thalmann (2004) and De Melo et al. (2004), who also use the VOX Surveys, used an identical model. 
28 The voting session of May 2004 includes for example eight objects covering various subjects. 
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4.3 The econometric model  
4.3.1 Selection bias 
The selection bias is often described as a problem of non-random sampling. For example, more 
educated citizens vote more and thus the sample of voters consists of a disproportionate amount of 
educated citizens. However, this non-random aspect of the sample is what is commonly 
misunderstood to be the problem of selection bias, but it alone may not bias the estimates (Sartori, 
2003). In order to correctly apprehend the problem of selection bias, we may consider the following 
example. In our setting, when trying to estimate the influence of education levels on voting behavior, 
the ordinary technique would be to estimate the following probit equation:  
 i  ( )  i ia b education evote = + +  (3.9) 
where i represents a voter in the sample and ei is a normally distributed error term. Votei takes the 
value 1 if the voter i accepts the initiative and 0 otherwise. We face the problem that we are observing 
only citizens who are actually voting and the latter may differ in an important unmeasured way from 
non-voters. When a referenda or an election is set on the political agenda, the voter has in fact to 
make two decisions: should he participate in voting at all, and if so, should he vote for or against the 
proposal or the candidate29.  
Suppose that voters, who are smarter, vote more and that education is the only measurable factor 
posited to influence the decision of whether or not to vote. Therefore, one may formulate a selection 
equation of the form: 
    ( )  i i iparticipation educationα β ε= + +  (3.10) 
where εi is a normally distributed error term. Participationi takes the value 1 if the citizen i casts a vote 
and 0 otherwise. The problem of selection bias is due to the fact that some uneducated citizens will 
vote. They decide to vote because they have a high value of some unmeasured variables (part of εi; 
for example, intelligence). Thus, the observations in the sample for the second equation that have 
small values of the independent variable (i.e., β(educationi)) have large error terms. The observations 
in the selected sample that have larger values of the independent variables have more usual range of 
errors. Whether or not education is correlated with the unmeasured variable such as intelligence in the 
overall population, these two variables are correlated in the selected sample.  
Because intelligence is an omitted variable in the two equations, the error terms of the two equations 
are correlated30. Assuming that intelligence leads to casting a vote, one will misestimate the effect of 
education on wages since, in the selected sample, voters with little education are unusually smart. It 
will follow that applying a standard probit estimation results in biased coefficient estimates and 
neglecting to model selection can be a serious mistake.  
When the error terms of two equations are uncorrelated, ordinary estimation techniques are indeed 
consistent and the sample is said to be consistently censored (Aachen, 1986). However, in practice, 
unobserved factors influencing selection also influence the outcome, inducing correlated error terms. 
                                                 
29 Generally, among 50 to 70 % of Swiss citizens do not to participate in the referenda. 
30 The selection bias problem has been therefore described as on omitted variable problem (Heckman, 1976, 1979) 
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In other words, whether one votes is likely to influence how one votes (Fort and Bunn, 1998). In order 
to correct for this selection effect, conditioning voting decision on the participation is required. Let the 
participation function P depend upon a vector of determinants, M as in (3.11). Formally, the 
conditioned voting decision is the modified version of (3.8) that appears in (3.12). 
 ( )P P M=  (3.11) 
 
1 0
- , ,( )j jj j jV V V z y P= ∆  (3.12) 
4.3.2 Bivariate probit model 
In order to take into account the potential presence of a selection bias, we opt for a bivariate probit 
model with censoring in order to test whether the participation decision had an influence on the results 
(Greene, 2000). As the dependent variable of interest (yes or no vote to the environmental referenda) 
is observed only if another dependent variable, participation, takes the value yes, one probit equation 
focusing on participation selects the sample for the other probit equation grasping the determinants of 
the voting decision. Censoring occurs since the voting decisions of non-participants are not observed. 
The empirical model corresponds to a sample selectivity model and takes the following form: 
 [ ] ( )' ' '1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 21, 1, , , , ( )P V P x x x x xφ β β ρ φ β= = =  (3.13) 
where the participation and voting decisions are modeled simultaneously by two dichotomous 
variables V (where V=1 denotes a positive vote, 0 otherwise) and P (where p=1 denotes participation, 
0 otherwise). x1 is a vector of determinants of vote and x2 a vector of determinants of participation, φ is 
the univariate normal cumulative distribution function and φ2 is the bivariate normal cumulative 
distribution function.  
 
4.3.3 Determinants of voting behavior 
We refer to the theoretical literature exposed in section 1 in constructing the variables to estimate the 
model. We distinguish between two groups of determinants. The first contains all economic and 
demographic variables, which may be easily monitored such as age, gender or income. The second 
catches more subjective variables, such as political and partisan preferences. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
briefly describe each of them.  
By including the subjective variables into the model, we examine if the demand for environmental 
quality could be understood only in terms of demographic characteristics, price and income, or if is it 
necessary to consider more subjective factors such as political ideology. We estimate therefore for 
each initiative two specifications, one including all variables, the other only the demographic and 
economic ones.  
 
a) Economic and demographic variables 
The variables income, gender, age, educ, city refer respectively to the income, gender, age, education 
and urban hypotheses.  
Demand analysis requires that the relevant prices of environmental goods are identified. We explore 
the hypothesis that environmental legislation may impose larger costs to some economic activities and 
may have consequences on the distribution of income. We expect that people employed in those 
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activities will more likely refuse environmental regulations. The variable ind captures citizens employed 
in industrial activities. The variable transp grasps the citizens employed in transportation activities and 
the variable hotel the citizens employed in tourism and hotel activities. In each case, the occupational 
variables also capture the people whose last occupation or whose partner’s occupation is in industrial, 
transportation or tourist activities. Unfortunately, the VOX database does not offer more detailed 
industrial activities, which could be pertinent when the acceptability of environmental regulation is 
examined. Furthermore, for the majority of VOX samples, only a few respondents were working in 
tourism and hotel activities and, therefore, the variable has to be dropped due to insufficient variation. 
We also include a variable car capturing the number of cars possessed by each household. This 
variable captures part of the cost supported when higher energy prices as well as traffic reduction are 
imposed. The variable alpine codes the alpine cantons as large hydroelectric producers face particular 
constraints concerning the regulation and taxation of electricity. The nuclear variable grasps the 
nuclear cantons for identical reasons 31.  
Finally, we also include a variable capturing French-speaking people which aims to grasp part of the 
cultural diversity between the different regions of Switzerland. 
 
Tab. 3.2 Description of economic and demographic variables 
Demographic and economic variables 
gender Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent is a woman,  0 for a man 
age Age (divided per 10) 
age2 Age squared (divided per 1’000) 
educ Number of years of education  
educ2 Number of years of education squared (divided per 10) 
french Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent’s mother tongue is French, 0 otherwise 
income Household monthly income (divided per 1’000) 
income2 Household monthly income squared (divided per 10’000’000) 
car Number of cars owned by the household 
city Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent lives in a city (population > 50’000) 
nuclear Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent lives in a canton which has a nuclear power plant (Zurich, Argau and Bern) 
alpine Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent lives in an alpine canton (Uri, Schwitz, Obwald, Nidwald, Glaris, Grison, Ticino, Valais) 
ind 
Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent works in industrial or construction activities, 0 otherwise. If the 
respondent is not working, his last job is taken into account. The dummy variable is also coded 1 if the 
respondent’s partner works in industrial or construction activities. 
transp 
Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent works in transportation, 0 otherwise. If the respondent is not 
working, his last job is taken into account. The dummy variable is also coded 1 if the respondent’s partner works 
in transportation. 
hotel 
Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent works in hotel or tourist activities, 0 otherwise. If the respondent is 
not working, his last job is taken into account. The dummy variable is also coded 1 if the respondent’s partner 
works in hotel or tourist activities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 The canton of Zurich is considered a nuclear canton since the Swiss authorities planned to construct a storage facility for 
nuclear waste there. 
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b) Political variables 
The political variables intend to catch the political orientation and preferences of the respondents. The 
variables left and right grasp people who are situated on opposite ends of the political spectrum. 
Identically, we also consider the attitude towards some political priorities by the variables openessCH, 
equityCH, jobCH and stateCH. We however did not use the available information on environmental 
preferences since it seems rather tautological. 
 
 
 
Tab. 3.3 Description of political variables 
Demographic and economic variables 
left Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent is on the left of the political map, 0 indicates the respondent is on the centre or the right of the political map 
right Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent is on the right of the political divide, 0 indicates the respondent is on the centre or the left of the political map 
openessCH Scale from 1 to 6 – 1 indicates the respondent would desire a more open country, 6 indicates the respondent would desire more closed country. 
equityCH Scale from 1 to 6 – 1 indicates the respondent is not concerned with income inequalities, 6 indicates the respondent is concerned with income inequalities. 
jobCH Scale from 1 to 6 – 1 indicates the respondent is not concerned with unemployment, 6 indicates the respondent is concerned with unemployment. 
stateCH Scale from 1 to 6 – 1 indicates the respondent desired more state intervention and less competition, 6 indicates the respondent desired less state intervention and more competition. 
polint Dummy variable – 1 indicates the respondent declared having a strong or rather strong interest for politics, variable included only in the participation equation 
 
 
 
4.3.4 Determinants of participation 
The question “why do people vote?” remains a longstanding issue in social sciences. Since a single 
voter has almost no influence on the outcome with his vote cast, but to cast the ballot has 
considerable non negligible costs (time, transportation), the expected utility of voting is close to zero 
and the rational citizen should therefore abstain. Many solutions have been advanced regarding this 
voting paradox. For example, Downs (1957) argues that people vote since they wish to maintain 
democracy and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) advance that a sense of duty makes people cast their 
vote. Other explanations range from the actions of group leaders or strategic politicians (Uhlaner, 
1989; Aldrich, 1993) to the minimax-regret hypothesis of extreme risk aversion (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 
1974).  
De Melo et al. (2004) argue that, in the Swiss context, the voting paradox in not relevant since the 
outcome of a vote will be taken into account in later governmental decisions even if the initiative or 
referendum is rejected. Evidence of this behavior is frequent in the case of environmental regulations. 
For example, one central argument of the government for rejecting the tax on non-renewable energy 
in December 2001 was that the citizens refused such taxes a year before. Furthermore, the 
government conceded that they basically agree with regulations aiming at greening the fiscal system 
but would not sustain them until the next legislature. 
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Empirical studies have found a strong link between socio-economic status, commonly measured in 
terms of education, income, and occupation with turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Leighley 
and Nagler, 1992; Shields and Goidel, 1997; Lijphart, 1997). They have shown that citizens of higher 
social and economic status and higher education participate more in general elections (Jackson, 
1995). Gender and age also explain turnout. Oppenhuis’ (1995) results confirm that men turn out at 
elections more frequently than women and that younger age groups abstain more often than older age 
groups. A strong ideological position (such as being on an extreme side of the political scene) is also 
linked with higher turnout. As most of theses variables actually also influence the voting decision, we 
include in the selection equation the same variables as in the voting equation.  
As we are mainly interested in the characteristic of voters and analyze each initiative separately, we 
could not consider variables capturing the characteristics of the initiatives (closeness of the ballot, 
availability of information, amount of campaign spending, competitiveness between political parties 
and characteristics of the institutions), which may explain the differences in turnout rates between 
ballot propositions. 
However, it is important to note that the previous Heckman-type selection model (Heckman, 1976, 
1979; Dubin and Rivers, 1990) is appropriate only when at least one “extra” explanatory factor, called 
an exclusion restriction, influences selection but not the subsequent outcome of interest (Sartori, 2003; 
Little and Rubin, 2002). In our setting, this means that we need to identify one variable that influences 
participation but not the voting decision.  
Technically, the conditional bivariate probit model is identified solely based on the joint normality 
assumption of the errors, and no exclusion restriction is required. Extensive experience in the 
literature in the form of both trial and error and Monte Carlo studies indicates that, in practice, an 
exclusion restriction is required to ensure the stability of the model (see the simulation results in 
Puhani, 2000 and Sartori, 2003).  
We could avoid the problem of identifying an exclusion restriction by using an alternative estimation 
procedure allowing identical explanatory variables in both the selection and outcome equations as 
proposed by Sartori (2003). This procedure would require however to make the assumptions that the 
errors from the two equations have a correlation or 1 or –1. This might be a reasonable assumption 
when the selection and the subsequent outcome of interest involve similar decisions or goals; the 
decisions have the same causes and the decisions occur within a short time-frame and/or are close to 
each other geographically. The voting and participation decisions do clearly not respect these 
conditions since we may not theoretically link the decision to vote to the choice of vote. Furthermore, 
since numerous initiatives and referenda on different subjects may be on ballot on the same day in 
Switzerland either at the federal or local level, the participation rate and the composition of the 
electorate may likely be influenced by the other objects and the latter may have a greater influence on 
who decides to vote than the vote of interest. 
In our setting, it appears to be quite difficult to find an instrument since most available variables that 
may influence the voting decisions such as the gender, age, income, type of occupation and education 
may also influence the decision of whether or not to vote. We opt for a variable capturing political 
interest (variable polint) since political interest and knowledge are strong determinants of turnout 
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(Ackaert and Winter, 1996) but do not usually influence the voting decision. As recommended, the 
polint variable appears to constitute a strong exclusion restriction, i.e. the variable included in the 
outcome equation but not in the participation has a substantively important effect on participation.   
 
 
5 Results  
The presentation of the results is as follows. First, we focus on the determinants of the voting behavior 
by examining the estimates of the voting equation. The aim is to verify the theoretical hypothesis 
formulated in section 1 by looking at the sign and significance of the different variables. We also 
examine if the demand for environmental quality can be understood in terms of income and 
demographic variables only or if it is necessary to consider more subjective factors such as political 
preferences. The variation of the results across initiatives is also discussed.  
Second, we explore the presence of the participation bias (sample selection bias) among our data and 
the determinants of participation are analyzed.  Finally, we compute and discuss the predicted 
probabilities issued from the estimations. 
All results have been computed using the STATA 7.0 software32. The estimations of the two 
specifications of the 9 environmental and 2 “placebo” initiatives are presented in detail in tables 4 to 14 
in appendix 3. We systematically test the inclusion of the square of the age, education and income 
variables in both the selection and the outcome equations. When such variables had no significant 
effect and added no explanatory power to the model, they were dropped from the equation leading to 
slightly different specifications between initiatives. 
 
5.1 The determinants of the voting decision 
We first explore the determinants of the voting equation from the bivariate probit model. Even if we 
may compare the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients between alternatives, we cannot 
directly balance the magnitude of effects. In order to do so, one needs to calculate the derivatives, i.e. 
the marginal effects33. Table 3.4 presents the marginal effects on the vote equation for the nine 
environmental initiatives. The results for the two placebo initiatives figure in table 2 in appendix 2. 
 
5.1.1 The economic and demographic variables 
The effect of income levels appears to vary widely across environmental initiatives and does not offer 
a clear-cut determinant of the demand for environmental quality34. A unit increase in income clearly 
raises the probability of approval in 2 cases (halving traffic, electricity market referendum). A positive 
income effect is also observed in the green tax reform II initiative, but it vanishes when we control for 
                                                 
32 The conditional bivariate probit model with censoring is estimated with the maximum likelihood estimator of Van de Ven and 
Van Praag (1981). Two-step estimations give almost identical results. 
33 Marginal effects have been calculated at the sample mean of the independent variables 
34 In order to check the robustness of that conclusion, we fit several other specifications excluding alternatively the age, 
education and income variables since these are likely to be correlated. The sign and significance of the parameters did not 
change 
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political preferences and attitudes. On the other hand, the marginal effect on income appears to be 
significant and negative for the solar and nuclear ban initiatives as well as the energy conservation 
initiative (but at a 90% confidence interval only). For the two placebo initiatives, high income 
individuals appear to vote more in favor of the adhesion of Switzerland to the UNO. In the case of the 
SNB gold surplus referendum, no significant effect is found. 
Our results differ from Kahn and Matsusaka (1997), who obtain a concave relationship between 
income and the rate of approval in 10 (out of 16) initiatives35. For nuclear initiatives, we obtained 
similar results to Fort and Bunn (1988) since richer counties appear to favor nuclear power in U.S. 
state initiatives. We also do not completely support Thalmann (2004), who obtains non-significant 
income coefficients for the solar and energy conservation initiative36.  
Comparing the initiatives, the effect of income on the demand for environmental quality depends on 
the instrument proposed and the type of environmental quality that it aims to preserve. High income 
citizens seem on average more sensitive to the type of costs the initiative involves. For example, they 
are more likely to refuse the initiatives increasing energy prices since they will bear the greatest 
burden in absolute terms. However, when the instrument seems more favorable to high incomes (as in 
the case of green tax reform) or imposes costs in a less predictable manner throughout society (traffic 
halving), richer citizens appear less inclined to refuse environmental initiatives. When comparing the 2 
nuclear objects, the high income voters appear also to more strongly oppose the most costly initiative 
(nuclear ban). However, the previous conclusion has to be considered with caution since high income 
citizens are no more likely to support the surplus gold initiative, which intends to alleviate future tax 
increases.  
We try to control for the distribution of the costs of environmental initiatives by including variables 
capturing the respondent’s occupation, car ownership and place of residence (alpin, nuclear). We 
intend to control for the income composition effect, i.e. people whose income is issued from activities 
penalized/favored by environmental protection measures are considered are more likely to 
oppose/accept the initiatives. Turning to occupation, the workers in industry or transport sectors did 
not appear to be more opposed to environmental propositions and the workers in the tourist and hotel 
sector more favorable to them. Indeed, most coefficients even if they have the expected sign are not 
significant. It is however surprising that the workers in the transportation activities did not strongly 
reject the initiatives aiming to increase gasoline prices and reduce traffic. We explain it by the fact that 
we could not distinguish between workers in road, rail and air traffic as well as between the private 
and public transport sector.  
                                                 
35 The income square variable has been dropped from the vote equation since it never appears significant. 
36 As said earlier, the result of Thalmann (2004) may however not offer reliable estimates since no exclusion-restriction criterion 
has been used. 
Chapter 3. The Demand for Environmental Quality 
-125- 
 
Tab. 3.4 Marginal effect on the vote equation (model including political variables) 
Traffic halving  Motorless sunday 
Nuclear 
moratorium Nuclear ban Solar 
Energy 
conservation 
package 
Green tax reform I Green tax reform II
Electricity 
market 
liberalization  
Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z 
gender  0.0660  1.27  0.1070***  2.72  0.0393  1.02  0.0605  1.56 -0.0146 -0.27  0.0275  0.52  0.0263  0.48 -0.0030 -0.06 -0.0764* -1.71 
age -0.0167 -0.9 -0.0575*** -4.5 -0.0503*** -4.12 -0.0340*** -2.63 -0.0382** -2.24 -0.0414** -2.5 -0.0310* -1.78 -0.0218 -1.11 -0.0051 -0.3 
educ  0.0249**  2.16  0.0127  1.41  0.0133  1.5  0.1517*  1.81  0.0434***  3.2  0.0432***  3.23  0.0510***  4.05  0.0039  0.3  0.0055  0.54 
french -0.1029* -1.67 -0.0413 -0.91 -0.0668 -1.49 -0.0362 -0.8 -0.0613 -0.86  0.1050  1.55 -0.0314 -0.44 -0.0141 -0.2 -0.1600*** -3.14 
income  0.0231***  2.57 -0.0030 -0.43 -0.0001 -0.01 -0.0153** -2.21 -0.0367*** -3.44 -0.0193* -1.89 -0.0148 -1.37  0.0102  0.99  0.0276***  3.5 
car -0.1472*** -3.32 -0.1304*** -4.44 -0.0737*** -2.7 -0.0477* -1.74 -0.0748* -1.86 -0.0544 -1.46 -0.1652*** -3.73 -0.0389 -0.94 -0.0229 -0.71 
city -0.0129 -0.2  0.0157  0.31 -0.0174 -0.35  0.0343  0.68  0.0680  0.99  0.1374**  2.15  0.0968  1.4 -0.0482 -0.78  0.0111  0.17 
nuclear  0.0709  1.22  0.0285  0.62  0.0431  0.97  0.0301  0.66  0.0440  0.71 -0.0619 -1.04  0.0139  0.22  0.0275  0.5 -0.0320 -0.67 
alpin -0.0534 -0.61 -0.0222 -0.38  0.0027  0.05  0.0941*  1.65  0.1786**  2.24  0.1394*  1.79  0.1761**  2.02  0.0814  0.89  0.0053  0.08 
ind -0.0920 -1.47 -0.0499 -1.03 -0.1008** -2.12 -0.0582 -1.22 -0.0764 -1.19 -0.1056* -1.67 -0.0157 -0.25 -0.0265 -0.4  0.0585  0.95 
transp  0.1270  0.54 -0.1218 -1.42 -0.1972*** -2.32 -0.1638** -2.01  0.0741  0.62  0.0817  0.74  0.2202*  1.85  0.1192  0.96 -0.0490 -0.6 
hotel  0.0794  1.22  0.0531  0.3  0.2527*  1.94  0.4131***  3.28           
left  0.2405***  3.29  0.3171***  6.66  0.2700***  5.66  0.2874***  5.86  0.2061***  2.71  0.1278*  1.75  0.2259***  2.89  0.3237***  4.37  0.0472  0.73 
right -0.0666 -0.93 -0.1404*** -2.54 -0.1924*** -3.61 -0.2018*** -3.83 -0.0534 -0.65 -0.0222 -0.28 -0.0514 -0.65 -0.0981 -1.41 -0.0365 -0.62 
openessCH -0.0235 -1.1 -0.0131 -0.94 -0.0079 -0.58 -0.0231 -1.61 -0.0617*** -2.98 -0.0352* -1.76 -0.0332 -1.61 -0.0219 -1.04 -0.0313* -1.98 
equityCH  0.0208  1.09  0.0429***  3.26  0.0205  1.6  0.0213*  1.64  0.0455**  2.11  0.0277  1.33  0.0414*  1.95 -0.0165 -0.82 -0.0286* -1.74 
jobCH -0.0259 -1.46  0.0161  1.22  0.0138  1.08  0.0150  1.17 -0.0203 -1.02 -0.0304 -1.56 -0.0086 -0.43  0.0242  1.33 -0.0237 -1.48 
stateCH -0.0211 -1.17 -0.0185* -1.58 -0.0410*** -3.56 -0.0391*** -3.4 -0.0405** -2.23 -0.0363** -2.06 -0.0380** -2.11 -0.0440*** -2.48  0.0418***  2.78 
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Marginal effects are those of the determinants on the probability of approval given participation. For the dummy variable, 
the marginal effect is for a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Car ownership appears to be a strong determinant of voting behavior. Indeed, voters with cars appear 
less favorable not only to measures aiming at restraining traffic but also to increases in the price of 
gasoline. The impact of car ownership is much less when the energy price increases are smaller (solar 
initiative, energy conservation package) or remain unknown (green tax reform II). The effect of car 
ownership is stronger and more significant when political variables are excluded from the estimations. 
The number of cars possessed by an individual may be considered as a good predictor of the 
environmental preferences of citizens since it appears to play no significant role in non-environmental 
decisions. 
As frequently observed by others37, one of the main demographic determinants of voters’ choices on 
environmental initiatives is education. Highly educated voters are more likely to accept environmental 
initiatives, especially those aiming at taxing non-renewable energy. However, the effect of education 
on approval is less significant when the initiative concerns nuclear energy. In the case of the nuclear 
ban, the inclusion of a quadratic education term appears pertinent. This may reflect the contrary views 
well-informed voters may share on the ecological consequences of nuclear electricity production.  
The variable alpin has the excepted sign. It is positive and significant for the initiatives aiming at taxing 
fuel energy and thus favoring hydroelectric electricity production. The citizens of alpine cantons did 
logically not support the green tax reform II initiative, which also intended to tax hydroelectric energy. 
However, the voters living in nuclear cantons did not behave differently than others. 
The coefficients grasping the influence of a voter’s age are, as expected, significant and negative. 
Older voters tend to vote less in favor of the environment in each case. This result is frequent in the 
literature examining voting behavior on environmental issues. Urban voters are also more likely to 
support environmental quality, which will give credit to the differential-exposure theory. However, the 
estimates generally remain not significant. Gender also does not appear to systematically influence 
the voting decisions even if women are more likely to support traffic restrictions. Finally, cultural 
differences in Switzerland show that French speakers do not generally vote differently than others 
(except in the cases of the “traffic halving” and “electricity market liberalization” initiatives). 
 
5.1.2 The political variables 
Another question motivating the analysis is to examine if the demand for environmental quality may be 
grasped by economic and demographic factors only or if it would also require the inclusion of less 
objective variables such as political preferences.  
In order to examine this problematic, we contrast the unrestricted (including the political variables) and 
the restricted specifications using a likelihood ratio test. For each initiative, the likelihood ratio tests 
(see table 3.5) reject the null hypothesis that the restricted and unrestricted equations are equal. So 
adding the political variables significantly enhances the overall fit and the explanatory power of the 
model. Testing linear restrictions on the political variables also rejects the hypothesis that these 
variables are null. Thus, political preferences explain a non-negligible part of voting behavior. 
                                                 
37 Thalmann (2004), Kahn (2002), Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) and Deacon and Shapiro (1975) 
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Political orientation appears indeed the main determinant of voters’ choice. The voters identifying 
themselves with leftist parties are more likely to approve environmental initiatives. On the contrary, the 
voters on the extreme right of the political scene are rather opposed to environmental ballot 
propositions. This dichotomy is found for all environmental propositions but the effects are higher 
when the environmental initiative would require a sizeable intervention of the states. The political 
orientation variables also appear to be a strong determinant of voters’ attitudes in non-environmental 
initiatives. The electricity market liberalization referendum does not fit the conclusion. However, this is 
not surprising when one considers that both left and right parties share conflicting views within 
themselves and between cantonal sections.  
 
Table 3.5 Likelihood ratio test  
Initiatives/referendum Likelihood ratio test  Chi2(12) 
Traffic halving (March 2000) 64.74 
Solar initiative (Sept. 2000) 86.47 
Energy conservation package (Sept. 2000) 76.85 
Green tax reform I (Sept. 2000) 72.21 
Green tax reform II (December 2001) 104.05 
Electricity Market Liberalization (Sept. 2002) 251.91 
Nuclear ban (May 2004) 146.28 
Nuclear Moratorium (May 2004) 151.81 
Motorless Sunday (May 2004) 144.98 
UNO membership (March 2002) 88.99 
Surplus gold reserve of SNB (Sept. 2002) 292.41 
 
 
The other political variables, catching voters’ preferences on specific subjects, show less regularity 
across initiatives and remain in most cases non significant. The only noticeable exceptions are that 
voters preferring competition to state’s regulation tend to reject environmental initiatives. There is also 
some evidence that people wishing for a more equitable income distribution favor environmental 
legislation. It suggests that the environmental protection instruments, in order to enhance their 
acceptability, should keep state intervention as negligible as possible. In this regard, voluntary 
approaches and the grandfathering of permits seem to constitute a judicious alternative. 
 
 
5.2 The selection mechanism and the determinants of participation 
The use of a conditional bivariate probit model was motivated since we suspect the presence of a 
participation bias among our data set. In order to confirm the presence of a participation bias, we may 
first examine the significance of the correlation ρ between the disturbances of the selection and the 
vote equation.  As shown in Table 3.6, ρ is significant and negative for the all initiatives aiming to 
increase environmental quality, except for the “electricity market liberalization” initiative.  
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Initiatives held on the same day logically ρ show a similar participation bias. Contrary to the results of 
Thalmann (2004), ρ is significant and negative for the three initiatives of September 2000. However, 
as the bivariate probit model of Thalmann does not include an exclusion-restriction38, estimates of ρ 
may be misleading (Sartori, 2003). A negative ρ means that any component of the error that makes 
selection more likely decreases the probability of casting a “Yes” vote. In other words, individuals who 
are more likely to participate due to their unobserved characteristics are generally more likely to reject 
environmental initiatives. The same conclusion holds for the UNO membership initiative but not for the 
surplus SNB gold referendum. 
The exact value of the coefficient of correlation ρ is however difficult to interpret since it depends 
heavily on model specification. Remember ρ is the correlation between the errors in the selection and 
outcome equation and errors are of course tied to the model specification. So, alternative 
specifications change the errors, which in turn change ρ. Furthermore, we posit that ρ is not equal to 
zero in the theoretical model and not simply for the sample in which me may have omitted some 
variables common to both equations. Thus, whatever is the cause of correlation between error terms 
should be inherently immeasurable.  
 
Tab. 3.6  Environmental initiatives and referendum 
Initiatives/referendum ρ  Unrestricted model
ρ  
Restricted model 
Traffic halving (March 2000) -0.55* -0.68** 
Solar initiative (Sept. 2000) -0.54*** -0.56*** 
Energy conservation package (Sept. 2000) -0.58*** -0.61*** 
Green tax reform I (Sept. 2000) -0.49*** -0.55*** 
Green tax reform II (December 2001) -0.47* -0.50** 
Electricity Market Liberalization (Sept. 2002) 0.33 0.30 
Nuclear ban (May 2004) -0.49*** -0.55*** 
Nuclear Moratorium (May 2004) -0.34*** -0.46*** 
Motorless Sunday (May 2004) -0.33** -0.39*** 
UNO membership (March 2002) -0.65** -0.54** 
Surplus gold reserve of SNB (Sept. 2002) 0.36 0.09 
 * significant at 10% level,** significant at 5% level,*** significant at 1% level 
 
                                                 
38 In other words, the vote and participation equations include the same set of explanatory variables. 
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However, in our case, as several initiatives are submitted to citizens’ approval on the same session, it 
is likely that one initiative, considered more important by the citizens, may actually have a greater 
influence on the participation decision. We may therefore expect that initiatives getting less attention 
may not influence the selection process and show a lower ρ value. The VOX data allows to derive 
some insight into this question since it collects information on the importance attached to each 
initiative by the citizens39. The correlation between the subjective importance of each object and ρ is 
as expected positive (0.44). Thus, the initiative of greater importance seems responsible for selecting 
the participants. However, as only 11 initiatives are taken into consideration, the prior conclusion 
should be considered with great caution. 
Another way to gauge the importance of the sample selection bias may be to draw comparisons 
between the estimates of the probit model40 and of the conditional probit model. For most initiatives, 
there are striking differences between the two outcomes. The naïve probit model gives biased 
coefficient values and would even lead us in some cases to adopt wrong conclusions about the 
determinants of attitudes towards the environment. In the traffic halving initiative, the probit estimates 
would lead to the conclusion that the variable french is a significant and negative determinant of 
casting a “Yes” vote. In the solar, energy conservation package and green tax reform I initiatives, the 
probit model found that the variable capturing the respondents’ age is non significant while it is 
significant and negative in the conditional probit. Other noticeable divergences concern the variable 
grasping education levels in the nuclear ban and nuclear moratorium initiatives. 
Overall, we may therefore conclude that correcting for selection bias appears to be essential in order 
to get reliable estimates. We focus therefore on the results from the conditional bivariate probit models 
and reject the probit estimates.  
Turning now to the determinants of selection, results appear more stable across initiatives. This is 
especially the case between initiatives submitted the same day, since most voters, when participating, 
usually cast a vote on all issues submitted (or at least cast a vote on all or none of the environmental 
issues). For example, in the three initiatives of September 2000, only one respondent to the VOX 
survey chose not to participate in the green tax reform but cast a vote on the other environmental 
initiatives. Table 3.7 shows the results for the participation equation. The results for the two placebo 
initiatives figure in table 3 in appendix 2. 
The respondent’s age appears to be a strong determinant of participation in almost each case. Older 
people are more likely to vote. In half of the cases, the relationship between age and participation 
appears concave, meaning participation tends to decrease among very old people (the age turning 
point is around 65 years old). Identically, higher educated or high income voters participate more. 
Abundant evidence confirms that the educational level increases the quality of civic knowledge as well 
as voting participation (Dee, 2003). The results are however not stable across specifications. When 
                                                 
39 People are asked to note each initiative on a scale from 0 to 10 according to the relative importance they personally attach to 
the initiative. The same question is asked according to the importance of each initiative for the country. Another way to measure 
the importance of each ballot propositions may be found in the VOX surveys (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003), which 
analyze how people at the time of the interview remember the object of the initiatives.  
40 The probit model ignores the selection mechanism and thus considers only observations on individuals who participate in the 
vote. 
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excluding the income variable, the education variable becomes significantly positive for the solar, 
energy conservation package and green tax reform (I and II) initiatives.  
On the other hand, gender, car ownership and the place of living/area of residence do not appear to 
be linked with the decision to participate. There is some evidence that cultural differences (variable 
french) and type of occupation play a role in the participation decision.  
In some cases, the inclusion of a quadratic income term appears significant (halving traffic, green tax 
reform II), this is consistent with the view that high income voters may participate less in votes 
considered as having no chance of being accepted. Their higher opportunity cost of time may explain 
such behavior. 
Political affinity is a strong determinant of participation since people sharing affinity with either left or 
right parties participate more. Political affinity appears to follow a convex relationship with turnout as 
extreme voters (either left or right) participate more than the center voters. Finally, our exclusion-
restriction criterion, which grasps the interest for politics, is highly significant and strongly positive for 
all initiatives. The exclusion-restriction seems valid since it has strong statistical significance in the 
selection equation and, when this variable is put in the outcome equation, it shows no relationship with 
the voting decision.  
We note that, as revealed by Matsusaka and Palda (1999), numerous regressions attempting to 
predict voters’ participation account only for around 15% of turnout variation (based on R2 measures) 
since numerous, idiosyncratic non-stationary variables (weather, traffic) may be pertinent when 
explaining participation. In our case, the participation equation explained around 25 % to 30% and the 
variable polint is largely responsible for this better fit41. This latter variable may actually grasp part of 
the numerous factors related to the individuals (stationary factors) that we may not be able to 
measure. Matsusaka and Palda (1999) measured past participation behavior in order to catch the 
unobservable stationary factors. In our dataset, past participation behavior, when the measure is 
available, appears correlated with our political interest variables42. 
 
                                                 
41 This statement is based on Mc Fadden R2 measures obtained by running a probit model for participation. The pseudo R2 is 
calculated by Stat 7.0 and corresponds to: Pseudo R2 = 1 - (log L(full model)/ Log L(constant-only model)). When excluding 
political interest, the Mc Fadden R2 drops to around 15%. 
42 For the voting session of May 2004, the coefficient of correlation between past participation behavior and political interest is 
0.67. 
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Tab. 3.7  Conditional probit model: coefficients on the participation equation 
Traffic halving  Motorless sunday 
Nuclear 
moratorium Nuclear ban Solar 
Energy 
conservation 
package 
Green tax reform I Green tax reform II
Electricity 
market 
liberalization  
Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z 
gender -0.013 -0.13 0.069 0.83 0.052 0.63 0.056 0.68 -0.009 -0.09 -0.008 -0.08 -0.026 -0.24 0.031 0.29 -0.149 -1.28 
age 0.339* 1.81 0.437*** 3.52 0.434*** 3.50 0.465*** 3.70 0.137** 4.24 0.136*** 4.22 0.134*** 4.14 0.163*** 4.78 0.793*** 4.45 
age2 -0.190 -1.03 -0.337*** -2.82 -0.334*** -2.80 -0.364*** -3.01     -0.578*** -3.33 
educ 0.023 0.86 0.279** 2.08 0.294** 2.17 0.275** 2.04 0.037 1.35 0.036 1.3 0.035 1.26 0.006 0.21 0.008 0.31 
educ2 -0.317*** -2.68 -0.008 -1.57 -0.008* -1.67 -0.008 -1.53       
french 0.152** 2.17 0.179* 1.9 0.196** 2.06 0.185** 1.96 0.157 1.13 0.150 1.09 0.158 1.14 -0.404*** -3.12 -0.177 -1.22 
income -0.096** -2.00 0.020 1.35 0.019 1.32 0.020 1.35 0.055*** 2.55 0.055*** 2.57 0.053*** 2.47 0.232*** 3.09 0.082*** 3.79 
income2             -0.016*** -3.09   
car 0.135* 1.77 -0.002 -0.04 0.002 0.03 0.001 0.00 0.094 1.25 0.095 1.28 0.097 1.28 0.051 0.64 -0.102 -1.29 
city 0.148 0.87 0.103 0.95 0.094 0.87 0.106 0.98 0.004 0.03 0.023 0.16 -0.021 -0.14 -0.042 -0.28 -0.051 -0.32 
nuclear 0.098 0.75 0.051 0.53 0.053 0.56 0.055 0.58 0.164 1.3 0.163 1.29 0.155 1.23 -0.008 -0.07 0.056 0.43 
alpin -0.334** -2.32 0.001 0.01 0.009 0.08 0.009 0.08 -0.166 -1.08 -0.167 -1.08 -0.176 -1.14 -0.326** -2.16 0.158 0.99 
ind -0.039 -0.3 0.166* 1.64 0.165 1.62 0.170* 1.66 0.167 1.23 0.146 1.08 0.162 1.2 0.251* 1.76 0.035 0.24 
transp 0.278 1.27 0.263 1.34 0.266 1.35 0.261 1.33 -0.372* -1.72 -0.379* -1.75 -0.370* -1.71 0.294 1.12 -0.098 -0.45 
hotel -0.115 -0.46 -0.644*** -2.35 -0.627** -2.28 -0.639*** -2.33       
left 0.109 0.71 0.189* 1.7 0.193* 1.73 0.192* 1.73 0.430*** 2.49 0.423*** 2.46 0.417*** 2.41 0.300** 2.06 0.345** 2.08 
right 0.154 1.00 0.283** 2.23 0.282** 2.22 0.279** 2.20 0.139 0.75 0.131 0.71 0.120 0.65 0.551*** 3.36 0.438*** 2.55 
openessCH -0.015 -0.39 0.009 0.34 0.011 0.40 0.010 0.38 0.036 0.88 0.034 0.81 0.036 0.86 -0.056 -1.36 -0.052 -1.22 
equityCH -0.072* -1.79 0.026 0.99 0.023 0.87 0.025 0.95 -0.047 -1.12 -0.050 -1.19 -0.052 -1.23 0.006 0.14 0.023 0.56 
jobCH 0.033 0.86 -0.002 -0.08 -0.004 -0.14 -0.003 -0.12 0.053 1.34 0.062 1.58 0.063 1.6 0.039 1.06 -0.007 -0.19 
stateCH 0.090*** 2.49 -0.015 -0.67 -0.017 -0.73 -0.018 -0.78 0.009 0.25 0.008 0.23 0.009 0.24 -0.050 -1.34 -0.024 -0.68 
polint 0.999*** 9.18 1.321*** 16.2 1.322*** 16.26 1.319*** 
16.1
2 1.471*** 13.17 1.470*** 13.18 1.485*** 13.28 0.991*** 9.06 1.005*** 8.52 
Intercept -2.762*** -4.43 -4.328*** -4.55 -4.397*** -4.60 -4.356*** -4.55 -2.615*** -5.2 -2.620*** -5.22 -2.585*** -5.15 -2.043*** -3.49 -3.024*** -4.98 
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, *** = significant at 1% level  
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5.3 Predicted probabilities 
It is also instructive to compute predicted probabilities in order to explore the link between 
environmental attitude and voting behavior. Table 3.8 estimates both marginal and conditional 
probabilities for the entire sample and the sub-sample including only people who participate. The 
conditional probability P(V=1I P=1) represents the model’s fit for the outcome of the vote. In each 
case, the rate of approval in each VOX sample is well predicted.  
The marginal probability P(V=1) indicates how people vote, or would have voted, whether they 
participated or not. The average rate of approval in environmental initiatives is systematically larger for 
the entire sample than in the sub-sample (except for the “electricity market liberalization” initiative). 
This is expected since the estimated ρ are negative indicating that non-participants were more likely to 
approve the environmental ballot propositions. For the nuclear moratorium and energy conservation 
package, the average probabilities of accepting the initiatives are respectively 51.0 % and 50.9%. In 
other words, had all Swiss citizens voted, these two initiatives would have been accepted.  However, 
we have to remain cautious since noting guarantees that the participants of the VOX survey are 
representative of the whole population43.  
These results on the selection bias are consistent with Fort and Bunn (1995). However, Thalmann 
(2004) offers different conclusions on the 3 initiatives of September 2000 since the predicted 
probabilities indicate that the non-participants would have been more likely to vote “No” and, therefore, 
the rates of approval would have been lower with full participation. The differences come from the fact 
that the bivariate probit specifications of Thalmann do not include an exclusion-restriction criterion and 
estimates of ρ are then biased. We control our conclusion by using an identical set of explanatory 
variables in both the selection and outcome equations and find low positive ρ (but non-significant).  
The large difference between conditional and marginal probabilities can be explained by appealing to 
differences in observed and unobserved characteristics between those who voted and those who did 
not. Thalmann (2004) explains his findings by considering the education level. More educated people 
are more likely to cast a vote. They are also more favorable to environmental initiatives. If the Swiss 
citizens will lower education had participated in greater proportion and expressed their negative vote it 
would have lowered the rate of approval. The political variable grasping the leftist view has an identical 
effect. We confirm these findings. However, other variables have an opposite effect. This is the case 
of age (older people vote more but vote against environmental initiatives), the variable grasping 
political affinity with the right and, in some cases, the income level. 
Furthermore, the effects of the observed characteristics remain quantitatively not important since the 
marginal probabilities of approval diverge only slightly between the sub-sample of voters and the 
entire sample of voters. Therefore, the unobserved characteristics are held responsible for the large 
difference between conditional and marginal probabilities; people who were more likely to vote due to 
their unobserved characteristic were also more likely to reject the initiatives. 
 
 
                                                 
43 In this regard, remember that around 60% of the contacted citizens refused to participate in the survey. 
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Tab. 3.8 Probability of approval 
(Sample average, in percentage; unrestricted specification) 
Initiatives/referendum 
(rate of approval in VOX sample) Models 
P(V=1) 
Entire 
sample 
P (V=1)  
Sub-sample 
of voters 
P(V=1¦ p=1) 
Sub-sample 
of voters 
Probit without sample selection 17.5 19.9  Traffic halving  
(19.3) 
Probit with sample selection 28.2 28.0 19.8 
Probit without sample selection 36.2 36.3  Solar initiative 
(35.2) Probit with sample selection 48.2 45.8 36.3 
Probit without sample selection 37.3 37.4  Energy conservation package  
(37.8) Probit with sample selection 51.0 48.3 37.6 
Probit without sample selection 27.3 28.3  Green tax reform I  
(28.7) Probit with sample selection 37.3 36.2 28.1 
Probit without sample selection 9.2 11.2  Green tax reform II  
(17.1) Probit with sample selection 25.9 25.9 17.6 
Probit without sample selection 32.4 33.3  Electricity Market Liberalization  
(34.1) Probit with sample selection 27.1 28.7 33.4 
Probit without sample selection 35.4 35.5  Nuclear ban 
 (35.5) Probit with sample selection 41.9 40.9 35.4 
Probit without sample selection 40.9 41.0  Nuclear Moratorium  
(40.7) Probit with sample selection 50.9 49.4 40.9 
Probit without sample selection 39.6 40.1  Motorless Sunday 
(39.2) Probit with sample selection 46.0 45.5 39.2 
Probit without sample selection 63.8 63.2  UNO membership 
 (60.1) Probit with sample selection 70.9 70.1 63.2 
Probit without sample selection 37.6 39.2  Surplus gold reserve of SNB 
 (39.3) Probit with sample selection 31.6 33.8 39.2 
 
5.4  Discussion 
When examining the voting decision of Swiss citizens, we find that education level, voter’s age, 
political affinity as well as car ownership are strong determinants of their demand for environmental 
quality. The effect of the others variables appears more ambiguous as their significance as well as 
their sign varies across objects. More particularly, the effect of income was not, as postulated by the 
EKC theories, uniformly positive. It is even significantly negative in the nuclear ban, solar and energy 
conservation package initiatives. 
We expected however to find divergent results across initiatives for two reasons. First, the 
environmental initiatives selected cover widely different aspects of environmental quality. As exposed 
in the meta-analysis of the EKC in chapter one, the evolution of environmental quality differs according 
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to the characteristics of the pollutants. Local pollutants generating direct consequences on human 
health tend to decrease at lower income levels.  We may therefore also expect that the pollutant or the 
aspects of environmental quality an initiative aims to preserve influence the voting behavior of 
individuals. In the nuclear initiatives, one may vote either for or against nuclear power depending on 
one’s ecological priority. On the one hand, nuclear energy production avoids CO2 emissions. On the 
other, the risk of nuclear accidents as well as the management of nuclear waste may hinder the 
environment. The “electricity market liberalization initiative” should also be compared to other voting 
objects with caution since its ecological dimension was less meaningful.  
Secondly, we also logically expected that the stringency of the initiative and, therefore, the costs 
induced, influence the results. Thalmann (2004) explores this problem and hypothesizes that small 
green taxes with many exemptions are more likely to be accepted than high and broad taxes, even 
though they are farther away from their efficient level and do little to improve the environment. 
Identically, we may expect that a ban on nuclear power is less likely to be accepted than a moratorium 
limited in time. Furthermore, the type of instruments (either economic or regulatory) proposed by the 
initiatives may also have an impact on voters’ behavior. The environmental taxes induce direct costs 
due to energy price increases and indirect costs due to behavioral changes. Interdiction and 
legislations also impose indirect costs since polluters will have to change their behavior, but the direct 
financial costs are generally financed by the general public budget through the fiscal system. For 
example, reducing private traffic necessitates public transport facilities, which are financed by the 
general budget of the State. High-income citizens, who contribute relatively more to the total fiscal 
income, may therefore oppose such environmental legislation since they will finance it proportionally 
more. Some light on those questions may be added by examining the motivation of votes and the 
approval of either the arguments in favor of or against the initiatives.  
The ecological arguments were usually and logically the dominant reason for approving the initiatives. 
However, only 2% of the respondents spontaneously advance ecological motivations for approving 
(and not refusing) the “electricity market liberalization” initiative. The motivation for rejecting the 
environmental initiative refers usually to the cost involved (taxation of energy) and the feasibility of the 
initiatives (nuclear ban and moratorium, traffic having, green tax reform II). It is actually noticeable that 
the voters do not consider that the environment does not need protection but they rather disagree with 
the means proposed. People refusing environmental taxes fear the financial costs involved. However, 
when the costs involved are less likely to be estimated by the voters, citizens, who refused them, 
consider the initiative as to vague and utopist. It is striking that in all cases no one citizen mentions 
that the environmental benefits expected were too low. Only a few voters mention the incentive 
mechanism behind the environmental taxes as a motive of supporting them.  We also note that the 
percentage of people unable to justify their vote was generally higher in environmental initiatives than 
in the two placebo initiatives.  
We could not more acutely compare the differences in the voting choice of individual voters between 
the initiatives since the samples of voters change throughout different voting sessions. However, when 
several initiatives are held on the same day, some observations can be made. Thalmann (2004) 
examines the three initiatives on the taxation of energy of September 2000. He concludes that voters 
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seem to prefer initiatives that redistribute the fiscal income of the energy tax to a wide array of 
potential beneficiaries. On the contrary, the tax rate and the mode of revenue recycling do not appear 
important. 
We may actually do a similar enquiry for the two nuclear initiatives held on May 2004. Only 16 % of 
the participants distinguish between the two proposals while 51% vote in block against the two 
proposals and 28 % accept both of them44. The majority of the voters who distinguish between the two 
proposals (65%) accepts the nuclear moratorium initiative and refuses the nuclear ban. These findings 
confirm that people are more likely to accept less stringent environmental regulations and do not 
consider the corresponding environmental benefit. 24 % of the people accept the moratorium initiative 
since it appears to be a less costly and more feasible alternative than the nuclear ban. The nuclear 
moratoriums, as actual power plants will stay active, allow for an easier return to nuclear power if 
deemed necessary. Simple cross tabulation shows that the more educated and richer voters were 
more likely to follow such a strategy.  
 
5.5 Limits 
Our result must be considered with caution for the following reasons. First, one should remain 
cautious when generalizing the results.  Swiss citizens share characteristics shaped, for example, by 
the institutional setting, the education system and the current national environmental problems. These 
factors influence their voting behavior and what is true for Switzerland may not be recorded in other 
countries.  
Similarly, the emergence of one initiative is not random. If one subject gets to a general vote, it had 
previously to go through numerous political steps. In other words, voting data exists only for 
environmental issues that generate sufficient motivation and concern for deserving a vote. When using 
voting data, we ignore all other environmental issues and noting allows us to consider that the 
preferences of the citizens would be identical in such cases. Indeed, our results show that there is a 
strong variation across voting sessions and initiatives. 
Secondly, as exposed in section 4.3.3, demand analysis requires that the relevant prices of 
environmental quality are identified. However, the question of the ‘‘price’’ of environmental goods and 
"who pays it" could not be apprehended with much detail. As in Kahn and Matsusaka (1997), we 
explore the hypothesis that an important price (or, ‘‘cost’’) of providing environmental goods is a loss 
of income to people employed in particular industries and occupations or possessing particular goods 
(car). However, our results indicate that the proxies for occupation are not good predictors of voting on 
environmental initiatives and referenda. This may cast doubt on the quality of these proxies45. 
However, further developments would require that more detailed data on occupations become 
available in the VOX data set. 
                                                 
44 The remaining 5% of voters did not participate in the two nuclear initiatives but took part in the other proposals held on the 
same day. 
45 Especially, when we compare our results with those of Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) 
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Third, the initiatives do not propose a given level of environmental quality but rather suggest a strategy 
in order to protect the environment. Therefore, and individual may in fact desire a higher level of 
environmental quality but refuses the initiative because he disagrees with the instruments proposed.  
Fourth, the green voters do not tell us anything about the polluters. In the cost-benefit voting model, 
citizens approving environmental initiatives are the ones whose anticipated net benefit would be 
positive. The initiative may induce large costs for the bigger polluters but the latter may also expect an 
even larger benefit and therefore accept the proposition. In other words, one should not link the voting 
decision of individuals to their day-to-day behavior according to the environment. 
Finally, we have to remain cautious about such conclusions since we could neither observe the voting 
decisions of individuals in different countries nor the evolution of the environmental demand of one 
specific individual throughout various income levels.  
 
Conclusion 
The third chapter of this thesis has explored the determinants of the demand for environmental quality. 
The latter has been grasped by the voting decisions of the Swiss citizens on environmental initiatives 
held during the last five years. Our estimations are based on a conditional bivariate model accounting 
for selection bias. Contrary to the literature on this subject, we could use individual-level data. 
Overall, our estimates do not confirm the widely advanced hypothesis of a positive relationship 
between households’ income levels and their demand for environmental quality. They thus refute the 
microeconomic “demand related” explanation of the EKC. High-income individuals are not 
systematically the greener voters in Switzerland. When the decision seems to bear large costs, rich 
voters appear even less favorable to the environmental policy. Our results rather confirm the 
theoretical presumption that the richest classes of society fear of having to support a large share of the 
burden imposed by environmental protection measures, so they oppose such policies. Our results 
show that other variables, such as age, educational level and political preferences are relevant for 
explaining variations in environmental concern among individuals. As far as one focuses on the 
demand for environmental quality, the EKC observed by the studies based on cross-countries and 
panel evidence may not be due to income growth. The EKC seems rather to rest on the complex links 
between the education level and income growth (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1996) on the one hand and 
education level and the demand for environmental quality on the other. However, as far as the process 
of development is also linked to a demographic transition and population ageing46, our results show a 
negative linkage between the age of the population and the demand for environmental quality. Overall, 
standard EKC empirical studies may face an omitted variables bias when the regressions do not 
include variables capturing the educational level and the demographic characteristics of the 
                                                 
46 Every industrialized country has undergone this demographic transition, and many developing countries are experiencing it as 
well. The stylized view of the transition sees the onset as being reflected initially in a decline of mortality, while fertility remains 
high. After a lag, this is followed by a stage during which both mortality and fertility decline, and finally they stabilize at low levels 
(low relative to historical experience). For further details on this subject, see Bloom and Canning (1999). 
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population.  Note that the results vary among the initiatives and referenda examined. As far as other 
referenda may be taken into consideration, conducting some form of a meta-analysis on such results 
may constitute an interesting opportunities for further research.  
Moreover, our estimates do confirm some results of the meta-analysis insofar as the determinants of 
the demand for environmental quality appear to vary between environmental initiatives and thus the 
type of pollutant they intend to abate. This article explores some of the hypotheses that could explain 
such variations. However, further research on this subject appears necessary by considering a larger 
set of initiatives. Furthermore, numerous other factors would be worth exploring, especially according 
to the information considered by the voters and the extent and the virulence of the political debates 
that surrounded the initiatives. Finally, a selection effect adverse to environmental protection is found, 
as people casting a vote are generally more likely to reject environmental initiatives. In the nuclear 
moratorium and energy conservation package, our results even show that if everyone had 
participated, the initiative would have been accepted.  
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Appendix 1: Initiative and referenda 
Tab. A-1 Description of the aims and campaign arguments of the environmental initiatives 
Initiatives/referenda Aims of the initiatives/referenda Arguments in favor Arguments against 
Position of 
the EC* 
and FP** 
Traffic halving 
12.03.2000 
To halve motorized traffic until 2010. The 
necessary legislation is not mention but the 
FP** has 3 years to legislate. 
- Environmental protection 
- Security enhancement 
- Job creation in public transportation 
- Imposes a very severe legislation 
- Requires a large administrative work 
- Seems inequitable (for the rural pop.) 
- Requires a costly investments in public 
transportation 
- Detrimental to economic growth 
No 
Green tax reform Ic  
24.09.2000 
Growing taxation (up to 0.02 CHF/KWh) of 
the non-renewable fuels (basis: energy 
content) 
The fiscal revenue (2.5-3 billion CHF) is 
used to lower social security contributions  
- Environmental protection 
- Favor job creation 
- Innovation 
- Large industrial consumers are 
exonerated 
- Worsening of the competitiveness of the 
Swiss economy 
- Unfair for poor household 
Yes 
Energy conservation 
packaged 
24.09.2000 
Taxation of the non-renewable fuels (basis: 
energy content), tax rate: 0.03 CHF/KWh. 
The tax is set for 15 year. 
The fiscal revenue (450 million) is used for 
the promotion of energy conservation, the 
promotion of renewable energy, the 
amortization of investments in hydroelectric 
plant 
- Environmental protection 
- Financial help for hydroelectric plant (in 
prevision of the electricity market 
liberalization) 
- Innovation 
- Large industrial consumers are 
exonerated 
- Worsening of the competitiveness of the 
Swiss economy 
- Unfair for poor household 
- Subventions are inefficient instruments 
Yes 
Solar initiative  
24.09.2000 
Growing taxation (from 0.001up to 0.05 
CHF/KWh) of the non-renewable fuels 
(basis: energy content). The tax is set for 
25 year. The fiscal revenue is used for the 
promotion of solar energy and for the 
conservation of energy 
- Environmental protection 
- Progressive adaptation to the   
exhaustion of fuel energy sources 
- Job creation and innovation 
- Positive cost-benefit analysis 
- Household expenditures will not be 
higher due to energy conservation 
measures 
- Large industrial consumers are 
exonerated 
- Worsening of the competitiveness of the 
Swiss economy 
- Focus only on solar energy 
- Tax rate too high and set for too long 
- Do not support hydroelectric plants 
- Unfair for poor household 
- Subventions are inefficient instruments 
No 
* Swiss Federal Executive Committee, ** Swiss Federal Parliament 
c: the object is a counter-proposal made by the FP. The original initiative has been withdrawn.  
d: the object is a counter-proposal made by the FP to the solar initiative, which means that both could not be implemented. 
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Initiatives/referenda Aims of the initiatives/referenda Arguments in favor Arguments against 
Position of 
the EC* 
and FP** 
Green tax reform II 
I01.12.2001 
Taxation of the non-renewable energy 
sources and of the electricity produced by 
hydroelectric plan exceeding 1 MGw. The 
fiscal income is devoted to lower the social 
security contributions and the retirement 
age. 
- Environmental protection 
- Job creation and innovation 
- The initiative plan also a redistribution 
toward the non-workers  
- The funding of  the retirement pensions 
are secured  
- Citizens do not want such taxation (3 
initiative rejected in 2000) 
- The initiative do not set tax rate, 
evaluation of costs and benefits are 
therefore not possible  
- The initiative tax the hydroelectric plants 
which may instead need subventions 
(market liberalization) 
No 
Liberalization of the 
electricity market  
22.09.2002 
Liberalization of the market for electricity. 
However, the State remains active as soon 
as the public service, the security of 
supplies, the economy, the environment 
and the job in the electricity sector are 
endangered. Furthermore, the State 
checks the electricity price, the security of 
the power plants and the network as well 
as the investment plans of the electricity 
producers 
The well being of the consumers will be 
enhanced through the liberalization and 
competition. The state supervision insures 
that the electricity provision will not be left 
to the hazards of free markets. 
Ecological information (type of production 
process and origin)  will be available for 
consumers 
The liberalization will raise energy prices 
and cause more breakdown. It also will 
cause unemployment and fear that the 
availability of the service, the security of 
equipment as well as environmental 
considerations will be jeopardized in the 
sake of profit. 
Yes, 
Nuclear ban 
8.05.03 
 
Progressive closure of all the Swiss 
nuclear power plants until 2014.  
- Security 
- Nuclear waste 
- Development of new and clean energy 
sources 
- Difficulties for electricity supplies 
- Rise of electricity prices 
- Require a large investment  
- The initiatives allow the construction of 
fuel power plant (large CO2 producer) 
No 
 
Nuclear Moratorium 
18.05.03 
Ban on the building and use of new nuclear 
power plants (or extension of existing one) 
during the next 10 years. Existing power 
plants will need an authorization from the 
Parliament to prolong their operating time 
beyond 40 years. 
- Extension of existing moratorium 
- Security 
- Electricity producers will have to indicate 
the origin of the electricity 
- The nuclear option remains 
- Actual power plants may be closed until 
2014 (if the FP** does not prolong their 
operating time).  
- Large economic costs 
- The initiatives allow the construction of 
fuel power plant (large CO2 producer) 
No 
 
 
Motorless Sunday  
18.03.04 
Interdiction of motorized traffic during 4 
Sundays (one per season) per year. The 
validity of this initiative last 4 years. At this 
time, a new vote has to take place. 
Four Sundays of leisure are created during 
which people may (re)discover the joy of 
living and the nature. It may also enhance 
the tourist attractive-ness of Switzerland. It 
proposes an experiment, which may make 
the public aware of their behavior 
according to their mobility. 
There is no need for a federal law since 
cantons and communes may already 
organize such events. Finally, as public 
transportation and cabs will be allowed, the 
security may not be optimal. Finally, people 
living in isolated region will be penalized 
and transport from foreign countries will be 
stopped at the borders and will penalize 
tourist activities.  
No 
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Initiatives/referenda Aims of the initiatives/referenda Arguments in favor Arguments against 
Position of 
the EC* 
and FP** 
Swiss membership to 
UNO 
03.03.2002 
Membership to UNO 
- Switzerland and UNO share identical 
goals: promotion of peace, human right 
enforcements, environmental protection, 
economic stability and development and 
poverty reduction 
- Switzerland will be able to defend its 
interests in an ever globalizing world 
- Switzerland will lose its neutrality 
- UNO is in fact governed by the great 
powers (member of the Security Council) 
and Switzerland will therefore loose its 
sovereignty. 
- The U.N. charter is an old treaty which is 
not adapted to actual behavior of the 
international relations 
Yes 
Surplus gold reserve of 
the Swiss national 
22.09.2002 
The surplus gold reserve of the Swiss 
national bank will be devoted to the 
financing of the retirement insurance 
- The surplus gold of the Swiss national 
bank belongs to the citizens and must be 
returned to them 
- This money will finance the retirement 
insurance until 2012 without the other 
tax increases. 
- Only the interest should be spent. The 
capital has to be preserved. 
- The Swiss canton are excluded 
No 
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Appendix 2: Placebo initiatives 
 
Tab. A-2 Marginal effect on the vote equation (Model with political variables) 
UNO membership Surplus Gold SNB  
 
Coeff. Z Coeff. Z 
gender  0.0480  1.22  0.022  0.48 
age -0.0111 -0.96  0.052***  3.53 
educ  0.0276***  2.65 -0.010 -0.90 
french  0.1818***  5.09 -0.024 -0.39 
income  0.0186***  2.40  0.011  1.35 
car -0.0180 -0.72 -0.001 -0.04 
city  0.0777  1.62  0.005  0.08 
nuclear   -0.077 -1.53 
alpin -0.0706 -1.35 -0.091 -1.49 
ind  0.0270  0.59  0.045  0.72 
transp  0.0576  0.73  0.012  0.13 
hotel     
left  0.1102**  2.26 -0.039 -0.60 
right -0.2351*** -3.98  0.227***  3.32 
openessCH    0.058***  2.99 
equityCH  0.0169  1.30  0.008  0.46 
jobCH -0.0023 -0.28  0.024  1.48 
stateCH  0.0034  0.28  0.032**  2.16 
 
 
Tab. A-3 Bivariate probit coefficient of the participation equation  
(model with political variables) 
UNO membership Surplus Gold SNB  
 
Coeff. Z Coeff. Z 
gender 0.194* 1.75 -0.122 -1.07
age 0.338** 2.15 0.858*** 4.85
age2 -0.221 -1.49 -0.645*** -3.74
educ 0.032 1.18 0.012 0.45
french -0.141 -1.2 -0.212 -1.48
income 0.024 1.1 0.072*** 3.43
car 0.039 0.5 -0.108 -1.38
city -0.220 -1.53 -0.018 -0.12
alpin -0.067 -0.48 0.181 1.14
ind -0.096 -0.7 0.012 0.09
transp 0.107 0.38 -0.106 -0.49
left 0.396*** 2.55 0.319 1.96
right 0.604*** 3.08 0.450*** 2.63
openessCH   -0.061 -1.43
equityCH -0.063 -1.62 0.024 0.59
jobCH 0.091*** 2.71 -0.026 -0.69
stateCH 0.019 0.53 -0.016 -0.47
polint 0.976*** 8.9 1.000*** 8.72
Intercept -1.946*** -3.4 -3.051*** -5.05 
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, *** = significant at 1% level. Marginal effects are those of the 
determinants on the probability of approval given participation. For dummy variable, the marginal effect is for discrete change of 
dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Chapter 3. Appendixes 
 
-147- 
Appendix 3: Detailed results 
Tab. A-4 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the “traffic halving” initiative  
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender 0.194 1.12  0.213 1.32  -0.013 -0.13  0.0660  0.289* 1.79  0.302*** 2.09  -0.060 -0.6  0.1048** 
age -0.010 -0.18  -0.054 -1.00  0.339* 1.81  -0.0167  -0.042 -0.85  -0.095*** -2.05  0.383*** 2.14  -0.0332* 
age2       -0.190 -1.03        -0.230 -1.3   
educ 0.099*** 2.46  0.080** 2.00  0.023 0.86  0.0249**  0.126*** 3.33  0.090*** 2.43  0.028 1.11  0.0316** 
french -0.591*** -2.46  -0.351 -1.32  -0.317*** -2.68  -0.1029*  -0.568*** -2.5  -0.232 -1.01  -0.346*** -3.07  -0.0788 
income 0.088*** 2.83  0.074*** 2.41  0.152** 2.17  0.0231***  0.079*** 2.67  0.055* 1.94  0.166*** 2.46  0.0194** 
income2       -0.096** -2.00      -0.096** -2.1   
car -0.467*** -3.58  -0.473*** -3.88  0.135* 1.77  -0.1472***  -0.572*** -4.57  -0.542*** -4.71  0.127* 1.72  -0.1894*** 
city -0.022 -0.10  -0.042 -0.20  0.148 0.87  -0.0129  0.010 0.05  -0.012 -0.06  0.101 0.62  -0.0041 
nuclear 0.298 1.60  0.220 1.21  0.098 0.75  0.0709  0.301* 1.71  0.214 1.32  0.069 0.55  0.0766 
alpin -0.359 -1.06  -0.180 -0.56  -0.334** -2.32  -0.0534  -0.323 -1.01  -0.075 -0.26  -0.382*** -2.72  -0.0258 
ind -0.380 -1.46  -0.321 -1.31  -0.039 -0.3  -0.0920  -0.304 -1.26  -0.241 -1.13  -0.028 -0.22  -0.0805 
transp 0.473 1.57  0.370 1.27  0.278 1.27  0.1270  0.240 0.58  0.246 0.92  0.261 1.23  0.0763 
hotel 0.247 0.56  0.238 0.57  -0.115 -0.46  0.0794  0.395 1.38  0.209 0.55  -0.014 -0.06  0.0901 
left 0.797*** 3.90  0.679*** 3.18  0.109 0.71  0.2405***      
right -0.162 -0.60  -0.228 -0.90  0.154 1.00  -0.0666         
openessCH -0.104 -1.40  -0.075 -1.06  -0.015 -0.39  -0.0235          
equityCH 0.062 0.96  0.067 1.11  -0.072* -1.79  0.0208           
jobCH -0.087 -1.45  -0.083 -1.47  0.033 0.86  -0.0259           
stateCH -0.045 -0.79  -0.068 -1.25  0.090*** 2.49  -0.0211           
polint       0.999*** 9.18          0.974*** 9.15   
Intercept -1.787** -2.13  -0.842 -0.89  -2.762*** -4.43    -2.313*** -3.76  -1.011 -1.43  -2.685*** -5.07   
Rho (s.e.)    -0.55*    -0.68*** 
Log likelihood -158.81  -591.56 -174.99  -623.82 
LR test   LR chi2(18) = 77.75    LR chi2(12) = 54.5 
Obs (uncens. obs) 412  786 (412) 423  904 (423) 
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Tab. A-5 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the solar initiative  
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender -0.085 -0.59  -0.037 -0.27  -0.009 -0.09  -0.0146  0.035 0.26  0.085 0.66  -0.045 -0.43  0.0341 
age -0.054 -1.26  -0.096** -2.25  0.137** 4.24  -0.0382**  -0.083** -2.14  -0.125*** -3.27  0.136*** 4.4  -0.0500*** 
age2                      
educ 0.137*** 4.08  0.109*** 3.18  0.037 1.35  0.0434***  0.146*** 4.6  0.117*** 3.65  0.034 1.28  0.0467*** 
educ2                      
french -0.201 -1.07  -0.154 -0.85  0.157 1.13  -0.0613  0.029 0.16  0.092 0.54  0.072 0.55  0.0366 
income -0.077*** -2.77  -0.092*** -3.46  0.055*** 2.55  -0.0367***  -0.062*** -2.42  -0.080*** -3.24  0.053*** 2.53  -0.0317*** 
car -0.183* -1.71  -0.188* -1.86  0.094 1.25  -0.0748*  -0.243*** -2.41  -0.245*** -2.58  0.090 1.23  -0.0978*** 
city 0.208 1.16  0.171 0.99  0.004 0.03  0.0680  0.222 1.32  0.169 1.04  0.038 0.27  0.0672 
nuclear 0.182 1.14  0.110 0.71  0.164 1.3  0.0440  0.210 1.4  0.140 0.96  0.153 1.25  0.0559 
alpin 0.391* 1.77  0.454** 2.17  -0.166 -1.08  0.1786**  0.329 1.55  0.420** 2.09  -0.174 -1.16  0.1652** 
ind -0.198 -1.15  -0.193 -1.18  0.167 1.23  -0.0764  -0.186 -1.11  -0.187 -1.19  0.158 1.2  -0.0741 
transp 0.108 0.33  0.186 0.61  -0.372* -1.72  0.0741  0.146 0.49  0.233 0.83  -0.425*** -2.01  0.0927 
left 0.737*** 3.79  0.529*** 2.62  0.430*** 2.49  0.2061***            
right -0.081 -0.37  -0.135 -0.65  0.139 0.75  -0.0534            
openessCH -0.158*** -2.93  -0.155*** -2.98  0.036 0.88  -0.0617***            
equityCH 0.099* 1.75  0.114** 2.11  -0.047 -1.12  0.0455**            
jobCH -0.023 -0.44  -0.051 -1.02  0.053 1.34  -0.0203            
stateCH -0.102** -2.15  -0.102** -2.23  0.009 0.25  -0.0405**            
polint       1.471*** 13.17          1.529 14.12   
Intercept -0.793 -1.23  0.265 0.38  -2.615*** -5.2    -1.317 -2.71  -0.338 -0.63  -2.296 -5.68   
Rho (s.e.)    -0.54***    -0.56*** 
Log likelihood -240.02  -630.14 -269.46  -673.37 
LR test   LR chi2(17) = 95.43    LR chi2(11) = 57.25 
Obs (uncens. obs) 439  821 (439) 453  845 (453) 
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Tab. A-6 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the energy conservation package initiative 
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender 0.020 0.14  0.069 0.52  -0.008 -0.08  0.0275  0.060 0.45  0.115 0.91  -0.046 -0.44  0.0460 
age -0.056 -1.32  -0.104*** -2.49  0.136*** 4.22  -0.0414**  -0.080** -2.05  -0.125*** -3.3  0.138*** 4.46  -0.0499*** 
age2             
educ 0.137*** 4.15  0.108*** 3.24  0.036 1.3  0.0432***  0.143*** 4.54  0.113*** 3.56  0.034 1.27  0.0449*** 
educ2             
french 0.232 1.28  0.265 1.53  0.150 1.09  0.1050  0.359** 2.07  0.402*** 2.45  0.064 0.48  0.1576*** 
income -0.029 -1.1  -0.048* -1.89  0.055*** 2.57  -0.0193*  -0.017 -0.69  -0.039 -1.63  0.054*** 2.57  -0.0157* 
car -0.127 -1.28  -0.136 -1.46  0.095 1.28  -0.0544  -0.209** -2.2  -0.209*** -2.35  0.094 1.29  -0.0835*** 
city 0.394** 2.25  0.350** 2.1  0.023 0.16  0.1374**  0.366** 2.19  0.306* 1.93  0.061 0.43  0.1203** 
nuclear -0.094 -0.6  -0.155 -1.03  0.163 1.29  -0.0619  -0.053 -0.36  -0.117 -0.82  0.146 1.19  -0.0465 
alpin 0.280 1.29  0.355* 1.74  -0.167 -1.08  0.1394*  0.223 1.06  0.326* 1.65  -0.177 -1.18  0.1280* 
ind -0.257 -1.51  -0.266* -1.66  0.146 1.08  -0.1056*  -0.170 -1.04  -0.189 -1.23  0.142 1.08  -0.0753 
transp 0.138 0.45  0.207 0.73  -0.379* -1.75  0.0817  0.152 0.52  0.246 0.91  -0.425*** -2.0  0.0966 
left 0.537*** 2.87  0.325* 1.72  0.423*** 2.46  0.1278*         
right 0.026 0.13  -0.056 -0.28  0.131 0.71  -0.0222          
openessCH -0.092* -1.74  -0.088* -1.76  0.034 0.81  -0.0352*           
equityCH 0.056 1.02  0.069 1.33  -0.050 -1.19  0.0277           
jobCH -0.055 -1.07  -0.076 -1.56  0.062 1.58  -0.0304           
stateCH -0.091* -1.95  -0.091** -2.06  0.008 0.23  -0.0363**           
polint      1.470*** 13.18          1.526*** 14.09   
Intercept -1.013 -1.6  0.127 0.19  -2.620*** -5.22    -1.552*** -3.21  -0.485 -0.92  -2.305*** -5.73   
Rho (s.e.)    -0.58***    -0.61*** 
Log likelihood -252.07  -640.94 -274.43  -677.05 
LR test   LR chi2(17) = 77.70    LR chi2(11) = 55.66 
Obs (uncens. obs) 439  821 (439) 453  845 (453) 
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Tab. A-7 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the green tax reform I initiative 
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
          
marg. effects 
on vote        
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender 0.042 0.28  0.071 0.48  -0.026 -0.24  0.0263  0.129 0.91  0.164 1.21  -0.061 -0.59  0.0624 
age -0.046 -1.02  -0.083* -1.85  0.134*** 4.14  -0.0310*  -0.078* -1.9  -0.117*** -2.91  0.135*** 4.35  -0.0445*** 
age2                      
educ 0.163*** 4.69  0.137*** 3.78  0.035 1.26  0.0510***  0.177*** 5.35  0.147*** 4.32  0.032 1.2  0.0560*** 
educ2                      
french -0.122 -0.6  -0.085 -0.43  0.158 1.14  -0.0314  0.054 0.28  0.112 0.62  0.073 0.55  0.0432 
income -0.023 -0.79  -0.040 -1.4  0.053*** 2.47  -0.0148  -0.015 -0.55  -0.036 -1.38  0.052*** 2.47  -0.0138 
car -0.457*** -3.65  -0.444*** -3.69  0.097 1.28  -0.1652***  -0.521*** -4.44  -0.499*** -4.46  0.097 1.31  -0.1903*** 
city 0.292 1.58  0.253 1.42  -0.021 -0.14  0.0968  0.285* 1.65  0.231 1.4  0.020 0.14  0.0899 
nuclear 0.102 0.6  0.037 0.22  0.155 1.23  0.0139  0.184 1.14  0.108 0.7  0.136 1.11  0.0416 
alpin 0.403* 1.75  0.456** 2.06  -0.176 -1.14  0.1761**  0.348 1.55  0.432** 2.04  -0.185 -1.22  0.1691** 
ind -0.029 -0.16  -0.042 -0.24  0.162 1.2  -0.0157  -0.065 -0.37  -0.078 -0.47  0.157 1.19  -0.0296 
transp 0.521* 1.64  0.563* 1.86  -0.370* -1.71  0.2202*  0.493* 1.66  0.557** 1.99  -0.422** -1.99  0.2192** 
left 0.768*** 3.96  0.581*** 2.84  0.417*** 2.41  0.2259***            
right -0.091 -0.39  -0.141 -0.63  0.120 0.65  -0.0514            
openessCH -0.088 -1.54  -0.089 -1.61  0.036 0.86  -0.0332            
equityCH 0.101* 1.72  0.111** 1.97  -0.052 -1.23  0.0414*            
jobCH -0.001 -0.02  -0.023 -0.43  0.063 1.6  -0.0086            
stateCH -0.103** -2.05  -0.102*** -2.11  0.009 0.24  -0.0380**            
polint       1.485*** 13.28          1.540*** 14.19   
Intercept -1.860*** -2.76  -0.853 -1.12  -2.585*** -5.15    -2.074*** -4.09  -1.060* -1.84  -2.255*** -5.61   
Rho (s.e.)    -0.49***    -0.55*** 
Log likelihood   -599.33 -234.31  -637.77 
LR test   LR chi2(17) = 97.07    LR chi2(11) = 71.09 
Obs (uncens. obs) 438  820 (438) 452  844 (452) 
 
 
Chapter 3. Appendixes 
 
-151- 
Tab. A-8 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the green tax reform II initiative  
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender 0.004 0.03  -0.010 -0.06  0.031 0.29  -0.0030  0.128 0.84  0.114 0.78  -0.007 -0.07  0.0380 
age -0.029 -0.52  -0.072 -1.24  0.163*** 4.78  -0.0218  -0.076 -1.54  -0.117*** -2.39  0.157*** 4.76  -0.0392** 
educ 0.030 0.68  0.013 0.3  0.006 0.21  0.0039  0.075* 1.87  0.051 1.28  0.007 0.27  0.0171 
french -0.212 -0.9  -0.047 -0.19  -0.404*** -3.12  -0.0141  -0.003 -0.01  0.128 0.62  -0.349*** -2.83  0.0435 
income 0.036 1.01  0.034 0.98  0.232*** 3.09  0.0102  0.065** 1.97  0.058* 1.83  0.242*** 3.33  0.0193* 
income2    -0.016*** -3.09      -0.016*** -3.25   
car -0.118 -0.83  -0.128 -0.95  0.051 0.64  -0.0389  -0.336*** -2.66  -0.339*** -2.81  0.078 1.04  -0.1134*** 
city -0.199 -0.85  -0.166 -0.74  -0.042 -0.28  -0.0482  -0.114 -0.53  -0.090 -0.45  -0.021 -0.15  -0.0296 
nuclear 0.116 0.63  0.090 0.51  -0.008 -0.07  0.0275  0.120 0.71  0.085 0.53  -0.017 -0.15  0.0285 
alpin 0.176 0.64  0.253 0.97  -0.326** -2.16  0.0814  0.125 0.51  0.195 0.84  -0.297** -2.09  0.0676 
ind -0.058 -0.24  -0.089 -0.39  0.251* 1.76  -0.0265  -0.124 -0.58  -0.140 -0.69  0.138 1.01  -0.0454 
transp 0.427 1.19  0.354 1.02  0.294 1.12  0.1192  0.464 1.47  0.384 1.25  0.241 0.95  0.1398 
left 1.053*** 5.13  0.912*** 4.02  0.300** 2.06  0.3237***       
right -0.240 -0.9  -0.362 -1.4  0.551*** 3.36  -0.0981         
openessCH -0.102 -1.39  -0.072 -1  -0.056 -1.36  -0.0219          
equityCH -0.048 -0.69  -0.055 -0.83  0.006 0.14  -0.0165          
jobCH 0.100 1.56  0.080 1.28  0.039 1.06  0.0242          
stateCH -0.166*** -2.7  -0.145*** -2.38  -0.050 -1.34  -0.0440***          
polint     0.991*** 9.06         1.096*** 10.43   
Intercept -0.898 -0.98  -0.099 -0.1  -2.043*** -3.49   -1.624* -2.65  -0.715 -0.99  -2.170*** -4.62   
Rho (s.e.)    -0.47*    -0.50** 
Log likelihood -158.23  -588.32 -187.84  -640.35 
LR test   LR chi2(17) = 56.44    LR chi2(11) = 24.44 
Obs (uncens. obs) 409  779 (409) 426  812 (426) 
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Tab. A-9 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the liberalization of the electricity market initiative  
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender -0.246* -1.72  -0.246* -1.75  -0.149 -1.28  -0.0764*  -0.251** -1.97  -0.258** -2.05  -0.147 -1.41  -0.0839*** 
age -0.053 -1.16  -0.017 -0.30  0.793*** 4.45  -0.0051  -0.058 -1.45  -0.028 -0.59  0.802*** 5.04  -0.0090 
age2      -0.578*** -3.33       -0.613*** -4.02   
educ 0.011 0.32  0.018 0.53  0.008 0.31  0.0055  0.025 0.83  0.033 1.08  0.014 0.57  0.0106 
french -0.589*** -2.94  -0.587*** -2.97  -0.177 -1.22  -0.1600***  -0.362** -2.16  -0.354** -2.13  -0.138 -1.09  -0.1075** 
income 0.078*** 3  0.089*** 3.33  0.082*** 3.79  0.0276***  0.070*** 2.98  0.079*** 3.31  0.068*** 3.42  0.0256*** 
car -0.065 -0.62  -0.074 -0.71  -0.102 -1.29  -0.0229  0.010 0.1  0.010 0.1  -0.061 -0.83  0.0032 
city 0.064 0.31  0.035 0.17  -0.051 -0.32  0.0111  0.109 0.6  0.088 0.49  0.044 0.31  0.0292 
nuclear -0.121 -0.77  -0.104 -0.67  0.056 0.43  -0.0320  -0.114 -0.78  -0.099 -0.68  0.059 0.49  -0.0317 
alpin 0.012 0.06  0.017 0.08  0.158 0.99  0.0053  -0.024 -0.13  -0.034 -0.18  0.129 0.91  -0.0109 
ind 0.193 1.04  0.180 0.99  0.035 0.24  0.0585  0.162 0.97  0.144 0.87  -0.038 -0.29  0.0481 
transp -0.147 -0.49  -0.166 -0.57  -0.098 -0.45  -0.0490  -0.118 -0.45  -0.136 -0.53  -0.037 -0.19  -0.0423 
left 0.094 0.48  0.147 0.74  0.345** 2.08  0.0472       
right -0.192 -1.01  -0.121 -0.61  0.438*** 2.55  -0.0365         
openessCH -0.091* -1.76  -0.101** -1.97  -0.052 -1.22  -0.0313*          
equityCH -0.093* -1.76  -0.092* -1.77  0.023 0.56  -0.0286*          
jobCH -0.085* -1.71  -0.076 -1.54  -0.007 -0.19  -0.0237          
stateCH 0.137*** 2.97  0.134*** 2.96  -0.024 -0.68  0.0418***          
polint      1.005*** 8.52         1.033*** 9.91   
Intercept -0.118 -0.18  -0.636 -0.81  -3.024*** -4.98   -0.709 -1.42  -1.166* -1.92  -3.110*** -6.27   
Rho (s.e.)    0.33    0.30 
Log likelihood -236.02  -607.1669 -286.21  -733.1209 
LR test   LR chi (17) = 67.93    LR chi2(11)  = 42.1 
Obs (uncens. obs) 424  708 (424) 481  820 (481) 
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Tab. A-10 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the nuclear ban initiative  
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender 0.166* 1.64  0.156 1.56  0.056 0.68  0.0605  0.207** 2.15  0.187** 1.99  0.061 0.76  0.0737** 
age -0.064** -2.03  -0.088*** -2.68  0.465*** 3.70  -0.0340***  -0.114*** -3.94  -0.138*** -4.86  0.472*** 3.84  -0.0548*** 
age2       -0.364*** -3.01          -0.376*** -3.17   
educ 0.476** 2.18  0.391* 1.79  0.275** 2.04  0.1517*  0.455** 2.21  0.318 1.57  0.257** 1.98  0.1260 
educ2 -0.017** -2.11  -0.014* -1.79  -0.008 -1.53  -0.0055*  -0.015** -2.06  -0.011 -1.55  -0.007 -1.44  -0.0045 
french -0.079 -0.66  -0.094 -0.8  0.185** 1.96  -0.0362  0.091 0.83  0.065 0.6  0.180** 1.96  0.0256 
income -0.035* -1.93  -0.039** -2.22  0.020 1.35  -0.0153**  -0.027 -1.61  -0.035** -2.12  0.018 1.25  -0.0139** 
car -0.119* -1.66  -0.123* -1.74  0.001 0.00  -0.0477*  -0.200*** -2.91  -0.195*** -2.92  -0.009 -0.16  -0.0770*** 
city 0.111 0.86  0.088 0.68  0.106 0.98  0.0343  0.208** 1.71  0.166 1.39  0.110 1.03  0.0660 
nuclear 0.097 0.82  0.077 0.67  0.055 0.58  0.0301  0.056 0.51  0.028 0.26  0.045 0.48  0.0112 
alpin 0.222 1.52  0.239* 1.67  0.009 0.08  0.0941*  0.255** 1.83  0.287** 2.13  0.002 0.01  0.1140** 
ind -0.147 -1.15  -0.152 -1.2  0.170* 1.66  -0.0582  -0.228** -1.85  -0.224* -1.88  0.172* 1.71  -0.0875* 
transp -0.415 -1.63  -0.455* -1.82  0.261 1.33  -0.1638**  -0.434** -1.82  -0.476** -2.06  0.245 1.26  -0.1777** 
hotel 1.061** 2.25  1.141*** 2.46  -0.639*** -2.33  0.4131***  0.775** 1.82  0.888** 2.14  -0.521** -2.07  0.3289*** 
left 0.816*** 6.42  0.737*** 5.6  0.192* 1.73  0.2874***            
right -0.521*** -3.15  -0.566*** -3.47  0.279** 2.20  -0.2018***            
openessCH -0.070* -1.87  -0.060 -1.61  0.010 0.38  -0.0231            
equityCH 0.053 1.56  0.055* 1.65  0.025 0.95  0.0213*            
jobCH 0.035 1.04  0.039 1.17  -0.003 -0.12  0.0150            
stateCH -0.102*** -3.37  -0.101*** -3.39  -0.018 -0.78  -0.0391***            
polint       1.319*** 16.12          1.314*** 16.46   
Intercept -2.980* -1.93  -2.007 -1.27  -4.356*** -4.55    -2.784** -1.96  -1.280 -0.89  -4.126*** -4.65   
Rho (s.e.)    -0.336**    -0.457*** 
Log likelihood   -1177.79 -524.95  -1253.69 
LR test    LR chi2(19) = 167.15    LR chi2(13) = 66.69 
Obs (uncens. obs) 841  1429 (841) 854  1444 (854) 
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Tab. A-11 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the nuclear moratorium initiative  
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender 0.109 1.09  0.098 1.01  0.052 0.63  0.0393  0.151 1.59  0.130 1.42  0.057 0.71  0.052 
age -0.096*** -3.08  -0.126*** -4.12  0.434*** 3.50  -0.0503***  -0.135*** -4.77  -0.161*** -5.9  0.433*** 3.57  -0.064*** 
age2       -0.334*** -2.80          -0.338*** -2.89   
educ 0.056*** 2.58  0.033 1.5  0.294** 2.17  0.0133  0.062*** 3.03  0.031 1.47  0.280** 2.16  0.012 
educ2       -0.008* -1.67          -0.008 -1.61   
french -0.161 -1.38  -0.168 -1.49  0.196** 2.06  -0.0668  -0.013 -0.12  -0.030 -0.29  0.190** 2.06  -0.012 
income 0.009 0.48  0.001 -0.01  0.019 1.32  -0.0001  0.010 0.62  -0.001 -0.08  0.018 1.28  -0.001 
car -0.177*** -2.5  -0.185*** -2.7  0.002 0.03  -0.0737***  -0.239*** -3.51  -0.236*** -3.61  -0.008 -0.14  -0.094*** 
city -0.019 -0.15  -0.044 -0.35  0.094 0.87  -0.0174  0.094 0.78  0.054 0.46  0.092 0.85  0.021 
nuclear 0.139 1.2  0.108 0.97  0.053 0.56  0.0431  0.088 0.81  0.054 0.52  0.042 0.45  0.022 
alpin -0.027 -0.19  0.007 0.05  0.009 0.08  0.0027  0.017 0.12  0.068 0.51  -0.008 -0.08  0.027 
ind -0.246* -1.95  -0.254** -2.09  0.165 1.62  -0.1008**  -0.295*** -2.44  -0.292*** -2.52  0.165* 1.64  -0.116*** 
transp -0.455* -1.85  -0.512** -2.16  0.266 1.35  -0.1972***  -0.468** -2.03  -0.517*** -2.34  0.255 1.31  -0.200*** 
hotel 0.565 1.31  0.682* 1.67  -0.627** -2.28  0.2527*  0.343 0.88  0.491 1.34  -0.488* -1.93  0.187 
left 0.835*** 6.43  0.712*** 5.4  0.193* 1.73  0.2700***            
right -0.439*** -2.96  -0.495*** -3.45  0.282** 2.22  -0.1924***            
openessCH -0.035 -0.97  -0.020 -0.58  0.011 0.40  -0.0079            
equityCH 0.048 1.44  0.051 1.6  0.023 0.87  0.0205            
jobCH 0.028 0.83  0.035 1.08  -0.004 -0.14  0.0138            
stateCH -0.106*** -3.56  -0.103*** -3.56  -0.017 -0.73  -0.0410***            
polint       1.322*** 16.26          1.319 16.63   
Intercept -0.247 -0.54  0.485 1.03  -4.397*** -4.60    -0.231 -0.66  0.693 1.81  -4.180 -4.73   
Rho (s.e.)    -0.49***    -0.55*** 
Log likelihood -481.77  -1193.50 -541.80  -1266.64 
LR test   LR chi2(18) =160.64    LR chi2(12) = 68.54 
Obs (uncens. obs) 839  1427 (839) 852  1442 (852) 
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Tab. A-12 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the “motorless Sunday” initiative  
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender 0.283*** 2.79  0.271*** 2.70  0.069 0.83  0.1070***  0.309*** 3.2  0.290*** 3.06  0.074 0.92  0.1152*** 
age -0.124*** -3.96  -0.145*** -4.56  0.437*** 3.52  -0.0575***  -0.166*** -5.8  -0.185*** -6.51  0.432*** 3.54  -0.0737*** 
age2       -0.337*** -2.82          -0.338*** -2.87   
educ 0.048** 2.17  0.032 1.41  0.279** 2.08  0.0127  0.052*** 2.53  0.031 1.43  0.259** 2.02  0.0124 
educ2       -0.008 -1.57          -0.007 -1.47   
french -0.092 -0.79  -0.104 -0.90  0.179* 1.9  -0.0413  0.029 0.27  0.011 0.11  0.173* 1.89  0.0045 
income -0.002 -0.12  -0.008 -0.43  0.020 1.35  -0.0030  -0.001 -0.08  -0.009 -0.54  0.018 1.29  -0.0036 
car -0.324*** -4.32  -0.329*** -4.45  -0.002 -0.04  -0.1304***  -0.376*** -5.27  -0.374*** -5.34  -0.013 -0.24  -0.1490*** 
city 0.062 0.48  0.040 0.31  0.103 0.95  0.0157  0.140 1.16  0.107 0.90  0.104 0.97  0.0425 
nuclear 0.087 0.75  0.072 0.62  0.051 0.53  0.0285  0.053 0.48  0.034 0.31  0.041 0.44  0.0136 
alpin -0.085 -0.57  -0.056 -0.38  0.001 0.01  -0.0222  -0.018 -0.13  0.021 0.15  -0.009 -0.08  0.0084 
ind -0.117 -0.93  -0.126 -1.02  0.166* 1.64  -0.0499  -0.174 -1.44  -0.178 -1.50  0.165* 1.65  -0.0704 
transp -0.277 -1.18  -0.316 -1.36  0.263 1.34  -0.1218  -0.315 -1.39  -0.357 -1.61  0.243 1.25  -0.1385* 
hotel 0.037 0.08  0.133 0.30  -0.644*** -2.35  0.0531  0.115 0.28  0.236 0.60  -0.515** -2.04  0.0937 
left 0.903*** 6.92  0.829*** 6.17  0.189* 1.7  0.3171***       
right -0.321** -2.13  -0.365*** -2.44  0.283** 2.23  -0.1404***         
openessCH -0.042 -1.19  -0.033 -0.94  0.009 0.34  -0.0131           
equityCH 0.108*** 3.19  0.108*** 3.26  0.026 0.99  0.0429***           
jobCH 0.036 1.07  0.041 1.22  -0.002 -0.08  0.0161           
stateCH -0.047 -1.57  -0.047 -1.58  -0.015 -0.67  -0.0185*           
polint       1.321*** 16.21          1.320*** 16.65   
Intercept -0.445 -0.97  0.071 0.14  -4.328*** -4.55    0.166 0.47  0.810** 2.00  -4.036*** -4.60   
Rho (s.e.)    -0.329**    -0.389*** 
Log likelihood -474.76  -1192.685 -532.80  -1265.173 
LR test   LR chi2(18) = 182.34    LR chi2(12) = 93.01 
Obs (uncens. obs) 845  1433 (845) 858  1448 (858) 
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Tab. A-13 Bivariate probit model of the Swiss membership to UNO initiative 
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender 0.207* 1.7  0.146 1.24  0.194* 1.75  0.0480 0.199* 1.72  0.158 1.39 0.138 1.29 0.0542 
age 0.001 0.01  -0.034 -0.95  0.338** 2.15  -0.0111 -0.019 -0.54  -0.049 -1.4 0.348** 2.22 -0.0169 
age2       -0.221 -1.49        -0.218 -1.47  
educ 0.109*** 3.56  0.084*** 2.76  0.032 1.18  0.0276*** 0.118*** 4.04  0.096*** 3.21 0.027 1.05 0.0329*** 
french 0.579*** 3.96  0.622*** 4.50  -0.141 -1.2  0.1818*** 0.548*** 3.95  0.598*** 4.47 -0.168 -1.48 0.1856*** 
income 0.074*** 3.26  0.057*** 2.49  0.024 1.1  0.0186*** 0.070*** 3.25  0.054*** 2.44 0.034* 1.62 0.0184*** 
car -0.042 -0.52  -0.055 -0.72  0.039 0.5  -0.0180 -0.109 -1.41  -0.121 -1.62 0.084 1.13 -0.0414 
city 0.224 1.27  0.252 1.51  -0.220 -1.53  0.0777 0.261 1.54  0.279* 1.71 -0.165 -1.18 0.0901* 
alpin -0.266* -1.76  -0.207 -1.42  -0.067 -0.48  -0.0706 -0.284* -1.93  -0.241* -1.67 -0.069 -0.51 -0.0857 
ind 0.093 0.6  0.084 0.58  -0.096 -0.7  0.0270 0.075 0.5  0.077 0.53 -0.122 -0.91 0.0259 
transp 0.245 0.86  0.187 0.68  0.107 0.38  0.0576 0.132 0.49  0.089 0.34 0.056 0.21 0.0297 
left 0.521*** 3.02  0.369** 2.12  0.396*** 2.55  0.1102**         
right -0.556*** -3.48  -0.644*** -4.19  0.604*** 3.08  -0.2351***         
equityCH 0.040 0.95  0.052 1.29  -0.063 -1.62  0.0169         
jobCH 0.008 0.21  -0.010 -0.28  0.091*** 2.71  -0.0033         
stateCH 0.014 0.35  0.010 0.28  0.019 0.53  0.0034         
polint       0.976*** 8.9        1.023*** 9.71  
Intercept -1.919*** -3.42  -0.987 -1.59  -1.946*** -3.4   -1.590*** -3.58  -0.853* -1.63 -1.671*** -3.31  
Rho (s.e.)    -0.65**    -0.54** 
Log likelihood -363.60  -727.7995 -338.62  -772.2947 
LR test   LR chi2(15) = 96.25    LR chi2(10) = 71.41 
Obs (uncens. obs) 595  823 (595) 611  841 (611) 
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Tab. A-14 Bivariate probit model for participation and approval of the liberalization of the NSB gold initiative  
 Model with political variables Model without political variable 
 Probit Bivariate probit with sample selection Probit  Bivariate probit with sample selection 
    Vote  participation     vote participation 
 Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z -stat  
marg. effects 
on vote Coeff. z -stat  Coeff. z –stat Coeff. z -stat 
marg. effects 
on vote 
gender 0.073 0.53  0.064 0.48  -0.122 -1.07  0.022 -0.012 -0.1  -0.015 -0.12 -0.127 -1.24 -0.0056 
age 0.118*** 2.71  0.152*** 3.22  0.858*** 4.85  0.052*** 0.126*** 3.29  0.134*** 3.14 0.861*** 5.39 0.0502*** 
age2    -0.645*** -3.74   -0.675*** -4.4  
educ -0.037 -1.15  -0.029 -0.91  0.012 0.45  -0.010 -0.045 -1.57  -0.043 -1.45 0.018 0.74 -0.0160 
french -0.046 -0.25  -0.070 -0.39  -0.212 -1.48  -0.024 -0.125 -0.8  -0.127 -0.81 -0.180 -1.42 -0.0469 
income 0.020 0.83  0.033 1.31  0.072*** 3.43  0.011 0.023 1.07  0.026 1.15 0.059*** 3.07 0.0099 
car 0.005 0.05  -0.003 -0.04  -0.108 -1.38  -0.001 0.033 0.38  0.033 0.37 -0.066 -0.92 0.0122 
city 0.041 0.21  0.015 0.08  -0.018 -0.12  0.005 -0.078 -0.47  -0.082 -0.49 0.077 0.55 -0.0302 
nuclear -0.251* -1.68  -0.228 -1.53  0.077 0.61  -0.077 -0.125 -0.91  -0.120 -0.87 0.080 0.69 -0.0447 
alpin -0.286 -1.42  -0.280 -1.41  0.181 1.14  -0.091 -0.235 -1.33  -0.239 -1.35 0.132 0.94 -0.0865 
ind 0.140 0.79  0.128 0.73  0.012 0.09  0.045 0.123 0.77  0.118 0.73 -0.057 -0.44 0.0446 
transp 0.060 0.21  0.035 0.13  -0.106 -0.49  0.012 -0.018 -0.07  -0.025 -0.1 -0.050 -0.26 -0.0092 
left -0.176 -0.92  -0.115 -0.59  0.319 1.96  -0.039      
right 0.538*** 3.06  0.606*** 3.43  0.450*** 2.63  0.227***      
openessCH 0.189*** 3.86  0.168*** 3.28  -0.061 -1.43  0.058***      
equityCH 0.023 0.46  0.023 0.46  0.024 0.59  0.008       
jobCH 0.066 1.38  0.069 1.48  -0.026 -0.69  0.024       
stateCH 0.095** 2.24  0.092 2.21  -0.016 -0.47  0.032**        
polint     1.000*** 8.72       1.033*** 10.09  
Intercept -1.747*** -2.64  -2.228*** -3.14  -3.051*** -5.05  -0.413 -0.85  -0.548 -0.93 -3.206*** -6.43  
Rho (s.e.)    0.36    0.09 
Log likelihood -267.04  -648.25 -334.72  -794.45 
LR test   LR chi2 (17) = 67.84    LR chi2(11) = 18.37 
Obs (uncens. obs) 448  732 (448) 512  851 (512) 
* = significant at 10% level, ** = significant at 5% level, *** = significant at 1% level. Marginal effects are those of the determinants on the probability of approval given participation. For dummy 
variable, the marginal effect is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
  
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE SUPPLY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY : 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MACRO–ECONOMIC COSTS OF CO2 ABATEMENT 
 
 
Chapter 4. The Supply of Environmental Quality 
 
-161- 
Introduction 
The theoretical explications given in chapter one consider that the emergence of the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC) rests on the evolution of the demand for and supply of environmental quality 
occurring in the course of economic growth. Most empirical studies have focused however on the 
reduced-form relationship1 when investigating the existence of the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between pollution and income for different countries and pollutants. Theoretical explanations giving 
rise to the EKC were therefore not yet tested empirically. In other terms, the existing empirical 
literature does not test whether the observed PIR rely on the evolution of the demand for or, rather on 
the supply of, environmental quality. The previous chapter contributes to fill the gap between the 
theoretical explanations of the EKC and the empirically oriented research by examining the link 
between income and the demand for environmental quality at the micro-economic level. The present 
chapter focuses on the supply related explanations of the EKC by examining the divergence in the 
macro-economic marginal costs of abatement of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions throughout a set of 
developing and developed countries. The production frontier approach, as suggested by Lindmark 
(2004), is used for empirical estimations.  
Indeed, recent developments in production theory allow to model the joint production of desirable 
outputs and undesirable by-products (i.e., pollution) through the estimation of a nonparametric 
production frontier. In doing so, the shadow-prices of pollutants are inferred. The latter determine the 
macroeconomic cost of abatement of the last unit of bad output emitted and are interpreted as a 
measure of the macro-economic marginal cost of abatement (Färe and Grosskopf, 1998), i.e. the 
quantity of output that has to be forgone in order to reduce pollution by one unit. 
The results provide evidence of a decreasing macro-economic marginal opportunity cost of CO2 
abatement as national per capita income grows. The evolution of the cost (supply) of environmental 
quality appears therefore favorable to the downturn of emissions since high-income economies face 
lower costs of CO2 reduction than low-income ones.  
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 1 identifies the issue, introduces the objectives of this 
chapter and reviews the existing empirical evidence. Section 2 sets the modeling approach and the 
estimation procedure. A formal as well as an intuitive presentation are proposed. Section 3 presents 
and describes the data while section 4 is devoted to the presentation of the results. Two categories of 
results might be distinguished. First, the marginal abatement costs for each country are estimated, 
postulating that countries are perfectly efficient (relative to the estimated production frontier). Second, 
we identify the location of the inefficiencies in CO2 emissions and the amount of CO2 emissions that 
each country could avoid at a null macro-economic cost by correcting the inefficiencies. Section 5 
interprets and discusses the findings and section 6 reviews the limits of the approach and explores the 
potential extensions that could be pursued. 
 
                                                 
1 Traditional econometric “reduced form approach” consists in investigating the existence of the EKC for cross-section or panel 
data. Either emissions per capita or emissions per unit of GDP (emission intensity) are considered to be a function of the GDP 
per capita and its multiples (GDP2, GDP3). Some other explanatory variables such as prices, socio-economic variables, time 
dummies, etc., are often taken into account. Such studies composed the database of the meta-analysis in chapter 2. 
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1 Abatement costs  
1.1 Definition and objective 
The literature defines pollution abatement costs as the costs of reducing pollution up to a given 
reference level (Pearce, 1976; Pizer and Kopp, 2003). Looking at this issue in more details, studies 
analyzing abatement costs generally distinguish between direct and indirect costs. Direct abatement 
costs refer to expenditure directly associated with environmental protection undertaken by firms, 
households, and governments, such as, for instance, in energy production (for example the costs of 
switching from coal to gas in electricity production). Direct costs denote the starting level from which 
the costs spread out to other parts of the economy. Indirect (or macro-economic) costs are associated 
with the additional cost burden resulting from the general equilibrium effects of environmental 
protection. Macroeconomic costs refer to the variation of gross domestic product (GDP), the change in 
private consumption and households’ welfare (utility). In principle, the costs’ measurement should be 
based on the change in utility, but in practice the variation in household consumption or GDP is used 
instead2. 
As announced in the introduction, we aim at estimating the macroeconomic marginal costs of CO2 
abatement in a set of developing and developed countries by means of the production frontier 
approach. These costs may be interpreted as the amount of GDP or consumption that each country 
has to forego in order to decrease CO2 emissions by one unit. Such approach assumed the existence 
of a trade-off between economic activity (i.e., production of the desirable good) and emission. This is 
illustrated in figure 4.I (see IPCC, 2001), which represents the production frontier (F) of an economy. 
Each point of the curve shows the maximum level of emissions reduction for a given level of economic 
activity. The economy is producing a composite good (Q) and environmental quality (E). When the 
economy is on the frontier (at point O’), the reduction of emissions moves the economy along the 
frontier to the right, lowering economic activity and thus increasing the cost of abatement. Our 
technique allows to estimate the slope of the frontier and thus measures the marginal macroeconomic 
costs, which equal to the value of the economic activity forgone, in order to reduce emissions. 
It is straightforward at this point to consider the principal limit of this approach. The latter assumes that 
each economy is located on the production possibility frontier and is thus perfectly efficient. However, 
if an economy is located below the frontier, at a point such at O, there is a potential for combined 
emission reduction and increasing economic activity (toward O’, for example). Our estimation 
procedure also considers such an issue by determining which units are inefficient and estimating the 
potential amount of emission reduction that could be realized at zero macro-economic cost (distance 
OO’’). 
 
 
                                                 
2 The second assessment report of the IPCC (see Hourcade et al., 1996) proposed a typology of abatement costs. 4 types of 
costs are considered: direct engineering costs and the financial cost of specific technical measures, economic costs for a given 
sector, macroeconomic costs (i.e., costs are evaluated as a loss of GDP or aggregate consumption) and welfare loss (these 
costs take into consideration the non-market effect of abatement such as the secondary environmental benefits or costs and the 
redistributive consequences). 
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Fig. 4.I Production frontier and the trade-off between  
economic activity and emission reduction 
 
This paper focuses on the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2). Two principal reasons explain the choice 
of this particular pollutant. First, empirical evidence regarding the existence of the EKC in the case of 
CO2 are mixed, so that further investigation seems useful. Even if a majority of studies shows a 
monotonically rising relationship3 (Amazohou and van Phu, 2001; Agras and Chapman, 1999) and 
even an increasingly steeper path between pollution and income (Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; 
Perrings and Ansuategi, 2000), some studies conclude to an EKC (Dijkgraff and Vollebergh, 1998; 
Carson et al., 1997). Second, as carbon dioxide is a global public bad, the effects of CO2 emissions on 
climate change do not depend on the location of emissions. Hence, a worldwide optimal abatement 
strategy consists in reducing emissions in the countries where abatement costs are the lowest. The 
emissions trading mechanisms between countries included in the Kyoto protocol4 rely on this 
argument.  
 
1.2 Theoretical links between abatement costs and the EKC 
The model of Munasinghe (1999) exposed in chapter 1 concludes that both the evolution of benefits 
derived from environmental quality and the costs incurred by environmental protection with income 
growth determine the PIR5. The neoclassical growth model of Vogel (1999) and Selden and Song 
(1995) as well as the standard static model of a single infinitely lived consumer (Lieb, 2002) offer 
similar results. They show that environmental preferences (increasing willingness to pay for 
environmental quality with income growth) are a sufficient condition for generating an EKC as long as 
the efficiency of abatement, i.e. the quantity of emissions that one unit of abatement (or forgone 
                                                 
3 According to Lieb (2003), the explanation of the rising relationship lies in the fact that CO2 is a global stock pollutant with a 
lifetime of about 125 years. 
4 The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement adopted in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan.  The Protocol sets binding 
emission targets for developed countries that would reduce their emissions on average 5.2% below their 1990 levels for 2008-
2012. 
5 As explained in chapter one, such model supposes that some form of internalization occurs. However, the equilibrium points 
may lead to a non-optimal pollution-income relationship if the MB and MC curves are not at their social level. 
Economic activity 
Emission reduction 
F (Q,E) 
O 
O’ 
O’’ 
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consumption) reduces, remains constant or increases with income levels. If it is not the case, the 
demand effect may be compensated by increasing marginal abatement costs (the inverse of the 
efficiency of abatement) with income growth. Lieb (2002) shows that the equilibrium PIR turns 
downwards when the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and pollution declines faster 
than the marginal rate of transformation between consumption and pollution as income increases. 
Consequently, for given consumer preferences, the location of the turning point varies directly with the 
opportunity cost of reducing pollution, the lower the opportunity cost, the lower the income level at 
which the turning point occurs (Khanna and Plassman, 2004).  
The apparition of the EKC in Selden and Song (1995) or Stokey (1998) rests on threshold effects that 
arise in abatement opportunities. In other words, regulation has no impact on the profitability of 
abatement at low income levels, so that no abatement is carried out and pollution increases. There is 
no technique effect to counteract the scale effect. But after a threshold income level, regulation 
becomes binding and pollution declines with income. Selden and Song (1995) conclude consequently 
that the evolution of the cost of abatement determines the exact shape of the PIR6. Threshold effects 
are implemented either through the specification of an abatement function where the marginal product 
of abatement is bound or by assuming the existence of a fixed cost of abatement. In these latter 
cases, the aggregate willingness to pay to decrease pollution may be less than the fixed cost, in which 
situation it is not worth setting up an abatement system.  
Finally, Andreoni and Levinson (2001) explain the emergence of the EKC by the presence of 
increasing returns to scale in the pollution abatement process (i.e., richer economies face lower 
abatement costs).7 The argument is simply that as the scale of economic activities increases, 
abatement becomes more profitable and hence even if policy is stagnant and unchanging, pollution 
falls as more abatement is undertaken. In such a situation, the marginal abatement cost curve is 
negatively linked to the income level. Chichilnisky (1993) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) use a 
similar argument8.  
Actually, several factors support the assumption that abatement costs vary with income levels. First, 
the development of scientific knowledge and environmental institutions may lead high-income 
economies towards the use of better and cheaper abatement strategies. Second, technological 
progress may lead to greater fuel efficiency. On the other hand, the reduction of the carrying capacity 
of the environment as development proceeds may necessitate ever-greater abatement efforts to offset 
the direct effects of growth on environmental degradation (Selden and Song, 1995). Finally, the 
complexity of the production process may also increase with income per capita, leading rich 
economies to face particular constraints regarding abatement opportunities.  
                                                 
6 When pollution cannot be abated (the cost of abatement is infinite), the PIR depends on the pace of capital growth and the 
impact of that growth on the environment. As far as capital growth leads to more pollution, pollution is monotonically increasing 
with income growth. 
7 Plassman and Khanna (2004) argue however that increasing returns to scale in pollution abatement are not sufficient for 
ensuring the pollution to fall with income growth, unless the returns to scale in the abatement activities exceed the returns to the 
“production” of gross pollution, i.e. the total amount of pollution that production generates.  
8 Chichilnisky’s (1993, 1994) studies are not concerned with the EKC, but with the allocation of abatement efforts. In the case of 
increasing returns in abatement (decreasing abatement costs), the equating marginal costs principle can lead to inefficiencies. 
Her results show that an efficient allocation requires that the marginal cost of abatement in each country be inversely 
proportional to that country’s marginal utility of consumption of all other private goods.  
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1.3 Empirical evidence on abatement costs 
Existing empirical evidence regarding the evolution of abatement costs across different levels of 
income or countries are rare. Andreoni and Levinson (2001) present some evidence in favor of 
increasing returns to scale in abatement in the U.S. industries and States. The relationship between 
direct abatement operating costs of controlling emissions (SO2) from large coal-fired boilers and their 
relative contribution to the Gross State Product appears to be concave controlling for the stringency of 
regulation and the particularity of each industry. A similar relationship is found at the level of the 
States. Overall, total direct abatement expenditures are increasing at a decreasing pace with the size 
of the economy.  
Abatement costs for air pollutants have been examined by Bluffstone (1997) for Lithuania and by 
Hartman et al. (1994) for the United States. Comparing these two studies shows that direct abatement 
costs are lower in Lithuania. Dasgupta et al. (1996) estimate the marginal costs of reducing water 
pollutants in China. Other available case studies calculate the abatement costs resulting either from a 
particular legislation, or concentrate on a particular plant or industrial sector.9 These studies usually 
rest on surveys (such as the US pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditure survey) or use an 
engineering model. Hartman et al. (1997) find that the use of surveys gives much more reliable 
estimates of abatement costs than engineering models10 since the latter have to hypothesize which 
abatement option firms will follow. Both survey and engineering studies ignore however changes in 
relative prices and the associated impacts on factor substitution and the behavior of firms and 
individuals. Thus, the results do not address the macroeconomic cost of abatement. The marginal 
abatement cost curves are obtained by ordering the abatement options according to their cost, from 
the cheapest to the most expensive. 
Another set of evidence dealing with CO2 emissions, is presented in the third assessment report of the 
IPCC (2001), which reviews some 200 studies reporting CO2 abatement costs. Several types of 
costing methodologies are used. They range from the standard bottom-up engineering to top-down 
macroeconomic models (including input-output models and general equilibrium models). The latter 
analyze aggregate economic behavior and address supply and demand relationships, behavioral 
changes and substitution effects. They thus allow to make inferences about the indirect costs of 
abatement. These models use aggregate economic variables and the relationships among these 
variables are determined by economic theory and equilibrium principles. These relationships are 
estimated econometrically and calibrated. To obtain cost estimates, an exogenous shock is introduced 
(such as a carbon tax) and the model is solved for equilibrium before and after the shock. By 
comparing the value of the relevant variables in the baseline and shock cases, cost estimates are 
obtained. Their main limit rests on their level of aggregation, in that they overlook specific 
                                                 
9 For a review, see Pizer and Kopp (2003). 
10 Such a model uses what is called a “bottom up” approach. An emissions abatement objective is defined. Then all the 
techniques by which this target could be achieved are listed and the expected expenditure (buying of pollution abatement 
equipment, maintenance and labor costs) that they required are calculated and added up to determine the total economy-wide 
abatement costs. 
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technological opportunities identified by bottom-up models11. To build the marginal abatement cost 
curves, the model is run under different constraints12 corresponding to different levels of carbon 
abatement, such as 10%, 20%, or 30% below reference emissions. For each set of constraints, the 
corresponding shadow-prices of carbon are computed by the model. Then, marginal abatement cost 
curves are used to plot the shadow-prices as a function of the level of abatement. 
However, even if there are now numerous studies reporting CO2 abatement cost estimates, the results 
they presented show that the costs of abatement vary widely across countries and regions. 
Furthermore, as far as one is interested in deriving comparisons between developing and developed 
countries, the evidence is rare, because the great majority of costing studies has focused on OECD 
countries. The IPCC (2001) presents a set of parallel studies (mainly bottom-up models) that measure 
abatement cost curves in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe, which show that there are a large number 
of low cost reduction potentials in those countries (Halsnæs, 2001; Halsnæs and Markandya, 1999). A 
number of global top-down models include non-OECD countries, but these are represented as a large 
aggregated region without reflecting the more specific characteristics of developing countries that are 
considered to have major implications on CO2 emission reduction potentials and related costs. These 
models conclude to the existence of lower marginal abatement costs in developing countries than in 
developed ones. The logical consequence of this finding is that in order to attain global efficiency, the 
largest abatement effort should be undertaken in developing countries whereas the richest countries in 
the world, with the largest historical CO2 emissions, have much lower abatement responsibility 
(Chapman and Khanna, 2000).   
Note that the prior conclusion remains uncertain. Indeed, marginal abatement cost estimates vary 
widely both between countries and according to the characteristics of the models. For example, top-
down models find larger cost estimates than bottom-up models. As pointed out by Chichilnisky (1993), 
the estimates of abatement costs obtained by means of general equilibrium models depend on their 
assumptions and calibration. In other words, these models assume rather than establish that 
developing countries have lower abatement costs. In such models, the marginal tax rate on carbon 
indicates the marginal cost of emissions reduction. For example, the ranking of regional levels of 
carbon taxes to reach certain emission targets largely reflects the ranking of the levels of initial energy 
prices. Where these prices are low, as in the former Soviet Union or China, carbon taxes necessary to 
achieve the given reduction of CO2 are low, while they are high in countries with higher initial prices, 
for instance, Japan (Hoeller et al., 1992). Other factors such as the substitution elasticities between 
inputs, the adjustment speed, the emergence of a backstop technology and the evolution of trade 
flows also influence the cost of abatement. Fischer and Morgenstern (2003) confirm these findings by 
conducting a meta-analysis on the estimated carbon abatement costs. Their results indicate that 
certain assumptions, like freer trade and greater disaggregation of regions lead to lower estimates of 
                                                 
11 Many recent studies tend to link bottom-up and top-down approaches, but the relative attention paid to each component 
varies widely. 
12 A general equilibrium model will produce a shadow-price for any constraint on carbon emissions for a given region R at time 
T. An example would be a 10% reduction below the reference case for the USA in 2010. This price indicates the marginal cost 
for abating the last ton of carbon required to meet the constraint.  
Chapter 4. The Supply of Environmental Quality 
 
-167- 
marginal abatement costs, while models looking more deeply at the substitution possibilities in the 
energy sector raise them13.  
Furthermore, Chapman and Khanna (2000) criticize the bottom-up approach. As said earlier, such 
models conclude to the existence of enormous “no regret” opportunities to energy efficiency 
improvements in developing countries (Shukla, 1995). Thus, it is assumed that projects would be 
undertaken regardless of the additional goal of reducing CO2 emissions. The authors consider that 
these studies seem overoptimistic as far as the feasibility of zero or negative cost abatement 
opportunities are examined. If this assumption is correct, why then are none of these options being 
implemented now? Obviously, there are other costs, which are excluded from the analysis. Another 
critique addresses the way climate change models represent technology change through the 
production function and the changes in the numerical values of exogenously specified parameters. 
The exogenous energy efficiency improvements are assumed to be rapid and to induce a continuous 
decline in energy intensity (energy/GDP) over time. It is a pure technological effect independent of the 
impact of rising energy prices. However, as far as past evidence is examined, the assumed 
exogenous rate of improvement in energy efficiency is not likely to occur (Chapman and Khanna, 
2000).  
 
 
2  Estimating the Shadow-Prices of Undesirable Outputs  
In order to clarify the question of the evolution of the macro-economic costs of CO2 abatement with 
income, this paper reports empirical evidence based on production process modeling by means of 
directional output distance functions. As said earlier, this technique allows us to determine the amount 
of desirable output that a country should forgo in order to get rid off the last "unit" of pollution emitted. 
In the relevant literature, these estimates are called the relative shadow-prices of the bad output in 
terms of the good output and are interpreted as the marginal costs of abatement14. This technique 
furthermore identifies the countries where the potential zero-cost CO2 abatement opportunities are 
located. 
Before turning to a formal presentation of the theoretical and empirical modeling of the production 
process, an intuitive presentation of ideas and techniques underlying the estimation of shadow-prices 
is given.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 This is explained by the fact that the former allows for larger opportunities to shift production and consumption to less energy 
intensive products, while the latter allows for a larger consideration of energy market rigidities. 
14 Even if the term “marginal abatement costs” is used in the literature computing shadow-prices from distance functions, these 
estimates are in fact capturing the marginal rate of transformation, which is defined as the absolute value of the slope of the 
production possibilities frontier. They thus measure, in our case, the opportunity cost of producing one more unit of one of the 
goods in terms of the forgone production of the other good. We will however follow Färe et al. (2002) and call them marginal 
abatement costs, defined as the cost of getting rid of pollution in terms of the desirable output forgone.   
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2.1 Intuitive presentation 
In the rest of this paper, countries are considered as independent production units, which aim at 
maximizing the production of desirable outputs such as consumption goods. We focus on 
characterizing their production process, i.e. the way countries transform inputs into outputs. However, 
as far as the production of desirable outputs also generates pollution, three categories of factors have 
to be taken into consideration when analyzing their production process: inputs, desirable outputs and 
pollutants in the form of undesirable outputs. In this respect, we will make several assumptions. They 
are formulated below (section 2.2). However, one of them, the weak disposability of the undesirable 
by-products (pollution) is of crucial importance and requires an intuitive explanation. 
In production theory, it is usual to assume that outputs are strongly disposable, which implies that the 
disposal of any output can be achieved without incurring any costs in terms of reduced production of 
other outputs. However, the symmetric treatment of outputs in terms of their disposability 
characteristics looses its justification if one or some of the outputs consist of an undesirable by-
product such as pollution (Zaim and Taskin, 2000). When producing units are forced to clean or 
reduce the undesirable by-product, one has to consider the disposal of undesirable outputs as costly 
to achieve, as it requires a reduction in the good output. In technical terms, the undesirable output is 
said to be weakly disposable. 
In figure 4.II, let y and b denote respectively the good (desirable) and bad (undesirable) outputs. The 
output correspondence sets (i.e., the amounts of both desirable and undesirable outputs that can be 
jointly produced with a given set of inputs) illustrate the difference between weak and strong 
disposability of outputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.II Output correspondence set for strongly -Ys(x)- and weakly –Yw(x)- disposable  
undesirable outputs for a given set of inputs x 
 
 
If the disposability of outputs is costless (i.e. both outputs are freely disposable), the line segment cd 
adequately describes the technology since a reduction in b would be possible without giving up any y. 
b
y 
c 
O 
d
Yw(x)  
Ys(x)  
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If however the disposability of b is costly, the line segment Od is relevant as any reduction in b 
requires to forego some of y. As we are interested in finding the cost of the undesirable output in terms 
of the forgone production of the desirable one, we will therefore model the production process of 
undesirable outputs as weakly disposable. 
The method called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to estimate the output correspondence 
set with undesirable outputs weakly disposable (Yw(x)). More precisely, the DEA is a non-parametric 
method that estimates the piecewise linear production frontier according to the joint-production of b 
and y. As indicated by its name, the DEA method consists in enveloping the observations. Thus most 
efficient units according to the production of both desirable and undesirable outputs define the best 
practice frontier. For example, in figure 4.III, units A, B and C define the frontier and are fully efficient 
while unit E is not efficient as it could produce more desirable output in point E’ without increasing the 
level of pollution. Note that figure 4.III presents the best practice frontier according to a given vector of 
inputs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.III  The production frontier defined from the “best” units 
 
 
Once the best practice frontier is estimated, it appears straightforward to compute the shadow-prices 
for efficient units. They are equal to the slope of the tangent to the frontier, i.e. to the amount of 
desirable output that has to be forgone in order to reduce emissions by one unit. The same can be 
done for inefficient units by projecting them on the frontier as shown in Figure 4.IV. All inefficient units 
(E for example) are transposed using a constant vector g(gb, gy) called the directional output vector. 
The direction of the latter corresponds to the chosen efficiency rule, which describes the way the 
desirable output may be expanded and/or undesirable bad reduced. The choice of the efficiency rule 
will have an impact on the estimated shadow-price. 
b
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Overall, the estimated shadow-prices are computed as if all units were perfectly efficient. However, in 
figure 4.IV, the inefficient unit E can reduce emissions without incurring costs when moving towards 
the frontier. The amount of zero-cost emissions reduction constitutes thus another important result. 
This may be grasped by the efficiency score, which reflects the distance from each inefficient unit to 
the production frontier15. By construction, the efficiency scores are equal to or smaller than one. They 
measure the feasible undesirable output reduction and desirable input increase that a unit could attain 
keeping the resource usage constant. For country E, the efficiency score is equal to βE=OβE/OβE’ 
when considering a “horizontal” efficiency rule (undesirable output oriented efficiency score). Thus, if 
the efficiency score of the unit E is equal to 0.8, unit E can potentially reduce the undesirable output by 
(1-0.8)/0.8= 0.25, i.e. 25 % of its actual undesirable output level, keeping its desirable output level 
constant and using the same amount of resources. Efficiency scores as well as shadow-prices may be 
generalized to the case of units transforming multiple inputs into multiple desirable and undesirable 
outputs. 
Fig. 4.IV: Shadow-prices and efficiency scores 
 
Several studies have attempted to analyze producer environmental performance from an estimated 
bad output shadow-price. Pittman (1981, 1983) studies 30 pulp and paper plants and estimates the 
Lagrange multiplier, reflecting the shadow-price, of the restriction that plants have to respect a 
maximum discharge level of pollutant. He found that shadow-prices vary between plants and hence 
that control regulations allocated the abatement effort inefficiently. Such an approach remains 
however limited since it assumes that each plant behaves optimally and discharges exactly the 
                                                 
15 Actually, the prime concern of most studies using the DEA method for efficiency evaluation is the efficiency score. Note that in 
practice, the best practice frontier and the measures of the efficiency scores are estimated in a single step. 
b
C 
 
E 
 
E’
g
g 
βE βE’ O 
Chapter 4. The Supply of Environmental Quality 
 
-171- 
authorized quantity of pollutants (Marklund, 2003).  Färe et al. (1993) examine the same data as 
Pittman but use a Shepard multi-output distance function, which estimates the shadow-prices as the 
trade-off between good output and bad output by considering that bad outputs are an undesirable by-
product of the production process. Their result confirms the previous findings of Pittman as the 
shadow-price estimates vary considerably across plants. Coggins and Swinton apply the same 
approach to SO2 emissions of coal electric power plants. Their results show that the shadow-prices, or 
marginal abatement costs, differ across plants and that the average shadow-price in their sample is 
close to the observed prices of SO2 allowances between utilities. Färe et al (2002) determine the 
shadow-prices of the pollution of water by agricultural pesticides with a directional output distance 
function, which contrary to the Shepard output distance function, allows for a simultaneous expansion 
of the good output and contraction of the bad outputs instead of a proportional expansion of both bad 
and good outputs to the frontier. 
In the rest of this paper, we will apply the directional output distance function in order to compute the 
marginal abatement costs. However, contrary to the vast majority of studies, we will not consider 
microeconomic units but countries. To our knowledge, only Färe et al. (1994) have applied the DEA 
technique and the Shepard distance function at the level of countries. Their study does not however 
account for the undesirable by-product of the production process16. 
 
2.2 Theoretical modeling of the production process and the shadow-prices model 
We assume each country may be considered as production units, which employ multiple inputs 
denoted by a vector x = (x1, x2, …, xP) ∈ ℜ+P to produce a vector of desirable outputs (goods) y = (y1, 
y2, …, yQ) ∈ ℜ+Q and a vector of undesirable outputs (bads) b = (b1, b2, …, bR) ∈ ℜ+R. The technology 
may be described in a very general way via the output correspondence set (Färe and Lovell, 1985): 
 { }=( ) ( , )  can produce (y,b)Y x y b x  (4.1) 
Following Chung et al. (1997), we impose standard assumptions on Y(x), namely, it is a closed, 
bounded, convex set with inputs and desirable and undesirable outputs null-joint. As exposed above, 
desirable outputs are freely disposable and undesirable outputs are weakly disposable. The previous 
assumptions may be formally stated as follows: 
Assumption 1. There is no free lunch: Y(0) = {0, 0}, i.e., zero inputs yield zero outputs. 
Assumption 2. Doing nothing is feasible: (0, 0) ∈ Y(x) ∀x∈ ℜ+P. This axiom guarantees that inaction 
is possible, i.e., given any input vector it is always possible to produce nothing. 
Assumption 3. Scarcity: Y(x) is compact for each x ∈ ℜ+P, i.e., only finite output can be produced 
given finite inputs. This is usually referred to as the basic scarcity problem of 
economics. 
                                                 
16 However, looking more deeply into the unpublished literature, Marklund and Samakovlis (2003) determine the marginal 
abatement cost of CO2 emissions for 15 European countries in order to analyze the determinants of the European Union (EU) 
burden-sharing agreement, which distributes the overall 8% CO2 emissions target among the EU member states. Their results 
show that the marginal abatement costs vary greatly across countries and that countries facing higher abatement costs were 
assigned easier emission changes. However, as far as this study includes only European economies, it does not allow to 
consider the variation of the marginal abatement cost across highly developed and developing countries. 
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Assumption 4. If (y, b) ∈ Y(x) and x' ≥ x then (y, b) ∈ Y(x'), i.e., inputs are freely disposable. This 
assumption says that if it is possible to produce a given amount of outputs (y, b) using 
the amount of inputs x, then it is also possible to produce the same amount of outputs 
with a larger amount of inputs x'. 
Assumption 5. If y ∈ Y(x) and 0 < θ ≤ 1, then θy ∈ Y(x), i.e., weak disposability of bad outputs. This 
property says that for a given input vector, proportional contractions of bad outputs are 
feasible. The weak disposability of a particular output implies that this output is 
undesirable (e.g., pollution) and its restriction is costly in the sense that it uses 
resources which otherwise could have been used to maintain or increase desirable 
outputs. 
Assumption 6.  If y ∈ Y(x) and y' ≤ y, then y' ∈ Y(x), i.e., desirable outputs are freely disposable. This 
assumption says that if it is possible to produce a given amount of desirable output y 
using the amount of inputs x, then it is also possible to produce a smaller amount of 
desirable output y' with the same amount of inputs x. 
Assumption 7.  (y, b) ∈ Y(x) and b = 0, then y = 0, i.e., for a given input vector, if bad output is zero, 
then the same must hold true for good output. This is called the null-jointness property. 
In other words, this means that good outputs cannot be produced without producing 
bad outputs 
Assumption 8. Y(x) is convex. 
Note that for each vector (y, b) ∈ Y(x), proportional contractions of any outputs are feasible. Also, the 
good output is freely disposable. Finally, the good and bad outputs are null-joint: if b = 0, then y = 0 
whenever (y, b) is in Y(x). 
The main analytical tool we employ is the directional output distance function introduced by Chung et 
al. (1997) and Chambers et al. (1998). This function is the output version of Luenberger's (1992) 
benefit function and it inherits the properties imposed on the output set Y(x). It was employed to 
compute shadow-prices by Färe et al. (2001) and Lee et al. (2002). Denote the directional output 
vector by g = (gb,gy), where gb = (gb1, gb2, …, gbR) ∈ ℜ–R and gy = (gy1, gy2, …, gyQ) ∈ ℜ+Q. The 
associated directional output distance function is defined as: 
 β β= + ∈( , , ; )  sup{ | ( , ) ( )}oD x y b g y b g Y x  (4.2) 
As explained above, the directional distance function is necessary to scale good and bad outputs in a 
chosen direction, g, to the frontier of the output correspondence set Y(x). Since gb ≤ 0 and gy ≥ 0, bad 
outputs are decreased and good outputs are increased. The function says how far (y, b) must be 
projected along g to reach the frontier of the production set. The directional distance function takes the 
value of 0 if the unit is situated on the production frontier; it takes a positive value for a unit operating 
below the frontier. The distance function is interpreted as a measure of technical efficiency, i.e. the 
efficiency score: a larger distance from the frontier means a lower technical efficiency. The properties 
of this function appear in Luenberger (1992), Chung et al. (1997) and Chambers et al. (1998) and 
hence will not be recalled in this paper. 
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According to Chambers et al. (1998), the directional distance function fully characterizes the 
technology in the sense that: 
 ( , ) ( ) if and only if ( , , ; ) 0oy b Y x D x y b g∈ ≥  (4.3) 
that is, x can produce (y, b) if and only if the distance function is nonnegative. 
Chambers et al. (1998) and Färe et al. (2001) show that the directional output distance function is dual 
to the revenue function. This duality allows us to retrieve the output shadow-prices by means of 
Shephard's lemma. Let us define the revenue function as: 
 { }= + ≥( , , ) max( , ) ( , , ; ) 0oR x p q y b py qb D x y b g  (4.4) 
where p = (p1, p2, …, pQ) ∈ ℜ+Q is the price vector for desirable outputs and q = (q1, q2, …, qR) ∈ ℜ–R is 
the price vector for undesirable outputs. The revenue function R(x, p, q) gives the largest feasible 
revenue that can be obtained from inputs, x, when the unit under investigation faces good output 
prices, p, and bad output prices, q. Undesirable outputs bear nonpositive signs because bads 
generate a nonpositive revenue. 
Using (4.3), the revenue function can be equivalently written as: 
 = + ≥( , , ) max( , ) { | ( , , ; ) 0}oR x p q y b py qb D x y b g  (4.5) 
This allows us to make revenue and distance functions appear in the same equation. The next step is 
to express Do(x, y, b; g) as a function of R(x, p, q). 
Note that if (y, b) ∈ Y(x), then (y + βgy, b + βgb) = {(y, b) + Do(x, y, b; g)g} ∈ Y(x). This is simply to say 
that if an output vector (y, b) is feasible, then the elimination of any inefficiency associated with that 
output vector by moving in the direction g is also feasible. Hence, we can write: 
 
( , , ) ( , ){ ( ,  ,  ;  ) ,    ( ,  ,  ;  ) }
= ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )
= ( ) ( , , ; )
o y o b
o y o b
y b o
R x p q p q y D x y b g g b D x y b g g
py qb pD x y b g g qD x y b g g
py qb pg qg D x y b g
≥ + +
+ + +
+ +
 (4.6) 
 
Rearranging the above expression, the relation between the directional output distance function and 
the revenue function becomes: 
 [ ]  ≤ − + + ( , , , ) ( , , ) ( ) /o y bD x y b g R x p q py qb pg qg  (4.7) 
The directional distance function can also be recovered from the revenue function as 
 = + +( , , ; ) min( , ){[ ( , , ) - (  )] /  [ ]}o y bD x y b g p q R x p q py qb pg qg  (4.8) 
Applying Shephard's lemma to the above expression, the normalized shadow-prices of bad and good 
outputs are: 
 ∂ −= ≥∂ +
( , , , )
0
( )
o
y b
D x y b g q
b pg qg
 (4.9) 
 ∂ −= ≤∂ +
( , , , )
0
( )
o
y b
D x y b g p
y pg qg
 (4.10) 
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where q is the nonpositive vector of shadow-prices of undesirable outputs and p is the nonnegative 
vector of shadow-prices of desirable outputs. 
For two different outputs, e.g. y and b, it follows that their relative shadow-price equals the 
corresponding ratio of the distance function partial derivatives, which is equal to the marginal rate of 
technical transformation of output y into b, i.e., ∂y/∂b. 
 ∂ ∂ ∂= = =∂ ∂ ∂ ,
( , , ; ) /
MRTT
( , , ; ) /
o
y b
o
D x y b g bq Y
p D x y b g y B
 (4.11) 
A high marginal rate of technical transformation implies that reducing b by one unit may only happen if 
y is reduced by several units. The converse holds true for a low marginal rate of transformation. Note 
that the relative shadow-price, q/p, is no longer normalized by (pgy + qgb). Hence, the ratio q/p reflects 
the opportunity cost, or the trade-off between desirable (y) and undesirable (b) outputs (Färe et al., 
1993). 
Next, if at least one observed output price is known and one is willing to assume that it is equal to its 
shadow-price, absolute shadow-prices may then be retrieved following Färe et al. (1993). Namely, if 
one bad and one good output are produced, then the absolute shadow-price of the bad output is 
obtained as: 
 ∂ ∂= ∂ ∂
( , , ; ) /
( , , ; ) /
o
o
o
D x y b g b
q p
D x y b g y
 (4.12)  
where po is the observed price of the desirable output. The absolute shadow-price (q) of the 
undesirable output (b) reflects the marginal opportunity cost, in terms of forgone revenue, of an 
incremental decrease in the ability to freely dispose of the bad. Note that if the shadow-price equals 
zero for a country, then this country can achieve a costless marginal reduction in its pollution 
emissions (Färe et al., 1993). When the desirable output is measured directly in dollars, the relative 
shadow-price q/p equals the absolute shadow-price of CO2 emissions. 
The computation procedure outlined above allows us to obtain the estimates of shadow-prices of 
pollution emissions that reflect the underlying technology. These are computed on the efficient 
boundary of the output correspondence set. Finally, note that shadow-prices are equal to the marginal 
costs of pollution abatement, but are not equal to the marginal benefit to society of pollution 
abatement. 
  
2.3 Estimation Procedure 
Following Chung et al. (1997), we employ a mathematical linear programming technique to estimate a 
nonparametric piecewise-linear production frontier. Denoting by N the total number of countries under 
investigation, the production frontier for country A is estimated by solving the following mathematical 
programming problem: 
 β∂ =( , , ; ) maxoD x y b g  (4.13) 
subject to 
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The coefficients zi, i = 1,…, N are called intensity variables. The non-negativity constraints on these 
variables force the technology to exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS). The variable returns to scale 
(VRS) are obtained by adding to the above LP the constraint: 
 
=
=∑
1
1      
N
i
i
Z  (4.15) 
and the non-increasing (non-decreasing) returns to scale are obtained by setting the sum of intensity 
variables zi to be lower (greater) or equal than one. 
The inequalities in the constraints for inputs x make them freely disposable, and the same holds for 
the good outputs y. Weak disposability of bad outputs b is imposed by the strict equalities in the bad 
output constraints and the "weak disposable parameter" δ which allows for proportional contractions of 
(y,b). Under constant returns to scale, δ may be set equal to one, thus making the mathematical 
programming problem linear. The strict equality on the bads constraints along with the scaling 
possibilities afforded under constant returns to scale yield a weak disposability of (y, b). Under 
variable, non-increasing or non-decreasing returns to scale, the nonlinear programming problem 
above may be easily transformed into a linear programming problem by defining the new intensity 
variables γi = zi/δ for i = 1,…, N. In what follows, we assume variable returns to scale, i.e., the least 
restrictive hypothesis. The shadow-prices p and q associated with the primal constraints for good and 
bad outputs are obtained as part of the usual linear programming solution's output. Note that the 
shadow-price on/of? a particular constraint of a linear programming problem represents the change in 
the value of the objective function per unit increase in the right hand-side value of the constraint 
(Bradley, Hax and Magnanti, 1977). In our case, the objective function is the directional distance 
function, and the good and bad outputs appear on the right hand-side of the constraints – hence, the 
shadow-prices equal the partial derivatives of Do(x, y, b; g). 
We used a “horizontal” directional vector g = (gb, gy) where gb equals the mean value of the bad output 
in the sample and gy is set to zero. For each country situated "below" the efficient production frontier, 
we find an efficient benchmark situated on the frontier. This benchmark – be it a real country or a 
virtual one – is characterized by the production of a lower quantity of the bad output and an identical 
amount of the desirable one.  
We are mainly interested in the relative ranking of the shadow-prices of CO2 across countries, so that 
the choice of the direction vector g does not alter this ranking as long as the same vector g is 
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employed for all countries. We performed tests using a different orientation vector and found that the 
relationship was not altered. However, this is not true if we consider the absolute value of the shadow-
prices. According to Lee et al. (2002), shadow-price estimates of SOX emissions vary considerably 
across studies since the latter use different directional vectors, as shown in figure 4.V. Coggins and 
Swinton (1996) have the lowest opportunity cost of SOX emissions on the frontier followed by Turner 
(1995), Boyd et al. (1996) and Lee et al. (2002). 
 
Fig. 4.V  Shadow-price estimates with varying directional vectors 
 
3  Data 
We use macro-economic cross-section data referring to a set of countries. Our sample comprises 76 
developed and developing countries observed in year 198517. These include 30 low- and lower-middle 
income countries and 46 upper-middle and high-income countries.18 The complete list of countries 
figures in Appendix 1. Either gross domestic product (GDP) or consumption has been alternatively 
considered as a proxy for the desirable output. As mentioned earlier, the undesirable output 
considered in this paper is carbon dioxide (CO2). We assume that each country uses four inputs that 
are labor force, the stock of capital, arable land and energy consumption. GDP and consumption data 
are expressed in purchasing power parity and in U.S. dollars and refer to the year 1985. The 
information on GDP, CO2 emissions, labor force, arable land and energy consumption was collected in 
                                                 
17 This is the largest database we could construct. 
18 This classification is based on the UN International Comparison Program (ICP). High income group refers to countries with 
income per capita exceeding 10’000 1985 U.S.$; upper-middle income group refers to countries with income comprised in the 
range [3’000, 10’000) 1985 U.S.$; the income range for the lower-middle income group is [1’500, 3’000) 1985 U.S.$, and that for 
the low-income group is [<1’500) 1985 U.S.$. 
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the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The consumption data come from the Penn World 
Table (PWT 5.6). 
To measure the CO2 emissions, the WDI consider the pollution stemming from the burning of fossil 
fuels and cement manufacturing. These comprise the CO2 emissions due to the utilization of solid, 
liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring. The input variable energy consumption refers to consumption of 
primary energy, natural gas, solid fuels and primary electricity.19 The energy obtained from all these 
sources is converted into oil equivalents. The arable land (in hectares) includes the land under 
temporary crops, temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen 
gardens, and land temporarily fallow.20 Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded. 
Data on physical capital stock come from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) and are based on the 
perpetual inventory method. This capital stock variable is considered to be the best currently available 
(Papageorgiou, 2003). As the capital stock data are initially expressed in constant 1987 U.S. dollars, 
we computed the physical capital stock by multiplying the GDP (in 1985 U.S.$) by the ratio of physical 
capital stock (in 1987 U.S.$) to the GDP (in 1987 U.S.$). Descriptive statistics for all output and input 
variables, as well as some additional ratios discussed further in the text are presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.2 displays the correlation coefficients among inputs and outputs. 
 
Tab. 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Units Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
GDP Mio. U.S.$ 210511 521378 3781 4022089 
Consumption Mio. U.S.$ 132504 339261 1733 2657178 
CO2 Thousands of tons 176342 565077 941 4451789 
Capital stock Mio. U.S.$ 593559 1442513 10437 10871285 
Labor force Thousands of workers 24322 74409 129 500’723 
Energy consumption Thousand of tons (equiv. oil) 75262 225378 1075 1781709 
Arable land Thousands of hectares 13089 31661 3 187765 
GDP per capita U.S.$ 5924 5063 325 17508 
CO2 per capita Tons 4.34 5.08 0.85 23.69 
Pollution intensity Tons/thousand of U.S.$ 0.66 0.52 0.09 3.23 
 
Tab. 4.2  Coefficients of correlation among inputs and outputs  
Variables CO2 GDP Con-sumption 
Capital 
stock Labor force 
Energy 
con-
sumption 
GDP 0.94      
Consumption 0.98 0.99     
Capital stock 0.92 0.99 0.98    
Labor force 0.51 0.40 0.46 0.32   
Energy consumption 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.93 0.50  
Arable land 0.79 0.73 0.78 0.69 0.73 0.81 
 
                                                 
19 Production of primary electricity refers to gross production of electrical energy of nuclear, hydro, geothermal, wind, tide, wave 
and solar origin. 
20 The double-cropped areas are counted once; see the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) definition of 
arable land. 
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4  Results 
According to the theoretical models, the relationship between the marginal pollution abatement cost 
and income is relevant for explaining the existence of the EKC. If pollution abatement costs rise when 
income grows, this may delay the decline of emissions. On the contrary, diminishing marginal macro-
economic costs of pollution contribute to the decrease of emissions even if this is not a sufficient 
condition to ensure that emissions decrease with income as the demand (or WTP) for emission 
reduction is ignored. The first part of this section examines the cross-country variations in the shadow-
prices of CO2 emissions. The second part reports the "win-win" situations existing for some countries 
where the CO2 emissions might be reduced without sacrificing any quantity of desirable output. 
 
4.1 Marginal macro-economic costs of pollution abatement 
The marginal costs of abatement are computed according to the procedure outlined in Section 2. As 
presented above, the costs of abatement (or shadow-prices) are calculated based on the trade-off (or 
marginal rate of transformation) between desirable and undesirable outputs implied by the estimated 
technology. The abatement cost specific to a country equals the ratio of its shadow-prices (q/p).  
Our results show that the shadow-prices of CO2 diminish as income per capita grows: the high-income 
countries have lower shadow-prices than the less developed ones21. Hence, the developed economies 
would have to undergo a smaller loss of consumption or GDP if the last unit of CO2 pollution had not 
been emitted. This result might be interpreted as the existence of a declining marginal macro-
economic cost of CO2 emissions with income growth. Identically, this means that the marginal 
productivity of CO2 emissions, defined as the quantity of good output that the last unit of emission “has 
allow to produce”. 
Figures 4.VI and 4.VII depict the negative relationship obtained between the shadow-price estimates 
and income per capita for the year 1985. The results in figure 4.VI employ GDP for measuring 
desirable output whereas consumption is used in figure 4.VII. Table 3.3 reports some descriptive 
statistics on the shadow-prices by income group. More details regarding these results are given in 
appendix 2. Logarithmic regressions (see appendix 3) have been estimated and in both cases, they 
assessed the negative relationship between per capita income and the shadow-prices.  
 
Tab. 4.3  Shadow-price estimates by income group (mio U.S. /Kt of CO2) 
Desirable output: GDP Average shadow-price 
Highest  
shadow-price 
Lowest  
Shadow-price 
Low-income countries 5.22 (4.33) 10.83 0.10 
Lower-middle income countries 3.83 (2.38) 8. 03 0.29 
Higher-middle income countries 3.27 (1.96) 7.27 0.01 
High-income countries 1.16 (0.77) 2.55 0.13 
Desirable output: Consumption    
Low-income countries 4.74 (3.63) 11.65 0.22 
Lower-middle income countries 2.51 (2.04) 6.68 0.17 
Higher-middle income countries 1.09 (0.78 ) 3.52 0.01 
High-income countries 0.60 (0.46) 1.29 0.07 
  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
                                                 
21 As our good output is measured in monetary units ($), the relative and absolute shadow-prices are equal. 
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Fig. 4.VI  Shadow-price estimates vs. GDP per capita (desirable output: GDP)  
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Fig. 4.VII  Shadow-price estimates vs. GDP per capita  
(desirable output: consumption) 
 
The GDP per capita and the CO2 emissions per capita being highly correlated22, the shadow-prices 
are negatively related to both the level of GDP per capita and the level of CO2 emissions per capita. 
The negative relationship between the shadow-prices and the CO2 emissions per capita is consistent 
with the hypothesis of growing marginal costs of abatement (Baumol and Oates, 1988). In other 
                                                 
22  The coefficient of correlation between these two variables is 0.78 
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words, when pollution per capita is high, the cost of abating the last ton of CO2 emitted is lower. This 
result remains when pollution intensity is used in the place of pollution per capita23 (see appendix 3). 
In interpreting the shadow-prices as a measure of the macro-economic marginal abatement cost, two 
aspects are worth noting. On the one hand, relatively more polluted economies face lower marginal 
rates of transformation between desirable outputs and CO2 emissions when we control for the inputs 
mix. This is in line with the standard marginal abatement cost curves presented in most economic 
textbooks. On the other hand, the marginal macro-economic abatement costs are higher in rich 
economies.  
 
4.2 Robustness of the results 
The deterministic DEA-like procedures of estimation of the shadow-prices might be sensitive to 
outliers (Wilson, 1995). If some atypical units define the production frontier, the estimation procedure 
might give unstable results across analyzed countries. Therefore, an outlier analysis was performed 
by regressing outputs on inputs and examining the leverage plots (leverage vs residual plots) and 
Cook distances, which measure the influence of each observation on all fitted values. Five outliers – 
China, United States, India, Japan and Germany – are identified. In standard regression, these 
observations would have a considerable influence on the estimates. Examining the production frontier, 
all of them belong to the 24 units located on the efficient frontier and dominate no other unit. Thus, 
these five outliers may have a considerable impact on the results. 
In order to check the robustness of our results, estimations were once more run on a restricted sample 
excluding these outliers. The negative relationship between shadow-prices and GDP per capita was 
conserved and even became stronger (see figure 4.VIII). 
We also feared that our results might be sensitive to the choice of the data set. We thus constructed 
an alternative data set where the GDP and capital data24 come from the Penn World Table (mark 5.6). 
The latter data are considered as particularly adequate for cross-country and temporal comparisons. 
The availability of capital data in PWT 5.6 reduces the sample size to 57 countries. The prior negative 
relationship holds. However, as this alternative sample counts only 15 low- and lower-middle income 
countries, the negative relationship is weaker (figure 4.IX). 
We also estimated the shadow-prices for an alternative directional vector g = (gy, -gb) where gy and gb 
are set as the sample mean GDP and CO2 emissions. This changes the values of shadow-prices, 
which are on average lower, but not their relative ranking across income levels. Finally, we computed 
the shadow-prices for alternative years (1980, 1990). In either case, the negative relationship between 
shadow-prices and GDP per capita or CO2 emissions per capita remain unchanged. These 
supplementary results are presented in appendix 4. 
                                                 
23 The goodness of fit, measured by the adjusted R2, is however lower when pollution intensity is used.  
24 Capital data are computed by multiplying the capital per worker by the labor force. These capital data do not take into account 
the residential capital stock (housing). 
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Fig. 4.VIII Shadow-price estimates vs. GDP per capita (desirable output: GDP)  
China, United States, India, Japan and Germany are excluded from the sample, year 1985 
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Fig. 4.IX Shadow-price estimates vs. GDP per capita (desirable output: GDP)  
with alternative capital and GDP data, year 1985 
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4.2 Zero-cost abatement opportunities 
Our second set of results examines the efficiency scores. It allows to determine where the zero-cost 
opportunities of reducing CO2 emissions are located. As explained in section 2.1, an efficiency score 
larger than zero indicates the presence of inefficiencies in the production process. Therefore, for 
inefficient countries there exist possibilities to pollute less without sacrificing desirable output. The 
efficiency scores β result from solving the mathematical programming problem given by the set of 
equations (3).  We compute the amount of CO2  (∆bi) that could have been avoided without reducing 
the desirable output by country i according to the following formula (Chung et al., 1997): 
 β∆ = − −( )i i i i bb b b g   
where bi is the observed quantity of CO2 emissions in country i, βi is the efficiency score of country i 
and gb is the component of the directional vector for the bad output (equal to the average value of CO2 
emissions in the sample). Note that (bi – ßigb) = bi* equals the estimated minimum attainable level of 
CO2 emissions for country i. 
13% of global carbon dioxide emissions could be avoided at no cost in terms of forgone GDP when 
the full sample is used, and this increases to 30% when the five outliers are excluded from the sample. 
The difference is explained by the fact that the five outliers, even if they are located on the efficient 
frontier, are responsible for a very large part of the CO2 emissions in the sample (≈60%).25 If 
consumption is used as a proxy for the desirable output, the zero-cost reductions amount to 28% of 
the CO2 emissions. Detailed results can be found in appendix 5. 
The location of the zero-cost reductions does not follow a particular pattern across income levels, as 
depicted in figure 4.X. The zero-cost reductions possibilities are however positively correlated with 
pollution intensities. This result is expected; it supports the hypothesis that the marginal abatement 
costs are low when pollution load is high (figure 4.XI). 
These prior results and interpretations on the existence of zero-cost emission reductions need 
however to be considered with caution. Indeed, the costs of transition from the current "dirty" 
production process to a "cleaner" and more efficient one are ignored. Transition costs may even be 
high in the short run. Our results give no information about the potential path of moving towards the 
efficient frontier. This uncertainty may reveal itself to be even greater if the efficient production frontier 
is not static through time, e.g., due to technological progress. In order to get further insight into the 
question of efficiency changes through time, the computation of indexes such as the Malquist index is 
necessary (Zaim and Taskin, 2000). 
 
                                                 
25 The percentage of efficient countries in the sample varies very little due to the exclusion of five outliers. Indeed, it equals 
36.8% for the whole sample, and 35.2% for the restricted sample without outliers. 
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Fig. 4.X  Zero-cost emission reductions (% of total national emissions)  
vs. income level 
 
 
R2 = 0.5148
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Pollution intensity (Kt of CO2/mio. U.S. $)
Ze
ro
 c
os
t C
O
2 
re
du
ct
io
n 
(%
 to
ta
l e
m
is
si
on
)
 
Fig. 4.XI  Zero-cost emission reductions (% of total national emissions) 
 vs. pollution intensities 
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5 Interpretation of the results 
The results of this study allow us to evaluate the macro-economic burden that the reduction of the CO2 
emissions might generate. This measure is interpreted as the marginal macro-economic cost of 
abatement. Our first set of findings indicates that the marginal cost of CO2 abatement diminishes with 
the country’s per capita CO2 emissions and per capita GDP (since these two variables are strongly 
correlated) when all units are hypothesized as perfectly efficient (i.e., the only way to lower CO2 
emissions is to decrease the production). According to per capita CO2 emissions, this is in line with the 
standard theoretical expectations about marginal abatement cost curves (Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
The curve is upward sloping with abatement effort (downward sloping with the amount of emissions), 
reflecting the increasing difficulty of substituting, for example, fossil fuels for other inputs in production 
(Parry et al., 1998). 
 According to per capita GDP, the decreasing marginal costs of pollution abatement may contribute, 
ceteris paribus, to diminishing levels of pollution observed in the high-income countries and may 
explain the emergence of the EKC or, at least, the flattening of emissions. This finding supports the 
idea that with continuing economic development and with countries entering the post-industrial phase, 
both available human resources and improved technological knowledge reduce the economic burden 
linked to abating pollution.  
However, as several empirical studies, as well as the meta-analysis conducted in chapter 2, raise 
doubt on the existence of an EKC for CO2 emissions, but identify rather a monotonically increasing 
relationship, our results suggest that, as far as the CO2 emissions are concerned, the demand for 
environmental quality may remain low leading to insufficient willingness to pay for abatement 
expenditure. In other words, decreasing macro-economic abatement costs leads to no measures due 
to the insufficient willingness to pay to abate.  
Note also that the decreasing marginal abatement cost relative to income per capita does not imply 
causality. Other variables may also have an influence; technological change and rising levels of 
human capital might both be at the source of income growth and decreasing marginal abatement 
costs.  
The results presented in this paper as well as the previous interpretation are however challenged by 
the belief, even if highly uncertain, emanating from bottom-up and top-down models that CO2 marginal 
abatement costs are lower in less developed economies. This antagonism can be explained by the 
fact that our estimates do not report the same type of costs as IPCC (2001). As explained in section 
1.3, bottom-up models compute the costs linked to the technological option necessary for reducing 
emissions by one unit. Top-down approaches determine the abatement costs by calculating the 
carbon tax (or another shock) that will reduce emissions by one unit. Both emission reductions are set 
relatively to a baseline scenario (according to which emissions would follow a business-as-usual path). 
Our estimate measures the abatement cost in terms of consumption or GDP forgone that abating one 
ton of CO2 will induce. This measure is not directly linked to the level of the carbon tax such a 
reduction requires. Indeed, this is also true in general equilibrium models reported by the IPCC (2001) 
where no strict correlation exists between the necessary carbon tax to reach a certain emission target 
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and the GDP loss faced by a country. As shown in Coppel (1993), a global carbon tax, imposed 
identically in each country, would result in a disproportionate burden on developing countries. 
Another source of difference between our estimates and IPCC (2001) lie in the estimation procedure. 
Usual abatement costing studies refer to the reduction of future emissions according to a business-as-
usual scenario while our measure rests on current emissions. Top-down models rest on multiple 
hypotheses and uncertainties according to the economic and demographic growth rates, the 
availability and cost of future backstop technologies and the existence of transition costs. Our 
estimation procedure needs no such assumption since it is based on the observed behavior of 
countries. 
Our second set of results examines where the inefficiencies are located, i.e. which countries are not 
located on the frontier of the output convergence set.  This allows us to determine the amount of CO2 
emissions that could be abated in each country without reducing the desirable output (zero-cost 
emission reductions). Our results show that the latter are not strongly linked to the level of GDP per 
capita or CO2 emissions per capita, but to the country’s pollution intensity. Inefficiencies are located in 
countries with higher pollution intensities. This result corresponds to the theoretical expectations and 
to the results of the bottom-up engineering models. These prior results and interpretation on the 
existence of zero-cost emission reductions need however to be considered with caution. Indeed, the 
costs of transition from the current "dirty" production process to a "cleaner" and more efficient one are 
ignored. Transition costs may be high in the short run. In other words, our results give no information 
about the potential path of moving towards the efficient frontier. 
 
6 Limits and possible extension 
One could argue that our estimate mirrors the information pollutant intensity ratios already offer and, 
applying Occam's Razor principle, appears as unnecessarily complicated. Several studies focus on 
pollution intensities when examining the environment-economy interface (Roberts and Grimes, 1997; 
Roberts et al., 2003). Such studies show that CO2 intensity has improved in highly developed 
economies while it has remained stable or deteriorated in low and middle income countries. This study 
offers alternative evidence, since it takes into consideration the amount of resources used by the 
countries (inputs) and thus offers a more complete and precise image of the efficiency of national 
production relative to the emissions of CO2. In our sample, there is no significant positive relationship 
between pollution intensity and GDP per capita26 (figure 3.6). However, the estimated shadow-prices 
are negatively related to GDP per capita. An interesting development in this direction would consist in 
analyzing the evolution of the shadow-prices across several years.  
                                                 
26 The estimated equation is: pollution intensity = 1.73E-5 (1.83) * GDP per capita + 0.557 (6,83). T-statistics are in parentheses. 
OLS procedure with robust standard errors has been used. R2 equals 0.07. Quadratic and logarithmic forms have been tested 
and did not result in a higher R2. 
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Fig. 4.XII Pollution intensity vs. GDP per capita 
 
A second potential development for the estimation of the shadow-prices would be to account in one 
unique measure for both the marginal macro-economic abatement costs and technical inefficiencies 
(as captured by the efficiency scores ß). In this paper, the inefficient countries are all projected on the 
efficient frontier and the shadow-prices are calculated for this projection. The potential zero-cost 
emission reductions due to the presence of inefficiencies are analyzed separately. We could 
overcome this limitation by determining shadow-prices of CO2 emissions where the inefficiencies 
involved in the process are taken into account. Lee et al. (2002) propose such a framework. Note 
however that according to our estimates, there is no systematic difference between the degree of 
technical efficiency attained by the developed and the developing countries. Hence, taking into 
account the zero-cost CO2 reduction opportunities would not change our conclusions regarding the 
relationship between the shadow-prices of CO2 and the countries’ per capita income.  
Our results must be considered with caution given the following issues. First, linear programming 
defines the frontier in terms of the best practices observed in the sample. Hence, our results are 
relative to the most efficient countries observed and do not rely on a defined optimal technology. For 
the year 1985, for example, 29 units define the frontier when all four inputs (labor force, capital stock, 
energy consumption and arable land) are used. Our estimates have however the advantage of being 
directly comparable across countries.  
Second, our estimates are based on cross-country comparisons. Therefore, even if we observe that 
marginal macro-economic costs of abatement are lower in developed economies, the latter 
relationship may not hold for one country with varying GDP levels observed over several years. We 
may again overcome this drawback by analyzing the evolution of the relationship over several years.  
Third, the quality of environmental data for poor countries is uncertain (see chapter 1, section 3.2). 
Shafik (1994) and Lieb (2002) warn that the usage of environmental pollution data might be 
problematic for the cross-country comparisons, because these data may be flawed by the differences 
in the definitions and inaccuracy. This concern has been largely ignored in the empirical literature. 
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However, as mentioned by Roberts and Grimes (1997), CO2 data are the best for any measured 
pollutant when both their coverage and their adequacy are considered. Similarly, data availability also 
constraint the inputs mix. Taking into consideration additional inputs could better apprehend the 
specificities of each country. In this regard, including a measure of the human capital stock could be 
interesting.  
Finally, the DEA technique relies on the hypothesis that one unique production frontier pertains to all 
countries, or, in other words, that countries belong to the same technological regime. This might be 
erroneous as countries may use different technologies and correspond to different production frontiers 
(Tyteca, 1995). We postulated the existence of one unique technological regime pertaining for all 
countries under investigation, because each combustion process generates CO2 emissions and the 
inputs take into account the fundamental specificities of each country. Further work on this issue is 
clearly needed since national conditions such as climate (average temperature), dispersion of 
economic activities, openness to trade, legislations and state interventions are also part of the story. 
Indeed, a valuable direction for further research would consist in examining the influence of 
exogenous variables on the efficiency scores and macro-economic abatement costs. Such work may 
more particularly allow to connect differences in preferences across countries (capture by the 
existence of various policies) to the macro-economic burden of abating pollution. 
 
Conclusion 
The implications of our result are twofold. First, income is negatively associated with the macro-
economic marginal cost of pollution abatement when all countries are supposed to be perfectly 
efficient, given their input mix. In other words, reducing carbon dioxide emissions is cheaper (in terms 
of forgone output) in high-income rather than in low-income countries. It seems therefore that the 
explanations for ever increasing CO2 emissions lay rather on the demand or willingness to pay for CO2 
reduction. 
Next, the low-income countries are not found to be systematically less efficient than the high-income 
countries when inputs used for the production processes are taken into account. Therefore, one 
should be cautious when asserting that numerous low-cost abatement opportunities are available in 
the developing countries. The amount of CO2 emissions that could be abated at zero-cost (expressed 
as a percentage of total national emissions) is higher in countries whose pollution intensities are high. 
Further work on the shadow-prices of pollutants is clearly needed. The empirical analysis should be 
extended to the panel data and to other types of pollutants. Furthermore, the computation of shadow-
prices taking into account the degree of a country's inefficiency offers the possibility to combine the 
two sets of results.  Finally, more work is needed in order to explore the link between the 
characteristics of countries and the macro-economic burden associated with abatement. 
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Appendix 1: Countries included in the sample 
The countries analyzed in this paper belong to four income groups. These groups have been defined 
by the United Nations International Comparison Programme (ICP). The GDP is measured in real 
terms, in 1985 U.S.$ per capita. The groups are the following: 
Low-income countries (GDP < $1,500): Bangladesh, China, Congo Dem. Rep., Ivory Coast, Ghana, 
Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Zambia. 
Lower middle-income countries ($3,000 > GDP > $1,500): Bolivia, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Philippines, Thailand, Zimbabwe. 
Upper-middle income countries ($10,000 > GDP > $3,000): Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Greece, Iran Islamic Rep., Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Korea Rep., Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
High-income countries (GDP > $10,000): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Appendixes 
 
-192- 
Chapter 4. Appendixes 
 
-193- 
Appendix 2: Shadow price estimates and efficiency scores 
Table A.1. Shadow price estimates and efficiency scores (desirable output: GDP, 1985) 
Country  Income group Efficiency score 
# 
Dominated 
units 
Shadow price 
bad 
Shadow price 
good 
Ratio of shadow 
prices 
Algeria 2 0.3084 0 0.005670794 -0.001218381 4.654368653 
Argentina 3 0.3205 0 0.005670794 -0.001218381 4.654368653 
Australia 4 0.8845 0 0.005670794 -0.006537906 0.867371702 
Austria 4 0.1336 0 0.005670794 -0.003297279 1.719840583 
Bangladesh 1 0 7 0.005670794 -0.00107857 5.257698928 
Belgium 4 0 1 0.005670794 -0.033106594 0.17128897 
Bolivia 2 0.0172 0 0.005670794 -0.000683295 8.299192659 
Brazil 3 0 2 0.005670794 -0.001901792 2.981816429 
Cameroon 1 0 0 0.005670794 -0.018942043 0.299376071 
Canada 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.04184105 0.135531837 
Chile 3 0.0839 0 0.005670794 -0.001218381 4.654368653 
China 2 0 0 0.005670794 -0.058005046 0.097763811 
Colombia 2 0 38 0.005670794 -0.001187833 4.774068025 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 0 24 0.005670794 -0.000523185 10.8389844 
Costa Rica 3 0 5 0.005670794 -0.00119555 4.743251658 
Cote d'Ivoire 1 0.0339 0 0.005670794 -0.000812085 6.983001929 
Cyprus 4 0 1 0.005670794 -0.003445769 1.645726736 
Denmark 4 0.2132 0 0.005670794 -0.026951363 0.210408442 
Dominican Republic 2 0.0257 0 0.005670794 -0.001262456 4.491873694 
Ecuador 2 0.0907 0 0.005670794 -0.001205865 4.702677346 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 0 2 0.005670794 -0.014230138 0.398505919 
El Salvador 2 0.0001 0 0.005670794 -0.004433567 1.279059234 
Finland 4 0.1846 0 0.005670794 -0.003297279 1.719840583 
France 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.010453063 0.542500736 
Germany 4 0.712 0 0.005670794 -0.004810305 1.178884566 
Ghana 1 0.0109 0 0.005670794 -0.000560068 10.12519482 
Greece 4 0.2271 0 0.005670794 -0.003297279 1.719840583 
Guatemala 2 0.0049 0 0.005670794 -0.001205865 4.702677346 
Haiti 1 0 22 0.005670794 -0.000627206 9.041358972 
Honduras 2 0.0034 0 0.005670794 -0.001087656 5.213774401 
Iceland 4 0 14 0.005670794 -0.002448142 2.316366875 
India 1 0 0 0.005670794 -0.017305322 0.327690779 
Indonesia 1 0 1 0.005670794 -0.020786581 0.272810342 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2 0.6558 0 0.005670794 -0.001234291 4.594374784 
Ireland 4 0.1091 0 0.005670794 -0.001608094 3.526406708 
Israel 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.548628815 0.010336304 
Italy 4 0 2 0.005670794 -0.004810305 1.178884566 
Jamaica 2 0.0204 0 0.005670794 -0.001621619 3.496996368 
Japan 4 0 4 0.005670794 -0.018926703 0.299618715 
Jordan 2 0.0324 0 0.005670794 -0.028712147 0.197505058 
Kenya 1 0.0139 0 0.005670794 -0.000538499 10.5307418 
Korea, Rep. 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.027352735 0.207320923 
Kuwait 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.012089887 0.469052701 
Luxembourg 4 0.0388 0 0.005670794 -0.003297279 1.719840583 
Malaysia 3 0.1499 0 0.005670794 -0.001187833 4.774068025 
Mexico 3 0.8823 0 0.005670794 -0.004385639 1.293037093 
Morocco 2 0.0557 0 0.005670794 -0.001391847 4.074294678 
Mozambique 1 0.004 0 0.005670794 -0.000577546 9.818780757 
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Netherlands 4 0.3491 0 0.005670794 -0.003722927 1.52320873 
New Zealand 4 0.0613 0 0.005670794 -0.003297279 1.719840583 
Nicaragua 1 0 2 0.005670794 -0.005161997 1.098566002 
Nigeria 1 0.3714 0 0.005670794 -0.00107857 5.257698928 
Norway 4 0.0032 0 0.005670794 -0.003297279 1.719840583 
Pakistan 1 0.0384 0 0.005670794 -0.025291829 0.22421448 
Panama 3 0.001 0 0.005670794 -0.011654201 0.486587988 
Paraguay 2 0 17 0.005670794 -0.000779968 7.270543589 
Peru 2 0.0435 0 0.005670794 -0.001205865 4.702677346 
Philippines 2 0.0292 0 0.005670794 -0.001187833 4.774068025 
Portugal 4 0.0964 0 0.005670794 -0.001205865 4.702677346 
Senegal 1 0 0 0.005670794 -0.011851882 0.478472063 
South Africa 2 1.3321 0 0.005670794 -0.001234291 4.594374784 
Spain 4 0.5183 0 0.005670794 -0.004385639 1.293037093 
Sri Lanka 2 0.0005 0 0.005670794 -0.001187833 4.774068025 
Sudan 1 0 0 0.005670794 -0.011791521 0.480921373 
Sweden 4 0.175 0 0.005670794 -0.003297279 1.719840583 
Switzerland 4 0 10 0.005670794 -0.002221851 2.552284061 
Thailand 2 0.1747 0 0.005670794 -0.001234291 4.594374784 
Trinidad and Tobago 3 0.1059 0 0.005670794 -0.001745692 3.248450309 
Tunisia 2 0.0474 0 0.005670794 -0.001218381 4.654368653 
Turkey 2 0.4616 0 0.005670794 -0.001234291 4.594374784 
United Kingdom 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.032769654 0.173050172 
United States 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.008264649 0.686150632 
Uruguay 3 0.0038 0 0.005670794 -0.001790366 3.167394592 
Venezuela, RB 3 0.486 0 0.005670794 -0.001205865 4.702677346 
Zambia 1 0.0125 0 0.005670794 -0.000624066 9.086850109 
Zimbabwe 1 0.0484 0 0.005670794 -0.000812085 6.983001929 
 
Table A.2. Shadow price estimates and efficiency scores (desirable output: consumption, 1985) 
Country  Income group 
Efficiency 
score 
# 
Dominated 
units 
Shadow price 
bad 
Shadow price 
good Ratio of shadow prices 
Algeria 2 0.3208 0 0.005670794 -0.004667061 1.21506757 
Argentina 3 0.1562 0 0.005670794 -0.007402808 0.76603292 
Australia 4 0.4816 0 0.005670794 -0.024236943 0.23397316 
Austria 4 0.1195 0 0.005670794 -0.004667061 1.21506757 
Bangladesh 1 0 5 0.005670794 -0.00117307 4.83414816 
Belgium 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.030622228 0.18518555 
Bolivia 2 0.0119 0 0.005670794 -0.002111725 2.68538479 
Brazil 3 0 16 0.005670794 -0.002904588 1.95235764 
Cameroon 1 0.0279 0 0.005670794 -0.000871386 6.50778818 
Canada 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.04652908 0.12187635 
Chile 3 0.0791 0 0.005670794 -0.004109731 1.37984576 
China 2 0 1 0.005670794 -0.025924474 0.21874289 
Colombia 2 0.0885 0 0.005670794 -0.005234748 1.08329852 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 0 14 0.005670794 -0.000486646 11.6528027 
Costa Rica 3 0 3 0.005670794 -0.002391003 2.37172201 
Cote d'Ivoire 1 0.0331 0 0.005670794 -0.000871386 6.50778818 
Cyprus 4 0 1 0.005670794 -0.006305945 0.89927742 
Denmark 4 0.2311 0 0.005670794 -0.004681562 1.21130378 
Dominican Republic 2 0.0279 0 0.005670794 -0.001376881 4.11858058 
Ecuador 2 0.0802 0 0.005670794 -0.004667061 1.21506757 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 0 0 0.005670794 -0.019685904 0.2880637 
El Salvador 2 0.001 0 0.005670794 -0.001668794 3.39813912 
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Finland 4 0.1661 0 0.005670794 -0.004681562 1.21130378 
France 4 0 5 0.005670794 -0.010100604 0.5614312 
Germany 4 0.4768 0 0.005670794 -0.014322331 0.39594073 
Ghana 1 0.0132 0 0.005670794 -0.000650184 8.72182414 
Greece 4 0.197 0 0.005670794 -0.004667061 1.21506757 
Guatemala 2 0 15 0.005670794 -0.002369436 2.39330948 
Haiti 1 0 11 0.005670794 -0.001327634 4.27135333 
Honduras 2 0.0008 0 0.005670794 -0.004510231 1.25731804 
Iceland 4 0 11 0.005670794 -0.005341148 1.06171818 
India 1 0.0355 0 0.005670794 -0.022607032 0.25084206 
Indonesia 1 0 0 0.005670794 -0.016662466 0.34033343 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2 0 0 0.005670794 -0.055020046 0.10306779 
Ireland 4 0.0837 0 0.005670794 -0.011438709 0.49575475 
Israel 4 0.0926 0 0.005670794 -0.004505293 1.25869613 
Italy 4 0 3 0.005670794 -0.006535535 0.86768631 
Jamaica 2 0.0169 0 0.005670794 -0.004270587 1.32787224 
Japan 4 0 1 0.005670794 -0.014271814 0.39734224 
Jordan 2 0 1 0.005670794 -0.013483299 0.42057914 
Kenya 1 0.0161 0 0.005670794 -0.000545946 10.3870901 
Korea, Rep. 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.76160798 0.00744582 
Kuwait 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.014600878 0.38838722 
Luxembourg 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.046200588 0.1227429 
Malaysia 3 0.1285 0 0.005670794 -0.004591894 1.23495768 
Mexico 3 0 6 0.005670794 -0.020228266 0.28034011 
Morocco 2 0 0 0.005670794 -0.032893842 0.17239684 
Mozambique 1 0.001 0 0.005670794 -0.000759791 7.46361991 
Netherlands 4 0 0 0.005670794 -0.082454796 0.06877458 
New Zealand 4 0.0054 0 0.005670794 -0.018198642 0.31160535 
Nicaragua 1 0.0034 0 0.005670794 -0.002610901 2.17196844 
Nigeria 1 0.3547 0 0.005670794 -0.00117307 4.83414816 
Norway 4 0.0122 0 0.005670794 -0.004626553 1.22570618 
Pakistan 1 0 0 0.005670794 -0.020072292 0.28251852 
Panama 3 0 0 0.005670794 -0.004178134 1.35725537 
Paraguay 2 0 6 0.005670794 -0.001608196 3.52618259 
Peru 2 0.0451 0 0.005670794 -0.004109731 1.37984576 
Philippines 2 0.0684 0 0.005670794 -0.005234748 1.08329852 
Portugal 4 0.0966 0 0.005670794 -0.004591894 1.23495768 
Senegal 1 0 3 0.005670794 -0.002421762 2.34159812 
South Africa 2 1.4645 0 0.005670794 -0.003941628 1.43869339 
Spain 4 0.2307 0 0.005670794 -0.010520751 0.53901042 
Sri Lanka 2 0 14 0.005670794 -0.000960457 5.90426655 
Sudan 1 0.0065 0 0.005670794 -0.002262325 2.50662285 
Sweden 4 0.0923 0 0.005670794 -0.011438709 0.49575475 
Switzerland 4 0 20 0.005670794 -0.004389738 1.29182979 
Thailand 2 0.1619 0 0.005670794 -0.002967163 1.91118364 
Trinidad and Tobago 3 0 0 0.005670794 -0.027725308 0.20453494 
Tunisia 2 0.0416 0 0.005670794 -0.004681562 1.21130378 
Turkey 2 0.4498 0 0.005670794 -0.002967163 1.91118364 
United Kingdom 4 0 1 0.005670794 -0.022298193 0.25431632 
United States 4 0 2 0.005670794 -0.022556136 0.25140806 
Uruguay 3 0 4 0.005670794 -0.003904463 1.45238762 
Venezuela, RB 3 0.1621 0 0.005670794 -0.022778367 0.24895527 
Zambia 1 0.0124 0 0.005670794 -0.001053224 5.38422602 
Zimbabwe 1 0.0527 0 0.005670794 -0.000849031 6.67914041 
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Appendix 3: Regressions of shadow prices estimates 
Regression for the shadow prices estimated by using GDP per capita as a measure of desirable 
output: 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Log (GDP per capita) -1.43 (-4.34) 
  0.09 
(0.15) 
Log (CO2 emissions per 
capita)  
-1.18 
(-5.34) 
 -1.23 
(-2.92) 
Log (Pollution intensity)= 
Log(CO2/GDP) 
  -1.78 (-4.01) 
 
Constant 15.02 (5.13) 
4.06 
(10.67) 
2.09 
(5.57) 
3.37 
(0.72) 
Number of observations 76 76 76 76 
F-statistic 18.83 28.48 16.10 14.12 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.34 0.19 0.34 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
Regression for the shadow prices estimated by using consumption per capita as a measure of 
desirable output: 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Log (GDP per capita) -1.44 (-5.43) 
  0.11 
(0.25) 
Log (CO2 emissions per 
capita)  
-1.19 
(-6.29) 
 -1.26 
(-3.45) 
Log (Pollution intensity)= 
Log(CO2/GDP) 
  -1.81 (-4.22) 
 
Constant 13.86 (5.83) 
2.81 
(8.90) 
0.80 
(2.87) 
1.93 
(0.54) 
Number of observations 76 76 76 76 
F-statistic 29.47 39.62 17.79 19.81 
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.47 0.27 0.48 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Appendix 4: Supplementary results 
R2 = 0.2922
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Fig. A.1 Shadow prices estimates vs. GDP per capita (desirable output: GDP) ,  
year 1990 
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Fig. A.2 Shadow prices estimates vs. CO2 emissions per capita (desirable output: GDP) , 
 year 1990 
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R2 = 0.178
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Fig. A.3 Shadow prices estimates vs. GDP per capita (desirable output: GDP) , 
 year 1980 
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Fig. A.4 Shadow prices estimates vs. CO2 emissions per capita (desirable output: GDP) , 
 year 1980 
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R2 = 0.2245
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Fig. A.4 Shadow prices estimates vs. GDP per capita (desirable output: GDP) , 
using an alternative directional vector  set at the sample mean of GDP and CO2 emissions 
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Appendix 5: Zero-Cost Abatement Opportunities 
Countries with existing zero-cost CO2 abatement opportunities: 
Country Kt of CO2 % of total 
emissions 
Country Kt of CO2 % of total 
emissions 
Algeria 54384 77% Morocco 9822 55% 
Argentina 56518 58% Mozambique 705 61% 
Australia 155975 70% Netherlands 61561 45% 
Austria 23559 44% New Zealand 10810 50% 
Bolivia 3033 74% Nigeria 65493 94% 
Chile 14795 68% Norway 564 3% 
Cote d'Ivoire 5978 81% Pakistan 6772 14% 
Denmark 37596 60% Panama 176 7% 
Dominican Republic 4532 63% Peru 7671 40% 
Ecuador 15994 83% Philippines 5149 18% 
El Salvador 18 1% Portugal 16999 56% 
Finland 32553 68% South Africa 234905 85% 
Germany 125556 18% Spain 91398 48% 
Ghana 1922 60% Sri Lanka 88 2% 
Greece 40047 66% Sweden 30860 51% 
Guatemala 864 25% Thailand 30807 63% 
Honduras 600 31% Trinidad and Tobago 18675 90% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 115645 78% Tunisia 8359 70% 
Ireland 19239 75% Turkey 81400 72% 
Jamaica 3597 71% Uruguay 670 21% 
Jordan 5713 68% Venezuela, RB 85702 87% 
Kenya 2451 65% Zambia 2204 80% 
Luxembourg 6842 79% Zimbabwe 8535 83% 
Malaysia 26434 73%   
Mexico 155587 57% TOTAL 1688758 13% 
 
Countries with no zero-cost CO2 abatement opportunities (i.e, countries located on the best 
practice frontier): Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo  Dem. 
Rep., Costa Rica, Cyprus, Egypt Arab Rep., France, Haiti, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Nicaragua, Switzerland, Sudan, Senegal, United Kingdom, United States, 
Paraguay. 
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This dissertation focused on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis which considers that 
during the early stages of income growth, degradation and pollution increase, but beyond some level 
of income per capita, the trend reverses so that at high income levels, economic growth leads to lower 
environmental degradation. Three distinct empirical studies have been conducted. However, their aim 
was not to estimate the relationships between some indicators of environmental quality and GDP per 
capita as the great majority of studies examining the EKC have previously done. Our objectives were 
rather to derive precise and detailed trends emanating from the EKC empirical literature and to explore 
some of the underlying forces between income levels and environmental quality that theoretical 
models judged of prime importance for the emergence of the EKC. 
These two objectives have been derived from two stylized facts recorded in the EKC literature. First, 
the EKC empirical literature is vast and presents widely divergent results according to the shape of the 
pollution-income relationship (PIR) and the value of the income-turning point (ITP) estimated. This 
outcome motivates the careful comparison of the available empirical evidence on the EKC through a 
meta-analysis in chapter 2. Second, the actual empirical literature on the EKC remains “black boxes” 
as it uses reduced-form specifications where the GDP per capita variable captures all effects of rising 
levels of prosperity growth on environmental quality. We thus intend to go further into the debate by 
exploring both the demand-related and supply-related explanations of the EKC with alternative 
estimation strategies. In chapter 3, we analyzed how the response of individuals to variation in 
environmental quality varies according to their level of income. Chapter 4 took a first step at estimating 
the evolution of the macro-economic abatement costs across developing and developed countries. 
This conclusion will exposed the principal limits and potential extensions of this dissertation and 
summarized its principal results. 
 
Limits and potential extensions 
This dissertation could be improved and completed in numerous ways. First, the theoretical 
underpinning could be enlarged as numerous and more detailed references could be made in the first 
chapter. We however decided to remain rather general since the arguments presented seemed 
sufficient to justify the empirical work realized in chapters 3 and 4. Second, the econometrics used 
could also be completed in several ways. In this regard, it is important to stress some caveats 
concerning the reliability and generality of results presented in this work. The limits of our research 
may also serve as guidelines for possible extensions of our work. 
Even if the meta-analysis of the EKC studies in chapter 2 seems to offer an interesting alternative to 
the literature reviews, it is important to stress that realizing a meta-analysis requires that the 
researcher arbitrates the tension between objective and subjective considerations. Our work includes 
subjective elements, as it did not cover the whole empirical literature on the EKC and ignores the 
evidence issued from time series analyses of individual countries. In collecting the primary studies, this 
restriction appeared anecdotic as only a few studies examined single national time-series. However, it 
seems now that their number has grown and it might be informative to include the primary studies 
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based on single time series and explain the divergence among their results by examining the various 
characteristics of the country examined. This might more particularly allow to control how 
environmental quality improvements depend on policies and institutions. In the meta-analysis, we also 
refrained from considering the quality of the primary study since it required adopting highly subjective 
considerations. However, not weighting studies according to their quality is also subjective since 
quality differences are obviously present in the EKC empirical literature. Further work could thus be 
done in establishing primary study quality criterions and include them in our meta-analytical approach. 
Finally, the meta-analytical procedure we followed did not consistently examine the presence of a 
publication bias among our dataset. Estimating a heckman estimation model that would allow for a 
detailed analysis of the publication selection process could however overcome this drawback quite 
easily1.  
In chapters 2 and 3, the main caveat lies in the fact that we offer cross-individual and cross-country 
evidence that does not allow to derive absolutely confident conclusions on the evolution of the 
preferences of one individual through various income levels and the evolution of the abatement cost of 
one single country with economic growth. As far as we know, a database capturing the evolution of the 
environmental demand of one specific individual throughout various income levels remains inexistent. 
Another direction would consist in analyzing additional initiative and referenda and examine the results 
emanating from all votes through a meta-analysis.  
In chapter 4, several years could be examined and the best practice frontier could be estimated for 
each year. Such development would allow to monitor the relative efficiency in good and bad output 
production and the evolution of the shadow-prices of each country through time. Another approach 
could consist in estimating the frontier for one country observed during several years. However, such 
a procedure has not yet been tested and may raise difficulties for interpreting the results. 
The estimation of the shadow-prices in chapter 4 could also be improved by specifying more inputs. 
The differences between countries would thus be grasped more precisely. However, the risk is to 
reduce the number of developing countries considered due to the lack of statistical information on 
them. One final idea for further development would consist in correcting the shadow-prices for 
inefficiency according to the method of Lee et al. (2002) as it would allow more direct comparisons 
between countries.  However, at this stage, nothing allows us to conclude to the existence of a cause-
to-effect relationship between income per capita and the macro-economic abatement costs. The 
empirical analysis already shows that the level of emissions per capita is also a candidate. Further 
work is clearly needed in relation to this latter question by examining alternative explanatory variables. 
It will certainly motivate our next research objective. 
 
Main results and conclusion 
In chapter 2, we use the meta-analytical toolbox in order to explore the causes of the variations in the 
shape of the estimated pollution-income relationship as well as in the value of the income-turning point 
                                                 
1 The disadvantage is that not all retrieved studies could be included in the meta-analysis. 
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of the EKC. Three estimation strategies are used and compared. Firstly, a multinomial logit model 
addresses the impact of the characteristics of the primary studies on the pollution-income relationship 
estimated in the EKC literature. Secondly, a tobit model intends to examine the reasons for 
divergences among the estimated income turning points. Third, a nested logit model is used in order 
to determine the factors explaining the difference between the pollution-income relationship and the 
income turning point in one unique empirical procedure.  Even if the main results confirm the more 
intuitive conclusions emanating from the literature reviews, they also give more precise indications on 
their relative strength and influence on the EKC estimations. It shows that the results of the primary 
empirical studies on the EKC vary considerably across pollutant types, the sample of countries 
considered as well as the econometric specifications used. It thus proves that the EKC is not a 
systematic relationship and sheds light on the factors that may contribute or not to the emergence of 
the EKC. In each model, environmental variables play a dominant role and explain much of the 
variation between the shapes of the pollution-income path and the values of the ITPs. Above all, the 
distinction between local and global air pollution seems crucial. Global pollutants tend ceteris paribus 
to follow a monotonically increasing relationship and higher ITPs when a well-behaved EKC is found. 
The sampling variables (data used, sample considered) cast doubt on the reliability of primary studies 
on the EKC since both the type of income data used and the composition of the sample influence the 
results. When examining the methodological variables (variables considered, type of econometric 
models), the empirical literature on the EKC appears again unstable across studies. Note finally that 
the variable capturing published studies is significant in all models and shows that published studies 
are more likely to conclude to the absence of the EKC and to the existence of a monotonically 
increasing pollution-income path.  
Chapter 3 aims to examine the demand-related explanation of the EKC and thus focuses on the 
determinant of the demand of environmental quality by using data on the voting decision of Swiss 
citizens on environmental issues. It principal aim is to examined if people, as they become richer and 
attains higher level of welfare, value environmental quality more relative to other consumption goods. 
We use a bivariate probit model accounting for selection bias since we could only observe the voting 
choice of the citizens that actually participated in the referenda. Our results show that the income level 
of individuals has only a moderate influence on their propensity to cast a “Yes” vote. Other 
characteristics of individuals such as their age and their level of education appear to be stronger and 
more systematic determinants of their environmental preferences. We also determined a selection 
effect adverse to environmental initiatives, as people who are more likely to participate are also more 
likely to refuse environmental initiatives. Overall, at the microeconomic level, income does not appear 
to be a strong determinant of the demand for environmental quality. This evidence is thus not 
favorable for the demand related explanation of the EKC. However, our results also show that the 
results vary considerably across voting sessions and initiatives so that our estimates seem heavily 
dependent on the circumstances that shape the political debate and the decision making process of 
the respondent. 
Finally, chapter 4 examines finally the evolution of macro-economic marginal abatement costs of CO2 
emissions across income levels, defined as the quantity of good output (either GDP or consumption) 
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that a country has to forgo in order to abate the last ton of CO2 emitted. The estimation procedure is 
based on production process modeling by means of directional output distance function. Two results 
are noticeable. First, when each country is considered as perfectly efficient (relative to estimated best 
practice production frontier), the marginal costs of CO2 abatement are a decreasing function of per 
capita income levels. In other words, richer economies face lower marginal costs. Second, the most 
inefficient units have on average greater pollutant intensities. Overall, it appears thus that rich and/or 
heavily polluted economies face lower abatement costs and are thus more prone to devote resources 
for abatement. This latter result is in line with the supply-related explanations of the EKC hypothesis.  
Overall, our dissertation offers the following general conclusion. First, the EKC hypothesis is invalid as 
far as one wants to consider the inverted-U shape as the systematic PIR between environmental 
quality and prosperity. This is not to say that the EKC may never exist. However, the PIR seems to 
depend not solely on income levels but rather on numerous characteristics that may or may not be 
linked to levels of development. First, the type of pollution seems crucial. Theoretical models should 
thus consider pollution as a heterogeneous bad and extend the traditional flow versus stock distinction 
to global and local pollution. Second, as far as we trust our estimates, the demand-related 
explanations of the EKC remain weak as richer voters do not appear to be the greener voters. The 
result tends indeed to show that other variables, such as educational level or political affinities, 
influence environmental preferences more strongly. This result confirms the suspicion underlined by 
the meta-analysis of an omitted variable bias in the reduced-form regression of the EKC. Finally, the 
evidence on the macro-economic abatement costs seems to confirm the technical explanations of the 
EKC. However, as stated before, the causal link between income levels and abatement costs has not 
yet been proven and other potential explanatory variables should be tested.  
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MAIN ACRONYMS 
 
BOD Biological Oxygen Demand 
CO Carbon Monoxide 
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
COD Chemical Oxygen Demand 
DEA Data Envelopment Analysis 
DO Dissolved Oxygen 
EKC Environmental Kuznets Curve 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IPAT Environmental Impact = Population * affluence * Technology 
IPCC International Panel on Climate Change 
ILO  International Labor Organization 
ITP  Income Turning Point 
ML Multinomial Logit model 
NL Nested Logit model 
NO Nitrogen Dioxide 
NO2 Nitrogen Monoxyde 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Association 
OECD Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development  
PIR Pollution-Income Relationship 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity  
SECO State Secretariat for Economic Affair 
SPM Suspended Particles Matter 
SO2 Sulfur Dioxide 
UN United Nation Organization 
US United States of America 
WB World Bank 
WLS  Weighted Least Square model 
WT Weighted Tobit model 
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